# Session Log — 2026-06-25 — Bitdefender skill audit + iterative fix-to-convergence

## User
- **User:** Howard Enos (howard)
- **Machine:** Howard-Home
- **Role:** tech

## Session Summary

Audited the `bitdefender` skill (GravityZone Cloud JSON-RPC CLI over the live ACG
partner tenant; `.claude/skills/bitdefender/`, ~3,200 lines across `gz.py` CLI +
`gz_client.py` API client + `selftest.py`) for correctness, CLAUDE.md compliance, and
bugs, then fixed everything found and looped review->fix->re-review until two
consecutive review passes returned no MEDIUM+ defects.

The first audit (two parallel review sub-agents, one per big file) found two CRITICAL
gating gaps on the live tenant: `move`, `scan`, `create-package`, `make-group` called
the API with no `--confirm` gate, and the `raw` destructive-method denylist omitted the
matching method names so `raw` bypassed the gates too. It also found no HTTP 429
backoff (a real 429 was in errorlog), no client-side object-id validation, non-atomic
cache writes, and assorted doc drift. Fixed the gating cluster (C1/C2/H1/H3/M1) first,
then H2 (429/5xx retry + connection pooling), then M3 (atomic cache write + advisory
lock), then the doc LOWs + sweep pagination, each committed and verified independently.

A second review pass caught issues partly introduced by the first round of fixes — most
importantly that the new retry fired on timeout/5xx for non-idempotent writes, which
could double-execute a `createScanTask`/`createPackage` if a timeout landed after a
server-side commit. Made retry idempotency-aware (429 and pre-send `connect` always
retried; ambiguous timeout/5xx retried only for `get*`/`list*` reads), finished the
`_require_oid` rollout across all destructive + required-id handlers, made the
write-through cache best-effort, added a pagination ceiling, extended the `raw` denylist
(`createInstallTask`), and wrapped non-JSON 200s.

A third pass found the urllib fallback misclassifying a post-send reset as the
always-safe `connect` code, a negative `Retry-After` crash, and three more unvalidated
company/parent ids (`sweep`/`install-links`/`company-create`); all fixed. A fourth
(convergence) audit returned CONVERGED: yes with only a read-only `companies`
single-page listing LOW and an unused-import NIT, both then fixed. A fifth/final
confirmation pass returned CONVERGED: yes — no MEDIUM+ defects. The skill's own live
selftest grew from 75 to 81 cases and ends green; new behavior is unit-tested offline
(retry idempotency, Retry-After clamp/ceiling, urllib reset classification, atomic cache
write + lock, context manager).

Eight descriptive commits landed on `origin/main` over the session
(`d8f0974` -> `befd265`); a few were absorbed by the background auto-sync into generic
commits (recurring friction), but no change was lost.

## Key Decisions

- **Validation-before-gate ordering** in handlers (bad id -> rc2 before the `--confirm`
  gate -> rc3). Fail fast on malformed input; never describe/perform an action for an
  invalid target. Required updating selftest gate-refusal cases to use valid-FORMAT ids.
- **Retry only safe failure classes for writes.** 429 (pre-processing rate-limit reject)
  and `connect` (pre-send) have no side effect -> always retried. Timeout/5xx are
  ambiguous (may have committed server-side) -> retried only for idempotent `get*`/`list*`
  methods. This preserved the 429-sweep fix while removing the double-execute hazard.
- **Did NOT validate ids of unpinned format** (package id, report id, `hashItemId`,
  quarantine item id, incident type). Their formats aren't confirmed 24-hex, so
  validating would risk rejecting valid input; they are `--confirm`-gated and bad ids
  match the expected-error markers (no mislog). Deliberate, not an oversight.
- **`raw` denylist kept as best-effort** (substring denylist on a power-user passthrough)
  rather than flipped to a read-method allowlist — minimal change, plus reworded
  docstring/help to say "verify any raw method yourself; not exhaustive."
- **Surgical edits + the existing selftest as the regression gate**, rather than
  regenerating files. The live selftest (read paths + gating + validation against the
  real tenant) is the definitive "everything works" check.
- **Looped to convergence** per the user's instruction: kept running fresh review passes
  until two consecutive passes found no MEDIUM+ defect, fixing only real/defensible items
  and consciously leaving documented LOW/NITs.

## Problems Encountered

- **Retry double-execution risk introduced by my own H2 fix** — the broad timeout/5xx
  retry would re-run non-idempotent writes. Caught on the second review pass; fixed with
  idempotency-aware retry (Fix A) + unit tests proving writes don't retry on timeout/5xx
  but do on 429/connect.
- **Selftest expectation drift after behavior changes** — moving gate messages to stderr
  and adding client-side id validation changed several exit codes/streams (rc1->rc2 for
  bad ids; "Would" stdout->stderr; empty-set-json now rc2). Updated the affected
  assertions and added new bad-id/connect/Retry-After cases each round; ended 81/81.
- **Dummy-key test polluted errorlog.md** — a `--confirm` smoke test with a dummy key hit
  a real 401 that was logged. Removed the artifact line; the API-key-error is otherwise
  correctly handled.
- **Background auto-sync interleaving** — repeatedly swept in-progress edits into generic
  "auto-sync" commits and once blocked a rebase via another session's unstaged files.
  Worked around by stashing the other session's changes, rebasing, pushing, and popping;
  no work lost, but several descriptive commit messages were absorbed.

## Configuration Changes

All under `.claude/skills/bitdefender/`:
- `scripts/gz.py` — gated move/scan/create-package/make-group; `_require_oid` rollout
  across endpoint/policy/endpoints/sweep/install-links/company(+suspend/activate/delete/
  create)/account(+update/delete)/assign-policy/set-label/reconfigure/delete-endpoint/
  delete-group/isolate/unisolate/blocklist-add/quarantine/incidents; extended
  `DESTRUCTIVE_RAW_PATTERNS` (move*/createscan/createpackage/createcustomgroup/
  createinstall); gate messages -> stderr; incident-status/note empty-set-json check;
  push-test parse-before-gate; companies lists full fleet; docstring/help fixes; removed
  dead `_require_company_for_sweep`.
- `scripts/gz_client.py` — 429/5xx/timeout/connect retry with idempotency gating +
  backoff honoring Retry-After (clamped [0,120]); single reused httpx client + close()
  + context manager; atomic `_write_cache` (temp+fsync+os.replace) + `_cache_lock`
  advisory lock; best-effort write-through; pagination by short-page + MAX_PAGINATION_PAGES
  ceiling; `list_all_companies()`; non-JSON-200 -> GravityZoneError; urllib URLError
  conservative connect/timeout classification; removed unused `field` import.
- `scripts/selftest.py` — VID valid-format placeholder; gate-refusal cases use VID;
  bad-id/sweep/install-links rc2 assertions; stderr "Would" assertions; incident
  empty-json assertion. 81 cases.
- `SKILL.md` — gating list adds move/scan/create-package/make-group; delete-package
  `--id <packageId>` (was `--package <name>`); cache "no PII" wording corrected.
- `references/api-reference.md` — `deletePackage` param corrected to `packageId`.
- `errorlog.md` — removed a dummy-key 401 test artifact.

## Credentials & Secrets

None created, rotated, or newly discovered. The GravityZone API key is loaded from the
SOPS vault (`msp-tools/gravityzone.sops.yaml` field `credentials.api_key`) via
`vault.sh`; never hardcoded, logged, or cached. Verified intact across all changes.

## Infrastructure & Servers

GravityZone Cloud Public API: `https://cloud.gravityzone.bitdefender.com/api/v1.0/jsonrpc`
(HTTP Basic, key as username/empty password). Live ACG partner tenant. ACG internal
company id `5c428b246c031893678b4569`; companies container `5c4280716c0318f3478b456e`;
root company `5c4280716c0318f3478b456a`. No infrastructure changed.

## Commands & Outputs

- `python -m py_compile gz.py gz_client.py selftest.py` — clean each round.
- `python selftest.py` — read-only + refusal-path harness against the live tenant;
  ended `81/81 passed, 0 failed` (sets `GZ_SUPPRESS_ERRORLOG=1`, no errorlog pollution).
- `python gz.py sweep --company 5c428b246c031893678b4569` — exit 0, swept 9 endpoints
  (verified refactored pagination end-to-end).
- Offline unit checks: retry idempotency (write+timeout NOT retried, write+429/connect
  retried, read+timeout retried), `_retry_delay` clamp+ceiling, urllib reset
  classification, atomic-write/lock round-trip + stale-steal + temp-cleanup.

## Pending / Incomplete Tasks

- **None for bitdefender** — converged; two consecutive review passes clean.
- Consciously left (documented, not defects): id validation deliberately omitted on
  unpinned-format ids (package/report/hashItemId/quarantine-item); `socket.timeout is
  TimeoutError` assumption (non-issue on the fleet's Python 3.12); `raw` denylist is
  best-effort by design.
- Recurring friction worth addressing fleet-wide: background auto-sync interleaving manual
  commits (absorbs descriptive messages). Option: pause auto-sync during focused dev.

## Reference Information

- Skill: `.claude/skills/bitdefender/` (SKILL.md, scripts/{gz.py,gz_client.py,selftest.py},
  references/{api-reference.md,BUILDOUT.md}).
- Commits (origin/main, claudetools): `d8f0974` (gating+id-validation cluster),
  `51751e6` (H2 retry+pooling), `4d75083` (M3 atomic cache), `1852f75` (doc LOWs+
  pagination), `a96a15a` (auto-sync swept second-pass hardening), `778e12d` (companies
  pagination+connect-retry+Retry-After ceiling+ctx mgr), `3d6cb46` (urllib reset+
  Retry-After clamp+sweep/install-links validation), `befd265` (companies full fleet+
  drop unused import).
- Exit-code contract: 0 success, 1 API/runtime failure, 2 bad input/validation, 3 gated
  refusal, 130 KeyboardInterrupt.
