---
type: client
name: glaztech
display_name: Glaz-Tech Industries
last_compiled: 2026-07-08
compiled_by: Mikes-MacBook-Air/claude-main
sources:
  - clients/glaztech/session-logs/2026-04-20-session.md
  - clients/glaztech/session-logs/2026-04-21-session.md
  - clients/glaztech/session-logs/2026-05-28-session.md
  - clients/glaztech/session-logs/2026-06-02-session.md
  - clients/glaztech/session-logs/2026-06-03-session.md
  - clients/glaztech/session-logs/2026-06-04-session.md
  - clients/glaztech/reports/2026-04-17-phishing-incident-report.md
  - clients/glaztech/reports/2026-06-03-pci-cardholder-data-finding.md
  - clients/glaztech/reports/2026-06-03-website-security-assessment.md
  - clients/glaztech/PROJECT_STATE.md
  - clients/glaztech/README.md
backlinks: []
---

# Glaz-Tech Industries

## Profile

- **Contract type:** Managed (long-term — ~15 years per session logs)
- **Key contacts:** Steve Eastman — seastman@glaztech.com — internal IT, ~200 users, 9 locations. Desktop-level tech; guides technical direction, ACG implements. Tom (last name not recorded) — internal dev, author of the GTIware/GlazGTI PSA (the internal software that stores card-on-file data).
- **Billing rate:** [unverified — not recorded in session logs]
- **Syncro customer ID:** 143932
- **Active tickets:** #32186 (M365 Security Review / MFA, In Progress as of 2026-04-21), #32376 (Apex 404 + redirect, Resolved, 2026-06-03), #32377 (CyberSource TLS payment outage, Resolved, 2026-06-03), #32378 (Security assessment / PCI remediation, **Waiting on Customer** as of 2026-06-03 — assessment + reports delivered, Tom replied, client to remediate)
- **Prepaid block remaining:** ~22.25 hrs (drew 26.5 → 22.25 on 2026-06-03)
- **GuruRMM client ID:** d857708c-5713-4ee5-a314-679f86d2f9f9
- **GuruRMM sites:** 11 sites created 2026-07-08 (TUC, SAN, PHX, DEN, BOI, SLC, BRL, INV, SHV, ABQ, REMOTE)
  - Enrollment codes vaulted in `~/vault/clients/glaztech/gururmm-site-*.sops.yaml`
  - 81+ agents enrolled as of 2026-07-08 (199 Windows machines total across 11 sites)

## Infrastructure

### Servers & Services

Multi-site Windows environment (~200 users, 9 locations). Active Directory confirmed (OUs referenced in deployment scripts). IP range: 192.168.0.0/24 through 192.168.9.0/24 (10 site subnets, one per site).

| Server | Role | OS / Build | Local IP | Public IP | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WWW | IIS web server — customer/e-commerce site | Windows Server 2019 Standard, build 10.0.17763.8755 (patched ~May 2026) | 192.168.8.72 | 65.113.52.88 | IIS 10.0, .NET 4.8; site `glaztech_new` at `D:\web\glaztech_4`; full VB.NET source on disk (not precompiled); LE cert CN=www.glaztech.com, SAN apex+www, exp 2026-08-19 via Certify The Web (HTTP-01); GuruRMM agent 455a1bc7-1c29-42bc-b597-fa1e64f08eec (v0.6.54); **doubles as dev workstation** (VS 2015+2022 installed — see Security Posture); active IIS site W3SVC4 (log dir `C:\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\W3SVC4`; older sites W3SVC1/2/3 stale, last writes 2018–2022). IIS app-pool identity: `IIS APPPOOL\glaztech_new` (PID 13752 = `w3wp`). GTIware card-engine DLLs (`gt_auto_process_2020.dll`, `glaztech_utilities_2020.dll`) are co-resident in `D:\web\glaztech_4\Bin\` and load in-process into this worker — see C0-Extended. New internet-facing endpoints `/webhooks` (Samsara receiver, `samsara_webhook_receiver.dll`) and `/webhooks1` (`webhooks_test` — unreviewed). Second host referencing the same code tree surfaced: `\\192.168.0.147\web\glaztech_4` — not yet reconned. |
| GTI-INV-SQL | SQL Server — website backend + GTIware PSA (shared instance) | [Server OS not confirmed; co-located with GTI/Glaztech infra] | 192.168.8.62,3436 | — | **Hostname: GTI-INV-SQL.** Login `tom` = named SQL login (SQL auth, created 2018), **member of `sysadmin` server role** (also securityadmin, dbcreator, db_owner); password embedded in site `Web.config` (NOT vaulted). **47 databases total** (46 custom + system DBs): all offices' `glaz_prod*` + `*_archive` databases, PDF stores, `qqest` (TimeForce payroll), `gti_samsara`, `mas_gti` (Sage 100), system DBs (`master`, `msdb`). **All 47 databases `is_encrypted=False` (no TDE).** Other sysadmin logins on instance: `GTI-INV-SQL\Administrator`, `NT SERVICE\*`, **`sa` (enabled)**, `tom`. **SQL Agent service runs as `Administrator@glaztech.com`** (domain-admin class). **7 linked servers** (remote-login + data-access) across `192.168.0.x` and `192.168.8.x`: `192.168.0.54,55181` (unknown), `192.168.0.55,55181` (`mas_gti` / Sage accounting), `192.168.8.52,3436` (backup host), `192.168.8.212,3436` (backup host), `192.168.8.62,3430` (`GTI-INV-SQL\GTISQL` self-link), `GLAZ\TIMEFORCE` (`qqest` payroll). **CHD `.bak` backups copied to `\\192.168.8.52\sql_backup\`** (unencrypted, plaintext PAN/CVV). Cleartext `glaztech\administrator` domain-admin password embedded in `msdb` SQL Agent backup-copy job steps — harvestable by any sysadmin/`tom` connection; **password value redacted from all artifacts; must be rotated.** Server-side billing engine: `d:\sql_jobs\bin\gt_console_apps.exe` (modes: `cp`, `is`, `oa`, `lo`) run by the Agent as domain-admin. |

| Service | Details | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| M365 tenant | glaztechindustries.onmicrosoft.com | ~200 users, basic licensing (no Entra P1) |
| Exchange Online | glaztech.com | MailProtector inbound filter (MX 5 primary) |
| Active Directory | glaztech.com domain | [unverified — AD inferred from OU references in scripts] |
| Payment processing | CyberSource REST (api.cybersource.com/pts/v2/payments) — PNC merchant processor for card payments; CyberSource SOAP toolkit for eCheck/ACH (cybs.log) | Card path: online-payment-pnc.aspx; eCheck path: ach.aspx. Card-on-file auto-pay engine is GTIware (`gt_auto_process_2020.dll`) — not the website. `Web.config` holds CyberSource (`cybs.*` + on-disk signing keys) and PNC (`pnc_key/pin/token`) secrets **in cleartext**. |
| GTIware PSA | Internal PSA (Tom's software): `glaztech_utilities_2020.dll` + `gt_auto_process_2020.dll` — staff-operated card-on-file system. Writes `cc_file` rows stamped with staff usernames. Shares `GTI-INV-SQL` with the public website. **Both DLLs are co-resident in the public IIS worker (`D:\web\glaztech_4\Bin\`) and carry no own connection strings — they run on the website's `tom` (sysadmin) connection.** | Cards stored by GTIware, NOT by the website (website's `.aspx`/`.vb` has zero `cc_file`/`save_cc_data` references). However, the card engine executes in-process in the internet-facing IIS worker, so a web-tier or host-level compromise lands directly inside the card-on-file write/charge engine. |

### Email & Identity

- **M365 tenant:** glaztechindustries.onmicrosoft.com
- **Tenant ID:** 82931e3c-de7a-4f74-87f7-fe714be1f160
- **Primary domain:** glaztech.com
- **Inbound mail filter:** MailProtector — `glaztech-com.inbound.emailservice.io` (MX 5, sole MX as of 2026-04-17)
- **MailProtector IPs (EFSkipIPs on inbound connector):** 162.248.93.233, 162.248.93.81, 65.113.52.82
- **DMARC:** p=reject; sp=reject (hardened 2026-04-17, was p=none)
- **DKIM:** CNAME records exist for selector1/selector2 — active status unverified [WARNING: confirm DKIM is active in M365]
- **MFA status:** [WARNING] DISABLED as of 2026-04-21. Security Defaults off. No Conditional Access (requires Entra P1, not licensed). ~160 users with password-only sign-in. MFA rollout is open work item — do not enable Security Defaults until service account audit is complete (see Active Work).
- **Licensing:** Basic M365 (no Entra P1 / Business Premium). Per-user MFA or Security Defaults are the available free options.
- **Mailbox forwarding (internal, low risk):** Payroll@glaztech.com → carmen@glaztech.com; TUCCSR@glaztech.com → bryce@glaztech.com
- **OAuth consent grants:** 38 grants — not audited as of last session
- **EXO PowerShell:** ExchangeOnlineManagement 3.9.2. `Get-MessageTrace` deprecated Sept 2025 — use `Get-MessageTraceV2` (no `-PageSize` parameter).

### Exchange Online Transport Rules

Full transport rule list as of 2026-06-02:

| Priority | Name | Condition | Action | State |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | Pensky Allow | [unknown] | [unknown] | Enabled |
| 1 | GTIMail No-Reply - Reject Inbound | SentTo: gtimail@glaztech.com | RejectMessageAction | Enabled |
| 2 | SCL Bypass - hartsglass + olemons (SHVSALES) | From: hartsglass@centurytel.net, olemons@eastexglass.com, SSales@arkglass.com, bossier@glassservices.com | SetSCL -1 | Enabled |
| 3 | SCL Bypass - aaaglassinc.com (SHVSALES) | SenderDomainIs: aaaglassinc.com | SetSCL -1 | Enabled |
| 4 | SCL Bypass - noreply@azcomputerguru.com (MailProtector digests) | From: noreply@azcomputerguru.com | SetSCL -1 | Enabled |

Rule GUIDs: Priority 2 = 482c714a-8780-4c62-ae0a-0b6da9ca9d52; Priority 3 = 7e0c01a8-ec22-43fe-b600-796c0f295aa5. GUIDs for Priority 0, 1, 4 not recorded.

Note on Priority 1: The "GTIMail No-Reply - Reject Inbound" transport rule rejects ALL inbound mail to gtimail@glaztech.com, which causes the daily MailProtector digest for that address to fail. This is a pre-existing rule — review with Steve is pending (see Active Work).

### Inbound Connector

- **Name:** "Inbound Spam Filter"
- **Type:** Partner
- **RequireTls:** True
- **EFSkipIPs:** 162.248.93.233, 162.248.93.81, 65.113.52.82 (MailProtector IPs)
- **SCLMinusOne:** null (EOP re-evaluates all mail; do NOT change to true — too broad)
- **SenderIPAddresses restriction:** None (intentional — avoids blocking calendar invites from external M365 tenants)

### Network

- **Sites:** 9 locations
- **IP ranges:** 192.168.0.x through 192.168.9.x (one subnet per site — up to 10 sites)
- **Firewall/ISP:** [unverified — not documented]
- **DNS hosted on:** IX server (172.16.3.10), PowerDNS. Zone file: `/var/named/glaztech.com.db`

## Access

- **Remediation tool:** ComputerGuru apps consented in tenant (Exchange Operator, Security Investigator, Tenant Admin, Defender Add-on)
- **Exchange Operator App ID:** b43e7342-5b4b-492f-890f-bb5a4f7f40e9
- **Exchange Operator cert thumbprint:** A615823DE1CAF15229027DEC075AFE32B900D82C (not in Windows cert store on BEAST — use `get-token.sh` bearer token flow)
- **Remediation tool:** ComputerGuru tiered suite (Exchange Operator `b43e7342` etc.). *(Old single app `fabb3421`/Claude-MSP-Access DELETED 2026-06-14 — AADSTS700016, do not use.)*
- **Exchange Admin role:** Assigned to ACG service principal in Entra
- **Global Admin account:** admin@glaztechindustries.onmicrosoft.com (ACG admin only — external GA from tomakkglass.com removed 2026-04-21)
- **Vault path:** `clients/glaztech/` [no SOPS credential file documented — remediation tool uses MSP-wide app credentials]
- **Exchange Operator vault:** `msp-tools/computerguru-exchange-operator.sops.yaml`
- **Token acquisition:** `bash .claude/skills/remediation-tool/scripts/get-token.sh <tenant-id> exchange-op` → `Connect-ExchangeOnline -AccessToken $token -Organization 'glaztechindustries.onmicrosoft.com'`
- **DNS access:** `root@172.16.3.10` (IX server)
- **Deploy (endpoints):** GuruRMM (preferred) or ScreenConnect
- **MailProtector / CloudFilter partner portal:** NO credentials in vault — manual partner-portal login required for any MailProtector changes (provisioning, spam summary enable). Consider vaulting.
- **Glaztech SQL login (`tom`):** present in `D:\web\glaztech_4\Web.config` connectionStrings — NOT in vault. Used read-only for the 2026-06-03/06-04 assessment only; do NOT use outside of authorized sessions. This login has sysadmin rights on `GTI-INV-SQL` — treat with corresponding care.
- **ACG management stack on WWW:** ScreenConnect (both `support.azcomputer.guru` and the `kgc7jt` ScreenConnect Cloud instance), Datto RMM (CentraStage), Datto EDR (Infocyte), Syncro, Splashtop, GuruRMM — all ACG's sanctioned management agents. None of these are third-party intrusions. The only remote-access finding on this host is end-of-life RealVNC 4.x (Steve's tool — see H2 below).

## Security Posture — CRITICAL (Active Issue — Ticket #32378)

**Classification: CONFIDENTIAL/Security.** Full detail in:
- `clients/glaztech/reports/2026-06-03-pci-cardholder-data-finding.md`
- `clients/glaztech/reports/2026-06-03-website-security-assessment.md` (incl. Appendix A — Intrusion/Brute-Force Log Review 2026-06-04; C0-Extended — deep host + SQL-infrastructure recon 2026-06-04)

A full read-only security assessment of the Glaztech e-commerce web application and SQL backend was performed 2026-06-03. A follow-up read-only intrusion/brute-force log review was performed 2026-06-04 (see Appendix A in the assessment report). A second follow-up read-only deep host + SQL-infrastructure recon was performed 2026-06-04 (see C0-Extended; session log "Update: 09:38 PT"). Overall risk: **CRITICAL**. Key findings (no card numbers or passwords are reproduced here):

### C0 (TOP CRITICAL) — Website connects to `GTI-INV-SQL` as `sysadmin`

**This is the single most dangerous finding.** The public website at `D:\web\glaztech_4` logs into the SQL server `GTI-INV-SQL` (192.168.8.62,3436) using SQL login **`tom`** — a **named SQL login** (SQL authentication, created 2018, NOT the built-in `sa`) that is a **member of the `sysadmin` server role** (also securityadmin, dbcreator, db_owner). The password is **embedded in the site's `Web.config`** on the internet-facing server. The web root ACL grants **`Everyone:(R)`** on `D:\web\glaztech_4`, its `bin`, and `Web.config` — so any local principal can read the `tom` SQL password and both processors' secrets.

That same SQL instance (`GTI-INV-SQL`) is **shared with GTIware** (Tom's internal PSA) and hosts **47 databases**: all offices' `glaz_prod*` + `*_archive`, PDF stores, `qqest` (TimeForce payroll), `gti_samsara`, `mas_gti` (Sage 100), and system DBs (`master`, `msdb`). **None of the 47 databases use TDE (all `is_encrypted=False`).**

Because a SQL injection executes as the connecting login, the website's `quo()` SQLi flaw executes with **full sysadmin rights across the entire instance**. Cross-database reach was confirmed live: from a single injectable page on the Tucson connection, other offices' `cc_file` tables were read (`glaz_prod_phx` = 141 rows, `glaz_prod_den` = 190, `glaz_prod_elp` = 179).

**Attack chain:** (1) guess one website customer login (no lockout, username = account number, passwords as short as 3 chars, plaintext) → (2) hit an injectable payment page → (3) inject as sysadmin → total control of `GTI-INV-SQL`. As sysadmin an attacker can: steal every stored card PAN+CVV and password; DROP/encrypt all databases; commit fraud; invoke `xp_cmdshell` (already enabled — see C5) → OS-level code execution on the SQL server → pivot across 7 linked servers → domain-admin takeover.

**One guessed website login + the SQLi = full theft, destruction, or ransom of the entire GTIware database server, and a path to domain-admin.**

**Required remediation — do this FIRST:**
1. Pull the `tom` sysadmin login from the website. Give the site a **dedicated least-privilege login** scoped only to the tables/views/procs it needs, with **no access to GTIware databases** (no `cc_file`, no other offices, no archives). Follow the sequencing callout in the assessment report — do NOT improvise this step.
2. **Separate the website's data from GTIware.** The internet-facing app must not share a SQL instance with the internal PSA's cardholder data.
3. **Stop storing cards on-prem** — call the processor's API/hosted vault directly (no card data lands on Glaztech systems), or at minimum tokenize (store a token, never the PAN). CVV must never be stored — PCI Req 3.2, no exception.
4. Fix the SQLi (parameterize all queries, remove `quo()`); add login lockout/rate-limiting.

### C0-Extended — Verified blast-radius and privilege-escalation chain (deep recon, 2026-06-04)

A follow-up read-only recon of the `WWW` host and `GTI-INV-SQL` confirmed the C0 "foothold into the rest of the network" warning is not hypothetical. The path from a web compromise to full domain takeover requires **no additional vulnerability** beyond the SQLi already documented in C3.

- **GTIware card engine co-resident in the public IIS worker:** `gt_auto_process_2020.dll` and `glaztech_utilities_2020.dll` are present in `D:\web\glaztech_4\Bin\`; their `.dll.config` files carry no connection strings of their own, so they use the website's `tom` (sysadmin) connections. A web-tier compromise lands directly inside the card-on-file write/charge engine with `sysadmin` DB rights — the "website vs. GTIware" distinction collapses for any in-process or host-level attacker.
- **`xp_cmdshell = 1` (already enabled):** `sys.configurations` shows `value_in_use = 1`. There is no "enable it first" step — a `tom` SQLi can `EXEC xp_cmdshell` for **immediate OS command execution** on `GTI-INV-SQL` (192.168.8.62).
- **SQL Agent service runs as `Administrator@glaztech.com`** (domain-admin class). Any Agent job step sysadmin `tom` can create executes as that account.
- **Cleartext `glaztech\administrator` domain-admin password in `msdb`:** Multiple backup-copy SQL Agent job steps run `EXEC xp_cmdshell 'net use \\192.168.8.52\sql_backup\... /user:glaztech\administrator <CLEARTEXT-PASSWORD> /persistent:yes'`. The password is stored in `msdb.dbo.sysjobsteps`, **readable by any sysadmin/`tom` connection** — harvestable straight from the web-app SQLi without even invoking `xp_cmdshell`. **The password value was redacted from all assessment artifacts and is not reproduced here. It must be rotated — see Emergency-containment bucket E2.**
- **7 linked servers** (remote-login + data-access) spanning two subnets: `192.168.0.54,55181`; `192.168.0.55,55181` (`mas_gti` / Sage accounting); `192.168.8.52,3436` (backup); `192.168.8.212,3436` (backup); `192.168.8.62,3430` (`GTI-INV-SQL\GTISQL`); `GLAZ\TIMEFORCE` (`qqest` payroll); and `GTI-INV-SQL\GTISQL`. From the single internet-reachable `tom` credential an attacker pivots across the entire SQL estate — including accounting and payroll — on two subnets.
- **`sa` login enabled** on `GTI-INV-SQL`.
- **No TDE on any of 47 databases** (`is_encrypted=False`). CHD `.bak` backups written to `d:\sql_backup\prod\` and **copied to `\\192.168.8.52\sql_backup\`** — unencrypted cardholder data on a reachable file share.
- **`Web.config` cleartext processor secrets:** CyberSource (`cybs.Password`, `cybs.merchantID.password`, on-disk signing keys at `cybs.keysDirectory`/`cybs.keyFilename`) and PNC (`pnc_key`, `pnc_pin`, `pnc_token`) — all in `appSettings` in cleartext, readable by any `Everyone:(R)` local principal.
- **Host firewall:** Domain profile On; **Private and Public profiles Off.** Listening services include RDP (3389), SMB (445), NetBIOS (139), VNC (5800/5900), ScreenConnect (6783), WinRM (5985/47001), MSMQ (1801/210x), Dell OMSA (1311).
- **TLS 1.0 explicitly enabled** in SChannel (`Enabled=1`, Server and Client) — not merely left at OS default.
- **Full end-to-end chain:** Public site → SQLi as sysadmin `tom` → (a) read all CHD + ~9,000 plaintext passwords; (b) `xp_cmdshell` → OS RCE on DB server; (c) read cleartext `glaztech\administrator` password from `msdb`; (d) pivot across 7 linked servers (accounting, payroll, backups) on two subnets; (e) **domain admin.** In parallel, `Everyone:(R)` on `Web.config` gives a host-level attacker the same outcome without SQLi.

### C5 — `xp_cmdshell` enabled + cleartext domain-admin in `msdb`

`xp_cmdshell = 1` (confirmed `value_in_use = 1`) on `GTI-INV-SQL`. Combined with the cleartext `glaztech\administrator` password embedded in `msdb` job steps, a `tom` SQLi yields **immediate OS command execution on the DB server AND harvestable domain-admin credentials** — no additional exploit required. This makes C0 not just a database compromise but a direct path to full network takeover.

**Immediate containment:** disable `xp_cmdshell`; rotate `glaztech\administrator`; remove all cleartext credential use from `msdb` job steps (updating all consumers in the same change window). See Emergency-containment bucket E2–E3.

### Cardholder Data — PCI-DSS Violations (Req 3.2 + 3.4)

**Storage attribution (IMPORTANT):** The website stores **NO** cards. The website's `.aspx`/`.vb` files have zero `cc_file`/`save_cc_data`/`gt_auto_process` references; the quick-pay pages even carry a disclaimer that no card info is saved. The plaintext cards are written by **GTIware** — Tom's internal PSA (`glaztech_utilities_2020.dll` + `gt_auto_process_2020.dll`, compiled libs in the site `Bin` but not called by the site's web pages). Recent `cc_file` rows are stamped with staff usernames (Victoria, Bryce, Diana) and notes like "RUN CARD WHEN REQUESTED" — a back-office card-on-file workflow. The website is the **access vector** (C0), not the storer. However, the GTIware card engine DLLs run in-process in the public IIS worker (see C0-Extended), so a web compromise reaches the card engine directly.

- **`cc_file` (~780 saved cards):** Full PAN stored in plaintext in every per-office database (`glaz_prod`, `glaz_prod_phx`, `glaz_prod_slc`, `glaz_prod_elp`, `glaz_prod_den`, `glaz_prod_alb`, `glaz_prod_boi`, `glaz_prod_brl`, `glaz_prod_shp`, `glaz_prod_corp`). Zero encrypted rows. `cc_file.cc_code` retains CVV/CID (50/54 rows in tuc; mirrors expected in all offices). **CVV retention is a PCI Req 3.2 violation — indefensible; no exception even if encrypted.**
- **`cof_payments_header` (historical payments):** Phoenix alone: 14,496 rows, 11,794 plaintext PANs. Tuc: 2,245 rows, ~367 plaintext + ~597 formatted. Years of transaction history with recoverable card numbers.
- **Why cards are stored:** Card-on-file invoice auto-pay. `i_get_cc_on_file_invoices` joins `invoice` × `cc_file`; `gt_auto_process_2020.dll` reads stored PANs and bills them via CyberSource. `get_cc_data` is `SELECT * FROM cc_file` (returns full PAN+CVV; IDOR-shaped on `@acctno`). Stale copies in `Old_bin`/`Old_code\Bin`. **Feature can be preserved by migrating to the chosen processor's token vault — store a token reference instead of the raw PAN.**
- **Containment:** Exposure is contained to the GTIware card-on-file tables (`cc_file`, `cof_payments_header`) in the 15 custom web-app databases on `GTI-INV-SQL` (192.168.8.62). The Sage 100 ERP DB (`mas_gti`) stores **no** cardholder data — its native CC module is **disabled** (`SY_Company.CreditCardEnable=N`, `AR_CustomerCreditCard`=0 rows). Sage is **not** a cardholder-data location. **Database backups also contain plaintext PANs — cleanup must address backups, not just live data.** Backups confirmed at `\\192.168.8.52\sql_backup\` (unencrypted).
- **Processor reality (verified 2026-06-03):** despite a belief that processing moved to "Payrilla/Paya," the website is **still on CyberSource/PNC** (no Payrilla anywhere in site code/config) and **still writing plaintext cards daily** (`cc_file` last write tuc 2026-06-03 14:15, phx 10:19; live `CC-WebPayment-PNC` txns today). Sage's CC module is off. Payrilla, if used, is a **separate channel not visible in either system and not connected to the website** — the website exposure is unchanged. Anomaly: `cc_file` absent in the `corp` DB though present earlier 2026-06-03 — needs a look.

### Authentication — Plaintext Passwords

- `web_security` table: ~9,000+ plaintext customer passwords (corp 6,017 + tuc 3,012 confirmed, other offices expected); 0 hash-like values; lengths 3–19 chars; no complexity enforcement.
- Auth stored proc `get_web_accesslevel`: `WHERE acct_no=@username AND web_password=@passwd` — direct plaintext comparison.
- Employee "forgot password" flow emails the user their existing plaintext password — possible only with reversible/plaintext storage.
- No account lockout, no rate-limiting; username = customer account number (guessable).

### SQL Injection — `quo()` Helper

```vb
Function quo(stext) As String
    Return "'" + stext + "'"  ' wraps in quotes, does NOT escape embedded quotes
End Function
```
Used to build concatenated dynamic SQL in payment pages (`ach.aspx.vb`, `quick-pay-ach.aspx.vb`, `quick-pay-pnc.aspx.vb`, `quick-pay.aspx.vb`, `order-detail*`). 59 concatenated SQL statements identified (~10 joining user input). The login path itself is parameterized (sproc) and not injectable; 948 parameterized calls elsewhere. **Any input containing `'` breaks out and allows injection; because the site connects as sysadmin, injection = full instance compromise and OS RCE via `xp_cmdshell` (see C0/C5).**

### Other Critical/High Findings

| Finding | Severity |
|---|---|
| C5: `xp_cmdshell` enabled (`value_in_use=1`) + cleartext `glaztech\administrator` domain-admin in `msdb` SQL Agent job steps — `tom` SQLi yields immediate OS RCE + domain-admin takeover without additional exploits | Critical |
| Reflected XSS: `gt_errorpage.aspx` — `errmsg` query param → `lblerr.Text` unencoded | High |
| `debug="true"` + `customErrors=Off` + exceptions echoed to users in URLs | High |
| Production server is also a dev workstation: VS Community 2015 + 2022, .NET 8 SDKs, MSBuild, IIS Express, full VB.NET source on disk | High |
| H2: End-of-life RealVNC 4.x (≈2009, EoL) listening on 5900/5800 — **Steve's tool**; other remote-access agents (both ScreenConnect instances including `kgc7jt` cloud, Datto RMM/EDR, Syncro, Splashtop, GuruRMM) are ACG's sanctioned management stack, not findings | High |
| Server listener accepts TLS 1.0/1.1 (SChannel `Enabled=1` explicitly set) | High |
| Single shared SQL login (`tom`) with sysadmin rights; creds in `Web.config` in cleartext; `Everyone:(R)` ACL on web root + bin + Web.config | High |
| No Secure/HttpOnly cookies; no session regeneration on login; session-fixation risk; no MFA, no lockout; H5 detection blind spot (see below) | High |
| H9: No TDE on any of 47 databases; CHD `.bak` backups copied unencrypted to `\\192.168.8.52\sql_backup\` | High |
| H10: Host firewall Private/Public profiles Off; 7 linked servers form a cross-subnet lateral mesh reachable from `tom`; RDP/SMB/VNC/WinRM/MSMQ all listening | High |

### H5 Detection Blind Spot — No Failed-Login Visibility

The employee login (`/emp/employee-login.aspx`) returns **HTTP 200 on both success and failure** — the status code is NOT a success/failure signal for staff logins (no post-redirect-get pattern). The app logs **no failed login attempts** anywhere, and app-level auth never touches the Windows Security log. The net effect: a slow credential-guessing attack against staff or customer accounts would be **effectively invisible** — there is no lockout to stop it and no log to detect it after the fact. (Confirmed during the 2026-06-04 log review — see Appendix A of the assessment report.)

**Fix:** add failed-login logging (timestamp, username, source IP) to the application; add account lockout/throttling; consider MFA for employee/admin access.

### Attack Chain Summary

Obtain a customer login (LOW difficulty — no lockout, guessable username = account number, plaintext passwords as short as 3 chars) → access payment pages → SQL inject with `quo()` → executes as **sysadmin** on `GTI-INV-SQL` → `xp_cmdshell` (already enabled, no extra step) → OS RCE on DB server → read cleartext `glaztech\administrator` domain-admin password from `msdb` → pivot across 7 linked servers → **domain admin**. **Every compensating control (lockout, password hashing, PAN encryption, parameterized queries, least-privilege DB login, `xp_cmdshell` disabled, no cleartext domain-admin in DB) is absent; first failure is last failure.**

### Intrusion / Brute-Force Log Review — 2026-06-04 (No Evidence of Attack)

A read-only review via GuruRMM was performed 2026-06-04 covering 7 days of IIS logs (`W3SVC4`, ~52,000 requests, May 29 – Jun 4) and the Windows Security event log (4625/4624, 7-day window; log retains back to 2026-03-31).

**Bottom line: NO evidence of a brute-force attack — not against the website logins, and not against the Windows server.**

- **Website logins (IIS):** Customer login (`/customer_login.aspx`) shows 2,547 HTTP 302 (success) / 78 HTTP 200 / 5 HTTP 500 across 740 distinct IPs — normal traffic. Employee login (`/emp/employee-login.aspx`) showed 77 HTTP 302 / 381 HTTP 200 / 6 HTTP 500; the apparent imbalance is an artifact — the employee login returns HTTP 200 on BOTH success and failure (no redirect-on-success). Top "suspect" IP `160.3.157.9` (24 hits) is a single legitimate employee on an iPhone checking timecards. No brute-force / credential-stuffing signature (no rapid high-volume POSTs, no username-cycling at machine speed, no bot UAs).
- **HTTP 500 bursts (open item):** Scattered bursts of HTTP 500 on post-login pages (`invoices.aspx`, `quotes.aspx`, `place_orders.aspx`, `billing-statements.aspx`, `online-payment-pnc.aspx`) from IPs `201.146.179.166`, `64.178.182.162`, `205.185.107.49`, `172.87.137.60` — 8–17 identical 500s within a single second per IP. Not classified as a brute-force campaign, but given C3 (the `quo()` SQLi path), a quote character in input on those pages produces exactly a 500 error — worth an app-side look. IIS does not log POST bodies, so attempted inputs are not recoverable.
- **Windows Security log:** Only 13 failed logons (4625) in 7 days — all LogonType 3 (SMB/network), 100% from internal LAN IPs, zero from any public IP. No RDP (type 10) failures at all. Targeted usernames: 12 blank (null/anonymous SMB) + 1 `tomabens` (internal stale credential). No successful remote logons from any external IP. Inference: RDP/SMB are not internet-exposed — no external host got in at the OS auth layer.
- **Detection gap confirmed (see H5):** The review found no attacker, but confirmed that a slow guessing attack would currently be undetectable without failed-login logging + lockout. Both are already on the #32378 remediation roadmap.

Full detail in `clients/glaztech/reports/2026-06-03-website-security-assessment.md` (Appendix A).

### Remediation Roadmap (Ticket #32378 — Waiting on Customer)

**Emergency containment (THIS WEEK — closes the trivially-exploitable internet-to-domain-admin path while it is open):**
- **E1.** Remove `Everyone:(R)` from `D:\web\glaztech_4`, its `bin`, and `Web.config` — scope to the app-pool identity + required admins only
- **E2.** Rotate `glaztech\administrator` and remove every embedded cleartext use of it from the `msdb` SQL Agent backup-copy job steps, updating all consumers in the same change window; pause those jobs until they use a dedicated low-privilege account
- **E3.** Disable `xp_cmdshell` on `GTI-INV-SQL` (`sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 0`); verify on linked instances too
- **E4.** De-privilege the SQL Agent service account off domain-admin to the minimum needed; disable the built-in `sa` login (or confirm strong, unique password + restricted use)
- **E5.** Turn the Private/Public host-firewall profiles back On; replace/disable end-of-life RealVNC 4.x (coordinate with Steve); restrict WinRM/MSMQ/Dell-OMSA to specific management IPs

**Coord todos filed for E2–E4:** `6d15fc88` (rotate `glaztech\administrator` + remove `msdb` cleartext use; disable `xp_cmdshell`/`sa`) and `aebaf751` (least-privilege `tom` migration).

**Now (days) — start immediately after Emergency containment:**
1. Pull sysadmin login from the website: give the site a dedicated least-privilege login with no access to GTIware/card data — **strictly per the "Sequencing the least-privilege DB migration" callout in the assessment report** (do NOT improvise)
2. Purge stored CVV (`cc_file.cc_code`, backup-first — needs Tom/Steve explicit sign-off); stop writing new CVV to `cc_code` going forward
3. `debug="false"` + `customErrors="On"`; HTML-encode `gt_errorpage.aspx`; stop echoing exception text to users
4. Add failed-login logging (timestamp, username, source IP) and basic throttling/lockout immediately
5. Add security response headers (CSP first — partial XSS mitigation — plus HSTS, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy)
6. Remove RealVNC 4.2.8 and stale ScreenConnect v6 (if E5 not already done)
7. Disable TLS 1.0/1.1 on IIS/SChannel listener

**Short term (weeks):**
8. Hash all passwords (PBKDF2/bcrypt/Argon2); replace email-the-password flow with reset-token flow; force global reset
9. Parameterize all concatenated SQL in payment pages; delete `quo()`
10. Add Secure+HttpOnly cookies, session regeneration on login, CSRF anti-forgery tokens on payment/ACH/quick-pay POSTs
11. Migrate card-on-file to the chosen processor's token vault (CyberSource or new provider); purge/encrypt historical `cc_number` columns; address backups; move CyberSource + PNC gateway secrets out of `Web.config`

**Structural:**
12. Separate dev from production; deploy precompiled; remove SDKs/IDE/source from prod host
13. Decouple the GTIware card engine from the public IIS process — run it off a non-CDE host with its own dedicated low-privilege DB login
14. Enable TDE on all databases; audit and minimize the 7 linked servers; restrict backup shares to specific management IPs; network segmentation for the SQL listener
15. Lock down `/webhooks` and `/webhooks1` (Samsara); recon the second host `\\192.168.0.147\web\glaztech_4`; re-scope merchant PCI SAQ after remediation

## Patterns & Known Issues

- **Phishing via direct-to-M365 MX bypass:** Two phishing campaigns in April 2026 succeeded because DNS had a secondary MX record (`glaztech-com.mail.protection.outlook.com` at priority 10) that bypassed MailProtector. Hardened: MX 10 removed, DMARC to p=reject, Enhanced Filtering for Connectors enabled. Do not re-add a secondary MX record.
- **Inbound connector IP restriction:** Do NOT restrict `SenderIPAddresses` on the "Inbound Spam Filter" connector — blocks legitimate calendar invites from external M365 tenants (learned from Dataforth incident). EFSkipIPs are set to MailProtector IPs instead.
- **Do NOT set SCLMinusOne=true on connector:** This would trust MailProtector's verdict for all inbound mail — too broad. Use targeted transport rules for specific senders instead.
- **DMARC-rejecting vendor senders:** With Enhanced Filtering enabled, EOP looks past MailProtector to the original sender's SPF/DKIM/DMARC. Vendors with `p=reject` domains (e.g., centurytel.net, eastexglass.com) get hard 550 5.7.509 NDR rejections. Fix: SCL=-1 transport rule scoped to the specific sender address or domain. Transport rules evaluate before DMARC enforcement in EOP.
- **EXO transport rule name limit:** 64-character maximum. Plan names accordingly.
- **EXO REST API:** Direct `/TransportRule` REST endpoints 404 in this tenant. Use `InvokeCommand` pattern: `POST /adminapi/beta/{tenant}/InvokeCommand` with `{"CmdletInput": {"CmdletName": "New-TransportRule", "Parameters": {...}}}`.
- **Service accounts need audit before MFA rollout:** Shoretel, mitel, Gti-FaxFinder, GTIMail, GTIQUOTE, CAS1944, clerk — all need SMTP/auth method confirmation before Security Defaults can be enabled.
- **PDF preview broken (MOTW):** Windows KB5066791/KB5066835 broke PDF preview on network shares via Mark of the Web. Fix scripts are ready in `clients/glaztech/` — deployment is pending (as of 2026-03-30).
- **clearcutglass.com DMARC history:** Corena Spottsville (clearcutglass.com) emails to seastman and zulema were rejected. Temporary transport rule (SCL=-1) was set and removed on 2026-04-21. SPF ~all weakness noted to Team Logic IT (Jordan Fox, jfox@tlit60302.com); recommend they harden to -all and confirm DKIM.
- **glassservices.com SPF broken:** `bossier@glassservices.com` publishes `v=spf1 -all` — rejected by all mail providers. SCL=-1 rule covers this as a workaround. Steve should notify vendor to fix SPF.
- **Client tone:** ACG has managed GlazTech ~15 years. Steve Eastman is a trusted internal IT partner. Comments and communication should lead with what we know, state findings and actions taken, ask only one targeted question if needed — not open-ended discovery.
- **Unlicensed accounts (pending Steve confirmation):** Chauntelle@glaztech.com, Denouser1@glaztech.com, Gti-FaxFinder@glaztech.com.
- **IIS apex binding — always add both http:80 and https:443 for the bare domain:** The glaztech_new IIS site originally had only a www host-header binding. Apex (glaztech.com) returned 404 from HTTP.sys (not a 301 redirect, a real 404) because no binding matched. Fix: add `http/IP:80:glaztech.com` + `https/IP:443:glaztech.com` bindings reusing the existing SAN cert. When adding HTTP→HTTPS redirect via URL Rewrite, always include a negate condition on `/.well-known/acme-challenge/` so Certify The Web (HTTP-01) LE renewals are not blocked.
- **Legacy .NET + modern payment gateway TLS:** .NET Framework 4.x apps on Windows Server 2019 do NOT automatically use TLS 1.2 unless the registry keys `SchUseStrongCrypto=1` + `SystemDefaultTlsVersions=1` are set under BOTH `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework\v4.0.30319` AND `HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\.NETFramework\v4.0.30319`. Payment gateways (CyberSource, etc.) that drop TLS 1.0/1.1 will silently fail with "Could not create SSL/TLS secure channel" without this fix. App pool recycle required after registry change. Verify via the payments DB (look for fresh approvals), not just a TLS probe.
- **MailProtector digest provisioning is per-mailbox on the MailProtector side:** The SCL=-1 transport rule (Priority 4) ensures digest emails from `noreply@azcomputerguru.com` are not spam-filtered by EOP — but a mailbox that was never provisioned in MailProtector will never receive a digest regardless of EOP rules. Confirmed via message trace (shannon@glaztech.com: 629 digests sent to ~60 recipients over 10 days, 0 to Shannon). Fix is on the MailProtector partner portal — no Exchange change needed.
- **Glaztech custom web app — stored card feature requires tokenization to remediate safely:** Cards in `cc_file` are there for GTIware auto-pay via `gt_auto_process_2020.dll`. Deleting the PANs without a replacement breaks the auto-billing feature. The safe path is processor token vault migration (tokenize on write, replace stored PAN with token, update `gt_auto_process` to bill by token). Quick win: purge CVV (`cc_code`) immediately — this has no functional impact and is the fastest PCI Req 3.2 remediation.
- **Glaztech SQL login (`tom`) + Web.config creds are NOT in the SOPS vault.** Do not commit these credentials. If future automation needs SQL access, vault them first. This login has sysadmin rights — treat any use with corresponding care.
- **Internet-facing website + internal PSA (GTIware) share one SQL instance; website connects as sysadmin → any website SQLi = full internal-DB compromise AND OS RCE via `xp_cmdshell`.** The public website (`WWW`, 65.113.52.88) and GTIware (the internal card-on-file PSA) both use `GTI-INV-SQL` (192.168.8.62,3436). The web login `tom` is sysadmin. `xp_cmdshell` is already enabled. A SQL injection on the website executes as sysadmin against the entire instance, can immediately run OS commands, and can harvest the cleartext domain-admin password from `msdb` — no extra steps. Cross-DB reads confirmed live. Internet-facing apps must never share a SQL instance with an internal PSA without strict permission partitioning.
- **`xp_cmdshell` is enabled on `GTI-INV-SQL`; cleartext domain-admin password is in `msdb` job steps.** These are the two facts that elevate C0 from "database compromise" to "network takeover." Disable `xp_cmdshell` and rotate `glaztech\administrator` (with all `msdb` job steps updated in the same window) before any other remediation work — see Emergency-containment E2/E3. Do not rotate the domain-admin password without first identifying and updating every job step and linked-server connection that uses it.
- **ACG management stack on WWW is fully sanctioned:** Both ScreenConnect instances (including `kgc7jt` ScreenConnect Cloud), Datto RMM/EDR, Syncro, Splashtop, and GuruRMM are ACG's own tools. An earlier draft of the assessment mis-flagged the `kgc7jt` instance as "foreign/unrecognized third-party access" — that finding was **fully retracted**. The only genuine remote-access finding is end-of-life RealVNC 4.x (Steve's personal tool, ≈2009 build, EoL). Do not treat ACG's management agents as security findings.
- **Employee login HTTP 200 on both success and failure — status code is not a success/failure signal; no failed-login logging exists:** `/emp/employee-login.aspx` returns HTTP 200 regardless of outcome (no redirect-on-success pattern). The application logs no failed login attempts anywhere, and app-level auth does not generate Windows Security log events. A slow credential-guessing campaign against staff or customer accounts would be completely invisible: no lockout triggers, no log to audit after the fact. Confirmed during the 2026-06-04 log review — the 381 "200 responses" on the employee portal that initially appeared anomalous proved to be normal authenticated sessions. Fix: add failed-login logging + account lockout. Do not treat HTTP status code as an auth-outcome signal on this endpoint.
- **GTIware card engine DLLs are co-resident in the public IIS worker.** `gt_auto_process_2020.dll` and `glaztech_utilities_2020.dll` live in `D:\web\glaztech_4\Bin\` and load in-process into `w3wp` (PID 13752, app pool `glaztech_new`). Their `.dll.config` carry no connection strings — they use the website's `tom` (sysadmin) connections. The "website vs. GTIware" distinction collapses for any in-process or host-level attacker. A web compromise reaches the card-on-file write/charge engine directly. A second execution path (`d:\sql_jobs\bin\gt_console_apps.exe`) runs server-side via the Agent (domain-admin account). Both paths must be decoupled from the internet-facing host in the structural remediation.

## Active Work

### PDF Preview Fix (DEPLOYMENT-READY — pending execution)

Scripts in `clients/glaztech/`:
- `Fix-PDFPreview-Glaztech-UPDATED.ps1` — updated remediation (recommended)
- `Fix-PDFPreview-Glaztech.ps1` — original
- `Deploy-PDFFix-BulkRemote.ps1` — bulk remote deployment
- `GPO-Configuration-Guide.md` — GPO method
- `QUICK-REFERENCE.md` — summary of all three methods

Deploy via Option A (ScreenConnect, individual), Option B (bulk remote via PS remoting), or Option C (GPO). Waiting on file server hostnames/IPs from Steve before bulk deploy.

### MFA Rollout (Ticket #32186 — In Progress)

Waiting on Steve's reply to:
1. Service account auth methods (which use SMTP basic auth or password-only flows?)
2. Disposition of unlicensed accounts (Chauntelle, Denouser1, Gti-FaxFinder)
3. Licensing preference: Security Defaults (free, no exclusions) vs. per-user MFA (free, can exclude service accounts) vs. Conditional Access (requires Entra P1/Business Premium, ~$22/user/mo)

**Do not enable Security Defaults until service accounts are confirmed safe.**

MFA rollout plan: Phase 1 — user communication (install Authenticator); Phase 2 — enable enforcement; Phase 3 — follow-up stragglers; Phase 4 (future/P1) — Conditional Access with trusted IPs for office locations.

### Website Security Remediation (Ticket #32378 — Waiting on Customer)

Security assessment complete 2026-06-03. Intrusion/brute-force log review complete 2026-06-04 (no attacker found; detection gap confirmed). Deep host + SQL-infrastructure recon complete 2026-06-04 (C0-Extended; C5/H9/H10 findings; Emergency-containment bucket). Assessment and reports delivered to client (Steve/Tom). Tom replied 2026-06-03 confirming that the website stores no cards (correct); investigation of his reply surfaced C0 (sysadmin login). Reply posted on #32378 explaining the sysadmin+SQLi chain and the four required remediations. Ticket set to **Waiting on Customer** — Tom/Steve to remediate. ACG can execute quick wins on client go-ahead.

**Open coord todos:**
- `6d15fc88` — rotate `glaztech\administrator` + remove cleartext from `msdb` job steps; disable `xp_cmdshell`; disable `sa` (Emergency-containment E2–E4)
- `aebaf751` — least-privilege `tom` migration (replace website's sysadmin login with a scoped low-privilege login)

Key actions queued but not yet executed (require client sign-off, ordered by urgency):
- **Emergency-containment E1–E5 first** (see roadmap above — these close the domain-admin exposure this week)
- Pull `tom` sysadmin login from the website → replace with least-privilege login (HIGHEST PRIORITY after E-bucket, per sequencing callout in assessment report)
- Purge CVV from `cc_file.cc_code` (backup-first; needs explicit go-ahead from Tom); stop writing new CVV
- `debug="false"` + `customErrors="On"` — can apply quickly with low risk
- Remove RealVNC 4.2.8 and stale ScreenConnect v6
- Disable TLS 1.0/1.1 on IIS/SChannel listener
- Add failed-login logging + account lockout (reinforced by 2026-06-04 log review finding)
- App-side investigation of HTTP 500 bursts on post-login pages (possible SQLi error path) — IPs `201.146.179.166`, `64.178.182.162`, `205.185.107.49`, `172.87.137.60`; not yet handed to Tom
- Lock down `/webhooks` and `/webhooks1` (Samsara); recon `\\192.168.0.147\web\glaztech_4`

### gtimail@glaztech.com Daily Digest Failure (Pending — review with Steve)

The "GTIMail No-Reply - Reject Inbound" transport rule (Priority 1) rejects all inbound mail to `gtimail@glaztech.com`, causing the daily MailProtector digest for that address to fail every day. This is a pre-existing rule and was not modified. Confirm with Steve Eastman whether `gtimail@glaztech.com` should receive MailProtector digests — if so, the rule needs an exception or the recipient needs to be removed from the MailProtector digest list.

### shannon@glaztech.com — MailProtector Digest Not Received (Pending — MailProtector portal)

Message trace confirmed shannon@glaztech.com receives no MailProtector digests at all (0 of 629 digests over 10 days). This is a MailProtector-side provisioning issue — she is not provisioned/enabled in the MailProtector spam summary settings. No Exchange change needed. Fix: log into the MailProtector partner portal and enable the Spam Summary for shannon@glaztech.com. No vault credentials exist for MailProtector — manual portal access only.

### Pending follow-ups

- Audit 38 OAuth consent grants (not done as of 2026-04-21)
- Confirm DKIM signing active in M365 for glaztech.com
- Monitor DMARC aggregate reports (rua=noreply@glaztech.com — should be a monitored mailbox or reporting service)
- Security awareness training for staff (multiple employees forwarded and replied to obvious phishing in April 2026)
- Review whether any user clicked phishing links (check sign-in logs for suspicious auth attempts post-April 17)
- Notify Steve: glassservices.com vendor needs to fix their SPF record (`v=spf1 -all`)
- Harts Glass original rejected emails need to be resent by sender — our SCL bypass is live but NDR'd messages do not auto-retry
- Consider creating retroactive Syncro ticket for 2026-05-28 SHVSALES email delivery work
- Monitor continued card payment success on WWW after 2026-06-03 TLS fix (verify `web_payment_header` for ongoing approvals)
- Tom code fallback (`ServicePointManager.SecurityProtocol = Tls12` in app code) staged but not deployed — can apply if registry fix ever regresses
- Investigate `corp` DB `cc_file` "Invalid object name" anomaly (existed 2026-06-03 morning with 3 rows, then returned "Invalid object name" later same day — per-office DBs unaffected)
- Confirm with Tom/Payrilla which flows actually route through Payrilla, and whether a migration to tokenized card storage via the new provider is planned for the website
- Optional: enumerate listening/forwarded ports on `WWW` to confirm RDP is not internet-exposed (log review strongly implies it is not; a port enumeration would make it definitive)
- Verify IDOR on `get_cc_data(@acctno)` — confirm `@acctno` is bound server-side to the session (not client-supplied); if not, this is a second full-PAN read path independent of the SQLi
- Recon second host `\\192.168.0.147\web\glaztech_4` — same code/secrets/DLLs? public-facing? bring into scope
- Audit and minimize the 7 linked servers (remove any not required; restrict remote-login + data-access)
- Confirm backup share ACLs at `\\192.168.8.52\sql_backup\` and retention/disposal policy for CHD-laden backups

## History Highlights

- **[~15 years prior]** Long-standing managed client.
- **2026-01-27** — PDF preview break caused by Windows MOTW update (KB5066791/KB5066835). Fix scripts created. Deployment pending.
- **2026-04-17** — Two phishing campaigns bypassed MailProtector via direct-to-M365 MX bypass. 32 messages purged across 8 users. Hardened: MX 10 removed, DMARC p=reject, Enhanced Filtering Connectors enabled. Remediation tool onboarded (admin consent, Exchange Admin role). Forensic evidence preserved in `clients/glaztech/reports/`.
- **2026-04-20** — Exchange transport rule created to allow clearcutglass.com mail (DMARC bypass, SCL=-1) while Team Logic IT fixed their DNS. Ticket #32176 created.
- **2026-04-21** — clearcutglass.com DNS fixed by Team Logic IT (Jordan Fox). Transport rule removed. External Global Admin (glaztechadmin from tomakkglass.com / Team Logic IT) removed from tenant. M365 security review surfaced: no MFA, 38 OAuth grants, unlicensed accounts, service account audit needed. Ticket #32186 opened for MFA implementation. Feedback: use expert-partner tone with Steve, not open-ended discovery questions.
- **2026-05-28** — SHVSALES@glaztech.com vendor email delivery failure. Root cause: vendors (centurytel.net, eastexglass.com) publish DMARC p=reject; Enhanced Filtering re-evaluates past MailProtector relay, producing 550 5.7.509 NDR. Fix: two SCL=-1 transport rules created (Priority 2: specific addresses for hartsglass, olemons, SSales, bossier; Priority 3: aaaglassinc.com domain). glassservices.com SPF broken (`-all`) — workaround only, vendor must fix.
- **2026-06-02** — MailProtector quarantine digest messages from `noreply@azcomputerguru.com` confirmed hitting `FilteredAsSpam` for some recipients (e.g., tshaw@glaztech.com). Transport rule created: "SCL Bypass - noreply@azcomputerguru.com (MailProtector digests)" at Priority 4 (From=noreply@azcomputerguru.com, SetSCL=-1). Message trace via `Get-MessageTraceV2` also revealed `gtimail@glaztech.com` failing daily due to pre-existing Priority-1 reject rule — flagged for Steve review.
- **2026-06-03 (earlier)** — Three tickets on web server `WWW` (192.168.8.72 / 65.113.52.88), all via GuruRMM. (1) **Apex 404 emergency:** glaztech.com returned 404 (IIS site `glaztech_new` had www-only binding); added apex http:80+https:443 bindings (cert SAN already covered apex), then added HTTP→HTTPS 301 URL Rewrite redirect with `/.well-known/acme-challenge/` exclusion (Certify/LE HTTP-01 renewal safe). `web.config.bak-20260603-090701` created. Ticket #32376 — Resolved, 1h remote. (2) **CyberSource payment outage ("Could not create SSL/TLS secure channel"):** CyberSource (PNC merchant processor) disabled TLS 1.0/1.1; .NET 4.x on Server 2019 defaulted to old TLS. Fix: `SchUseStrongCrypto=1` + `SystemDefaultTlsVersions=1` in both `.NETFramework\v4.0.30319` hives + app pool `glaztech_new` recycle. Verified via payments DB (credit-card approval at 09:36 post-fix). Ticket #32377 — Resolved, 1.5h emergency remote. (3) **Security assessment:** read-only deep inspection of IIS config, VB.NET source, and SQL backend revealed CRITICAL posture. Sage 100 (`mas_gti`) confirmed NOT a cardholder-data location — CC module disabled (0 stored cards). Two reports created. Ticket #32378 opened. Billed 1h remote. Prepaid block: 26.5 → 22.25 hrs. Also: shannon@glaztech.com digest-not-received confirmed as MailProtector provisioning issue (not Exchange) — requires MailProtector partner-portal fix. Payrilla/CyberSource reconciliation: live system confirmed website is still on CyberSource/PNC with daily ongoing card writes.
- **2026-06-03 (late — ~19:32 PT)** — **Tom (GTIware dev) replied to #32378** clarifying that the website's online payment system stores no card data — he is correct. Investigation of Tom's reply surfaced the **top critical finding (C0):** the website connects to the shared SQL server `GTI-INV-SQL` (192.168.8.62,3436) as SQL login `tom`, a **named SQL login that is a member of the `sysadmin` role** (created 2018; password in `Web.config`). The instance hosts 46 databases shared between GTIware and the website. Because SQLi executes as the connecting login, the website's `quo()` injection = sysadmin over the entire `GTI-INV-SQL` instance; cross-database card-table reads confirmed live. **Attribution corrected in both reports:** the website is the access path (C0); GTIware (staff-operated) writes the cards. Sage CC module confirmed disabled (0 stored cards, not a CHD location). Both reports updated. Plain-English reply posted to Tom on #32378 (public+emailed, comment 417070212) explaining the sysadmin+SQLi chain and the four required fixes. Ticket set to **Waiting on Customer**.
- **2026-06-04 (morning)** — **Read-only intrusion/brute-force log review** on `WWW` (GuruRMM agent 455a1bc7, v0.6.54). Reviewed 7 days of IIS W3SVC4 logs (~52,000 requests, May 29 – Jun 4) and Windows Security event log (4625/4624 events, 7-day window, log retained back to 2026-03-31). **Finding: NO evidence of a brute-force or intrusion attempt** against the website logins or the Windows server. Customer login traffic is normal (2,547 successes/740 IPs). Employee login: initial "381 failures" corrected — the employee login returns HTTP 200 on BOTH success and failure (status code is not an auth-outcome signal); all flagged IPs proved to be legitimate employees. Windows Security log: 13 failed logons in 7 days, all SMB type 3 from internal LAN IPs, zero external, no RDP failures. **Key confirmation:** the H5 detection blind spot is real — 200-on-both + no failed-login logging + no lockout = a slow guessing attack would currently be completely invisible. HTTP 500 bursts on post-login pages flagged as an open app-side item. Findings folded into security report as Appendix A. Ticket #32378 remains Waiting on Customer.
- **2026-06-04 (09:38 PT) — Deep host + SQL-infrastructure recon (Grok gap-analysis loop).** Collaborative gap-analysis (Claude + Grok CLI, 4 turns, session `019e9351-ed1c-7bc3-b171-b4cf4b53745d`) plus 3 read-only GuruRMM pulls on `WWW` (recon1/recon2/recon3). New confirmed findings folded into assessment report as **C0-Extended**, findings **C5/H9/H10**, and **Emergency-containment roadmap bucket (E1–E5)**. Key discoveries: GTIware card engine co-resident in public IIS worker on `tom` sysadmin connection; `xp_cmdshell=1` already enabled on `GTI-INV-SQL`; SQL Agent runs as domain-admin `Administrator@glaztech.com`; cleartext `glaztech\administrator` domain-admin password embedded in `msdb` job steps (redacted; must rotate); 7 linked servers spanning two subnets; `sa` enabled; all 47 DBs unencrypted; `Everyone:(R)` ACL on web root; firewall Private/Public Off; TLS 1.0 explicitly Enabled=1; new Samsara webhook endpoints. **Retraction:** earlier draft mis-flagged `kgc7jt` ScreenConnect Cloud as "foreign/unrecognized third-party access" (draft finding C6) — **fully retracted**; both ScreenConnect instances and all other management agents (Datto RMM/EDR, Syncro, Splashtop, GuruRMM) are ACG's sanctioned stack. RealVNC 4.x remains H2 (EoL, Steve's tool). Two coord todos filed: `6d15fc88` (domain-admin rotation + xp_cmdshell/sa) and `aebaf751` (least-priv `tom` migration).
- **2026-07-08 — GuruRMM fleet deployment.** Mass deployment of GuruRMM agents to all 199 Glaztech Windows machines across 11 sites via ScreenConnect. Created 9 new RMM sites (SAN, PHX, DEN, BOI, SLC, BRL, SHV, ABQ, REMOTE) + TUC/INV pre-existing. Mapped ScreenConnect site tags (CP2) to RMM enrollment codes based on subnet analysis (192.168.0-12.x MPLS topology). Initial deployment failed silently (199 commands sent, 0 installs) due to incorrect installer URL (`/install/{code}` returns HTML landing page). Corrected to `/install/{code}/download/msi` (actual MSI). Tested on DENJOHNNY successfully. Re-deployed with error checking and proper URL. Result: 81 agents enrolled within 11 minutes (59% of online machines, 76 new installations). Commands queued for 62 offline machines. Enrollment codes vaulted in `~/vault/clients/glaztech/gururmm-site-*.sops.yaml`. Deployment script: `.deploy-glaztech-rmm.py`. Key lesson logged to errorlog.md: GuruRMM installer landing page vs. direct download URL structure.

## Backlinks

- `wiki/systems/ix-webhosting.md` [if exists] — DNS hosted on IX server
