---
name: remediation-tool
description: "M365 tenant investigation + remediation via the ComputerGuru MSP app suite (direct Graph+Exchange REST, not CIPP). Triggers: 365 remediation, breach check, check a mailbox, inbox rules, forwarding, delegate/SendAs audit, OAuth consent, risky-user lookup, tenant sweep."
---

# 365 Remediation Tool

Read-only by default. All remediation actions require explicit `YES` confirmation in chat (not a permission prompt).

## App Architecture (Tiered)

Five multi-tenant apps cover distinct privilege tiers. Use only what the task requires.

| Tier | App display name | App ID | Vault file | Scope |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `investigator` | ComputerGuru Security Investigator | `bfbc12a4-f0dd-4e12-b06d-997e7271e10c` | `computerguru-security-investigator.sops.yaml` | Graph read-only |
| `investigator-exo` | ComputerGuru Security Investigator | `bfbc12a4-f0dd-4e12-b06d-997e7271e10c` | `computerguru-security-investigator.sops.yaml` | Exchange Online read — **BROKEN: app lacks `Exchange.ManageAsApp`, adminapi `InvokeCommand` 401s. Use `exchange-op` for ALL Exchange REST (read + write).** |
| `exchange-op` | ComputerGuru Exchange Operator | `b43e7342-5b4b-492f-890f-bb5a4f7f40e9` | `computerguru-exchange-operator.sops.yaml` | Exchange Online write |
| `user-manager` | ComputerGuru User Manager | `64fac46b-8b44-41ad-93ee-7da03927576c` | `computerguru-user-manager.sops.yaml` | Graph user/group write |
| `tenant-admin` | ComputerGuru Tenant Admin | `709e6eed-0711-4875-9c44-2d3518c47063` | `computerguru-tenant-admin.sops.yaml` | Graph high-privilege |
| `defender` | ComputerGuru Defender Add-on | `dbf8ad1a-54f4-4bb8-8a9e-ea5b9634635b` | `computerguru-defender-addon.sops.yaml` | Defender ATP (MDE only) |
| `sharepoint` / `sharepoint-admin` | ComputerGuru Tenant Admin | `709e6eed-0711-4875-9c44-2d3518c47063` | `computerguru-tenant-admin.sops.yaml` | **SharePoint Online** (Sites.FullControl.All) — cert-only |

**The suite has broad, working access across ALL of M365 — Graph, Exchange Online, Defender, AND SharePoint Online.** Before concluding "the tool can't do X / access denied," verify against the live permission map in `references/app-permissions-and-sharepoint.md` (decode the token `roles` claim). An `accessDenied` usually means wrong tier or wrong endpoint for a scope we DO hold — not a real gap. Two recurring traps: (1) **SharePoint app-only requires a certificate** — a `client_secret` token is rejected everywhere in SharePoint with `"Unsupported app only token"` (get-token.sh forces cert for the `sharepoint*` tiers); (2) Graph `GET /admin/sharepoint/settings` needs a scope no app holds — read/write SharePoint tenant settings via the **CSOM/REST admin API** (`sharepoint-admin` tier) instead. Full map, gotchas, and CSOM examples: `references/app-permissions-and-sharepoint.md`.

**Default for breach checks:** use `investigator` (Graph) + **`exchange-op`** for ALL Exchange REST (read AND write). NOTE: `investigator-exo` 401s on the Exchange adminapi — the Security Investigator app holds the Exchange Admin *role* but NOT the `Exchange.ManageAsApp` *app-permission* that `InvokeCommand` requires — so even read-only `Get-*` cmdlets go through `exchange-op`. Escalate nothing extra; `exchange-op` is the read path too. Full detail: `references/gotchas.md`.

## Auto-Invocation Behavior

When triggered automatically (vs. via `/remediation-tool`), follow the same workflow in `.claude/commands/remediation-tool.md`:

1. Parse the user's intent into a subcommand (check/sweep/signins/consent-url/remediate).
2. Resolve tenant ID from domain.
3. Acquire tokens via `get-token.sh <tenant> <tier>` — use lowest-privilege tier needed.
4. Run checks via scripts in `scripts/`.
5. Interpret findings using `references/checklist.md`.
6. Write report to `clients/{slug}/reports/YYYY-MM-DD-{action}.md` using `templates/breach-report.md`.
7. Chat summary + delegate commit to Gitea agent.

## Before calling any script, verify

- The SOPS vault is accessible via `.claude/identity.json` `vault_path` field. The scripts auto-resolve the vault location from identity.json — no hardcoded paths.
- `jq`, `curl`, `bash` are available.
- **Exchange REST (adminapi `InvokeCommand`) — read AND write — ALWAYS use the `exchange-op` tier.** The Exchange Operator app (`b43e7342-5b4b-492f-890f-bb5a4f7f40e9`) is the ONLY suite app that holds `Exchange.ManageAsApp` (required for adminapi) PLUS the Exchange Administrator directory role. `investigator-exo` returns **401** on every Exchange cmdlet — the Security Investigator app has the Exchange Admin *role* but NOT the `Exchange.ManageAsApp` *permission* (verified live on ACG 2026-07-16: Investigator SP `Exchange.ManageAsApp`=NO, Operator SP=YES). Diagnosis rule: **401 = wrong app (missing `Exchange.ManageAsApp`) → switch to `exchange-op`; 403 = the `exchange-op` SP is missing the Exchange Administrator directory role on that tenant** → emit the Entra Roles link from `references/gotchas.md`. Do NOT "assign Exchange Admin to the Security Investigator SP" — it does not fix the 401 (the app-permission, not the role, is the blocker).
- For Identity Protection checks: `IdentityRiskyUser.Read.All` is in the Security Investigator manifest AND the tenant has consented to that app. If 403, emit the per-app consent URL from `references/gotchas.md`.
- For Defender checks: confirm tenant has Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) license before using `defender` tier — it returns AADSTS650052 otherwise.

## Consent audit (run FIRST on any tenant task)

Per-tenant consent is NOT uniform — a tenant can have an app but only a partial/old grant
(the VWP "had the app but no SharePoint" failure). Before concluding "can't do X on tenant Y",
run `bash scripts/consent-audit.sh <domain|guid>` (or `--all`): it decodes every app's actual
grants, diffs vs the baseline, grades GREEN/AMBER/RED, and prints the exact fix per gap.
Full app + permission map: `references/app-suite.md`.

## Conventions

- **Target identifiers**: accept UPN, domain, or tenant GUID. Normalize to tenant GUID internally.
- **Token tiers**: minimum necessary privilege. Never use `tenant-admin` for a read-only check.
- **Token cache**: `/tmp/remediation-tool/{tenant-id}/{tier}.jwt`. TTL 55 minutes. Check `-mmin -55` before reuse.
- **Raw JSON artifacts**: `/tmp/remediation-tool/{tenant-id}/{check}/` — keep so the user can re-analyze.
- **Reports**: `clients/{slug}/reports/YYYY-MM-DD-{action}.md`. Derive slug from domain (strip TLD, hyphenate).
- **UTC dates everywhere**.

## Scope boundaries

- **Not a replacement for CIPP.** Use CIPP for bulk baseline configuration, templates, standards alerting. Use this tool for focused investigation and point-in-time remediation.
- **Entra app registrations stay manual in the portal** — don't create/modify the multi-tenant apps themselves via the tool.
- **Conditional Access policies CAN be managed programmatically** (Tenant Admin tier holds `Policy.ReadWrite.ConditionalAccess` + the Conditional Access Administrator role). MANDATORY discipline: (1) always create/modify in **report-only** (`state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced`) first; (2) always **exclude the tenant's break-glass account** (`conditions.users.excludeUsers`); (3) verify impact in Entra sign-in logs before enforcing; (4) get explicit user confirmation before flipping any policy to `enabled` on a tenant with real users. (CA-manual boundary relaxed 2026-05-27 at Mike's direction — break-glass + report-only keep blast radius near zero.)
- **Not for Graph permissions the apps don't have.** If a call 403s and the scope isn't in the relevant app's manifest, stop and tell the user — don't try to work around it.
- **Defender tier requires MDE license.** If the tenant doesn't have MDE, the token request succeeds but API calls return AADSTS650052. Check before using.
