# Cascades Tucson — 8-User Breach Check (Read-Only)

**Date:** 2026-04-20 (UTC)
**Tenant:** Cascades Tucson (cascadestucson.com, `207fa277-e9d8-4eb7-ada1-1064d2221498`)
**Scope:** Read-only breach check across all 7 users targeted in Mike's 04-20 phishing sweep + JD Martin (named by Howard; previously a false-positive)
**App used:** Legacy `Claude-MSP-Access` Graph API app (`fabb3421-8b34-484b-bc17-e46de9703418`). New tiered `ComputerGuru Security Investigator` app vault files do not yet exist in `D:/vault/msp-tools/` — provision those before next run.
**Operator:** Howard Enos (ACG-TECH03L)
**Posture:** Investigate + document only. No remediation actions taken.

---

## Per-User Verdicts

| User | Verdict | Immediate action needed? |
|---|---|---|
| John Trozzi | CLEAN | No (re-confirms 04-20 AM check) |
| Megan Hiatt | CLEAN **but actively attacked via SMTP AUTH** | Yes — disable SMTP AUTH |
| Dax Howard | CLEAN, 1 disabled external-forward rule to verify | Clarify w/ Dax |
| Lois Lane | CLEAN | No |
| Meredith Kuhn | CLEAN, 1 dormant rule with attacker-signature name | Yes — delete `....` rule |
| Anna Pitzlin | Account **disabled/offboarded**; stale risky-user record | Low — clean up Identity Protection |
| Ann Dery | CLEAN **but no MFA, 0 recent sign-ins, stale risky-user record** | Yes — enroll MFA or disable |
| JD Martin | CLEAN | No (confirms false-positive exclusion from sweep) |

**Bottom line:** No active compromise on any of the 8 mailboxes. Two dormant concerns to resolve (Meredith's `....` rule, Dax's disabled forward). Two account-hygiene gaps (Ann no-MFA, Anna stale offboarding state). One active attack vector that needs tenant-level control (SMTP AUTH credential stuffing against Megan).

---

## 10-Point Check Matrix

All checks per `.claude/skills/remediation-tool/references/checklist.md`. `[OK]` = within normal parameters, `[!]` = needs attention, `[?]` = ambiguous.

| # | Check | John | Megan | Dax | Lois | Meredith | Anna | Ann | JD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 01 | Visible inbox rules (Graph) | 0 OK | 1 OK | 3 OK | 0 OK | 3 OK | 0 OK | 0 OK | 0 OK |
| 02 | Auto-reply | off | off | off | off | off | **alwaysEnabled** (legit offboarding) | off | off |
| 03a | Hidden inbox rules (EXO REST) | 1 system | 4 OK | **4 (1 flag)** | 1 system | **6 (1 flag)** | 3 system | 3 system | 1 system |
| 03b | Non-SELF mailbox permissions | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 03c | Non-SELF SendAs | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 03d | Mailbox forwarding fields | null | null | null | null | null | null | null | null |
| 04a | OAuth grants | 2 OK | 4 OK | 1 OK | 0 | 2 OK | 1 OK | 2 OK | 0 |
| 04b | App role assignments | 1 (BlueMail) | 3 (iOS/Alignable/Adobe) | 3 (SurveyMonkey/Zoom/CalendarBridge) | 0 | 2 (iOS/ReadMtg) | 1 (Template.net `[?]`) | 1 (BlueMail) | 0 |
| 05 | Auth methods | 5 (phone, Auth, FIDO2) | 2 (pw, Auth) | 2 (pw, Auth) | 2 (pw, Auth) | 2 (pw, Auth) | 1 (pw only) | **1 (pw only) [!]** | 2 (pw, Auth) |
| 06 | Interactive sign-ins 30d (non-US / legacy) | 12 / 0 / 0 | **122 / 106 / 108** | 0 / 0 / 0 | 11 / 0 / 0 | 0 / 0 / 0 | 0 / 0 / 0 | 0 / 0 / 0 | 0 / 0 / 0 |
| 07 | Directory audits 30d | 41 (our 04-16 reset) | 1 | 2 | 2 | 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| 08 | Risky user / detections | none / 0 | none / 0 | none / 0 | none / 0 | none / 0 | **low/atRisk stale 2023-11** | **low/atRisk stale 2020-12** | none / 0 |
| 09 | Sent items recent 25 | normal | normal | normal | normal | normal | none post-disable | normal | normal |
| 10 | Deleted items recent 25 | normal | normal | normal | normal | normal | none post-disable | normal | normal |

No MFA-challenge, password-reset, sign-in-alert, or bounce-notification messages found in any Deleted Items across the 8 accounts (would indicate attacker cleanup). All legitimate sign-ins are from US IPs — for those who signed in interactively during the 30-day window.

---

## Detailed Findings

### 1. John Trozzi — CLEAN (re-verified)

Matches Mike's 04-20 AM breach check. 12 interactive sign-ins all US/Phoenix (`184.191.143.62`). 5 auth methods (phone, 2x Authenticator, FIDO2). 41 directory audits — all from our 04-16 remediation cycle (password reset, disable/re-enable). Phishing emails from 04-20 were deleted in the sweep.

### 2. Megan Hiatt — CLEAN mailbox, ACTIVE credential-stuffing attack

**Mailbox state:** No malicious rules, no forwarding, no non-SELF delegates. 14 successful sign-ins all from her two known US IPs (`184.191.143.62`, `72.211.21.217`) via Browser.

**Active attack:** 108 `Authenticated SMTP` sign-in attempts over 30 days, geographically distributed:

| Country | Attempts | Failure codes |
|---|---|---|
| GB (UK) | 48 | 50053 (smart lockout) |
| DE (Germany) | 30 | 50053 |
| NL (Netherlands) | 18 | 50053 |
| LT (Lithuania) | 6 | 50053 / 50126 (bad password) |
| CH (Switzerland) | 4 | 50053 |
| US | 2 | 50053 |

Every single attempt failed. Smart lockout (50053) triggered repeatedly — Entra is correctly blocking. BUT: if the attacker ever guesses a correct password, SMTP AUTH **bypasses MFA** because it uses Basic Authentication. This is the highest-risk attack surface still exposed on this tenant.

### 3. Dax Howard — CLEAN, dormant external-forward rule

3 inbox rules total:
- **Two** "Arizona ALFA" rules forwarding newsletters from `info+azalfa.org@ccsend.com` (Constant Contact) to Meredith Kuhn — legitimate business. Duplicate (one is `(1)`) — consolidation opportunity, not a security issue.
- **One disabled** rule "Copy of which is a meeting invitation or update" forwarding meeting requests to `dax@megaloscapital.com`. Currently OFF. `megaloscapital.com` is Megalos Capital — likely Dax's personal/other-company email. Needs user confirmation.

0 interactive sign-ins in 30d, auth methods include Authenticator but with `createdDateTime: null` (possible duplicate-entry pattern like John had). Authenticator creation date null is low-risk but worth cleaning up.

### 4. Lois Lane — CLEAN

No custom rules. 11 interactive sign-ins all US. 2 auth methods (password, Authenticator). No anomalies.

### 5. Meredith Kuhn — CLEAN, DORMANT attacker-signature rule

**Primary flag — rule named `....`:**
- Disabled (`Enabled: false`)
- Action: mark as read, move to `RSS Subscriptions`, stop processing more rules
- No `From` / `SubjectContainsWords` filter — applies to **everything** if re-enabled
- Owner: `meredith.kuhn`
- Priority: 3

This matches the textbook attacker-persistence pattern (short-or-blank name, silent move to obscure folder, stop further processing). **BUT it is disabled.** `Get-InboxRule` doesn't return creation date, so we can't confirm whether this was ever active or when it was turned off. Two possibilities:
- **(A)** Someone (Meredith, prior IT) found it and disabled it but didn't delete it.
- **(B)** Meredith created it herself and gave up on it — Outlook occasionally ships templates that can produce odd-named rules.

Either way, leaving it in place is a latent risk: if her account is ever compromised, re-enabling it is one click away. **Recommend deleting it outright after confirming with Meredith she didn't create it.**

Other 5 hidden rules: system defaults (Junk, 2 disabled OOF templates) + two disabled legitimate rules (`support@focushr.net`, `results@j2labs.com`).

### 6. Anna Pitzlin — ACCOUNT DISABLED (offboarded)

- `accountEnabled: false`
- `lastPasswordChangeDateTime: null`
- Auto-reply set to "We regret to inform you that Anna Pitzlin is no longer employed here. Please direct any future correspondence to Meredith Kuhn." (effective 04-20 18:00 UTC → 04-21 18:00 UTC; almost certainly configured then left indefinitely with a non-terminal schedule)
- Risky-user record: `low / atRisk`, last updated **2023-11-16** — this is stale. Identity Protection never cleared the signal after offboarding.

Anna received 2 phishing emails in the 04-20 sweep because the account is still licensed and accepting inbound mail for the auto-reply. **Not a compromise vector** (no interactive auth possible, no MFA method configured, password disabled). The stale `atRisk` signal is noise.

**Side issue:** Verify with Mike whether Anna should be converted to a shared mailbox (cheaper, no license) or fully deleted after the retention window expires. Keeping a disabled user account licensed just to run an auto-reply is not standard.

### 7. Ann Dery — CLEAN mailbox, unused/unprotected account

- `accountEnabled: true`, `lastPasswordChangeDateTime: null` — account never had a password changed (implying it predates the forced-change policy or was exempted)
- **Only 1 auth method: password.** No MFA, no Authenticator, no FIDO2.
- 0 interactive sign-ins in 30d.
- Risky-user: `low / atRisk`, last updated **2020-12-07** — 5+ year old stale signal.
- 2 OAuth grants to BlueMail (same as John) — likely from original device pairing, dormant.

This is a dormant, enabled, non-MFA-protected account that received 2 phishing messages. If an attacker ever gets her password, there's no second factor to stop them. **Recommend Mike confirm whether Ann still uses this account:**
- If yes → enforce MFA enrollment
- If no → disable the account (don't delete — keep mailbox for historical access)

### 8. JD Martin — CLEAN

No custom rules, no forwarding, 0 non-SELF permissions, normal OAuth (none). Confirms JD was NOT targeted in the phishing campaign — his presence in the sweep was the false-positive HR-thread reply Mike correctly excluded. The HR thread from Ashley Jensen (`HRPYDBRUNFOC...xlsx`) was and remains legitimate internal payroll correspondence.

---

## Why this keeps happening — root causes

Howard's question was "what can we do to prevent this." The phishing is landing because four layers of defense are not fully engaged:

| Gap | Impact | Fix |
|---|---|---|
| **DMARC is `p=none`** | Receiving servers (Microsoft) have no instruction to junk/reject mail that spoofs `cascadestucson.com`. SPF fails silently, mail lands. | Publish `p=quarantine pct=25` for 1 week → observe DMARC reports → `p=reject`. See `_dmarc.cascadestucson.com` TXT. |
| **SMTP AUTH still enabled** | Megan is being credential-stuffed daily across 5 countries. 108 attempts in 30d. An eventual guess bypasses MFA entirely. | `Set-TransportConfig -SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled $true` (tenant-wide) + per-mailbox `Set-CASMailbox -SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled $true`. Coordinate with any legacy scanners/MFPs on-site first. |
| **No tenant-wide anti-impersonation/anti-phish policy tuned for `cascadestucson.com`** | Lookalike-domain tricks (`zoom.nl` instead of `zoom.us`) and display-name spoofing get through. | Defender for Office 365 anti-phishing policy → add `cascadestucson.com` as protected domain + key users (Meredith, CEO/admin tier) as protected users. Requires Defender P1 or M365 Business Premium. |
| **No URL/IP blocklist from this campaign** | Same attacker infrastructure can hit again tomorrow on different users. | Exchange TABL: IP block `139.28.37.117`, `104.168.101.10`, `207.189.10.75`, `91.244.70.212`. URL block `zoom.nl`, `*.awstrack.me`. |

**User-level hygiene also matters:**

- **Ann Dery** — no MFA method at all. If her account is active, enroll MFA today. If inactive, disable.
- **Anna Pitzlin** — offboard cleanup: convert to shared mailbox or remove license.
- **Meredith Kuhn** — delete the dormant `....` inbox rule.
- **Dax Howard** — confirm the `dax@megaloscapital.com` external-forward rule is Dax's own, still disable/delete either way.
- **Megan, Meredith, Ann, Anna** — none have FIDO2 or hardware tokens. Authenticator-push is sufficient for most, but for Meredith (finance/admin role) consider FIDO2 like John has.

---

## Prioritized Action List

### P1 — Tenant-level prevention (highest leverage)

1. **Publish DMARC `p=quarantine pct=25`** → 1 week observation → `p=reject`. Coordinate with Meredith and verify DKIM signing is healthy first. Blocks ~all external-hosting spoofs going forward.
2. **Disable SMTP Client Authentication tenant-wide.** Megan's active attack ends the moment this is off. Check first with Mike whether any on-site devices (copier, HR scanner) use SMTP AUTH to send — if so, migrate them to App Password / Modern Auth or SMTP relay.
3. **Add TABL IP blocks + URL blocks** from the 04-20 sweep (4 IPs + `zoom.nl` + `*.awstrack.me`).

### P2 — User-level cleanup (read-only; ask before acting)

4. **Delete Meredith's `....` inbox rule** after a 30-second confirmation with Meredith that she didn't create it.
5. **Enroll Ann Dery in MFA** (or disable account if she's no longer using it).
6. **Clarify Dax's `megaloscapital.com` forwarding** — delete the disabled rule regardless once confirmed benign.
7. **Offboarding tidy-up for Anna Pitzlin** — consider converting to shared mailbox; clear the stale `atRisk` signal.

### P3 — Defensive posture

8. **Defender for Office 365 anti-phishing policy** for `cascadestucson.com` (needs SKU confirmation — does Cascades have M365 Business Premium or E3+Defender?).
9. **Baseline sweep of remaining 38 mailboxes** not hit this month (per sweep report recommendation — attackers may cycle to fresh targets).
10. **Template.net OAuth grant** (Anna Pitzlin) — publisher not verified. Low severity because account is disabled, but review if that app pattern appears on any active accounts during a re-sweep.

---

## Raw Artifacts

All 8 users' raw JSON under:
```
/tmp/remediation-tool/207fa277-e9d8-4eb7-ada1-1064d2221498/user-breach/{user}_cascadestucson_com/
```

Files per user:
- `00_user.json` — profile
- `01_inbox_rules.json` — Graph visible rules
- `02_mbox_settings.json` — mailbox settings (auto-reply)
- `03a_hidden_rules.json` — EXO Get-InboxRule with `-IncludeHidden`
- `03b_mbox_perms.json` — Get-MailboxPermission
- `03c_recip_perms.json` — Get-RecipientPermission (SendAs)
- `03d_mailbox.json` — Get-Mailbox (forwarding fields)
- `04a_oauth.json` — oauth2PermissionGrants
- `04b_approles.json` — appRoleAssignments
- `05_auth_methods.json` — authentication/methods
- `06_signins.json` — 30d interactive sign-in log
- `07_audits.json` — 30d directoryAudits where user is target
- `08a_risky.json` — identityProtection/riskyUsers
- `08b_risk_det.json` — identityProtection/riskDetections
- `09_sent.json` — last 25 sentitems
- `10_deleted.json` — last 25 deleteditems

## Tooling notes for next session

- **Fixed in this session:** `user-breach-check.sh` referenced old tier names `graph`/`exchange`; updated to `investigator`/`investigator-exo` to match the rewritten `get-token.sh`.
- **Not fixed:** the new tiered app vault files (`computerguru-security-investigator.sops.yaml` et al) do not exist at `D:/vault/msp-tools/`. The skill's new 5-app architecture is not provisioned yet. This session fell back to inline curl calls using the legacy `Claude-MSP-Access` app. Mike should provision the new vault files before retiring the legacy app.
