---
type: client
name: lonestar-electrical
display_name: Lone Star Electrical Systems LLC
last_compiled: 2026-06-03
compiled_by: Mikes-MacBook-Air/claude-main
sources:
  - clients/lonestar-electrical/session-logs/2026-06-03-session.md
  - clients/lonestar-electrical/session-logs/2026-06-02-session.md
  - clients/lonestar-electrical/session-logs/2026-06-01-session.md
  - clients/lonestar-electrical/session-logs/2026-05-29-sophos-removal.md
  - clients/lonestar-electrical/docs/apple-mdm-setup-reference.md
  - session-logs/2026-03-23-session.md
  - session-logs/2026-03-24-session.md
  - credentials.md
  - clients/lonestar-electrical/google-workspace.sops.yaml (vault)
  - clients/lonestar-electrical/gururmm-site-warren.sops.yaml (vault)
  - clients/lonestar-electrical/unraid-server.sops.yaml (vault)
  - temp/lonestar-russ-setup.py
  - temp/lonestar-kyla-reset.py
  - temp/lonestar-kyla-2fa-fix.py
backlinks: []
aliases: [lonestar]
---

# Lone Star Electrical Systems LLC

Electrical contractor in Tucson, AZ. ACG-managed client. Distinctive in the fleet for being a **Google Workspace** shop (not Microsoft 365) with mobile devices managed by **ManageEngine MDM** (Zoho), not Intune. Field-heavy: techs use phones/tablets on job sites.

---

## Profile

- **Company type:** Electrical contractor (field service)
- **Contract type:** Prepaid hour block
- **Hours remaining:** 13.5 hrs as of 2026-06-02 (Syncro live — always re-check `GET /customers/33809612` before billing).
- **Billing rate:** (verify — check recent Syncro invoices; not captured in available sources)
- **Syncro customer ID:** `33809612` (Lone Star Electrical Systems LLC)
- **Address:** 3774 North Warren Avenue, Tucson, AZ
- **Managed assets (Syncro):** 1 asset on record
- **Sites:** Norris site (location of the LS-1 / LS-2 Win11 workstations)
- **Key contacts:**
  - Robin Eneix — robine@lonestarelectrical.net (Syncro primary contact)
  - Jose R. (joser@lonestarelectrical.net) — field user; subject of the 2026-03 personal-phone MDM issue
  - sysadmin@lonestarelectrical.net — Google Workspace admin account (ACG-managed)
  - James — account compromised 2026-03-10 (Syncro #32010); [verify current name/role]
  - Kyla, Russ — GWS user accounts touched via provisioning/2FA scripts (temp/); [verify roles]
  - Main phone on file (Syncro): 520-730-3642
- **Active ticket:** None open in Syncro as of 2026-06-02

---

## Infrastructure

### Email & Identity

- **Platform:** Google Workspace (domain `lonestarelectrical.net`). NOT Microsoft 365 — the M365 remediation tool does not apply here.
- **GWS admin:** sysadmin@lonestarelectrical.net
- **GWS mobile management:** set to **Basic** (no Google-native MDM push) — device management is delegated to ManageEngine.
- **ACG management plane:** Google Workspace API access via the `ACG-MSP-Access (Google Workspace)` service account (vault: MSP Tools). `lonestarelectrical.net` is an onboarded tenant. Service-account key: `temp/acg-msp-access-8f72339997e5.json`.

### Mobile Device Management (MDM)

- **Platform:** ManageEngine MDM (Zoho) — https://mdm.manageengine.com/webclient
- **MDM admin:** mike@azcomputerguru.com (Zoho account, Super Admin)
- **Enrolled devices:** 2 company tablets (named **Zach** and **JOSE**), enrolled 2025-12-04 via QR code, fully managed. These are direct enrollments and are unaffected by the Google third-party-EMM integration.

### Workstations

- **LS-1, LS-2** — Windows workstations at the **Norris site**; both upgraded to Win11 on 2026-05-04 (Syncro #32244). Both were inherited from the **previous MSP** with **Sophos Endpoint Protection** (managed via the previous MSP's Sophos Central — no ACG access). **Sophos has been fully removed from both machines as of 2026-06-02** (Syncro #32347; see Patterns for full procedure). Both enrolled in **GuruRMM** during the 2026-05 removal work; ScreenConnect + GuruRMM agents registered for Safe Mode (`SafeBoot\Network`).
  - **LS-1 GuruRMM agent:** `6b9617fa-5c77-40e1-8b64-a1545e730895`
  - **LS-2 GuruRMM agent:** `97fe5582-aa3d-4132-94a6-f4c8582bca31`
  - **Windows Defender:** active and real-time protection enabled on both as of 2026-06-02.
  - **Current location (2026-06-02):** both desktops are physically at the **Computer Guru office** for repair (hence they appear on the ACG `172.16.0.0/22` network). To be taken back **onsite to Norris and reconnected the week of 2026-06-08**.

### Virtual Machine — LONESTAR-VM

- **Host:** `LONESTAR-VM` — Windows VM at the Warren site. **GuruRMM-managed** (agent `a4d39a9d-2210-483c-9b1e-6348efdba627`, v0.6.54, online as of 2026-06-10). Discovered via the GuruRMM fleet on 2026-06-10 (was not previously documented). Also reachable via ScreenConnect.
- **IP:** `192.168.120.197/24` (interface "Ethernet 2"), gateway `192.168.120.1`. **Warren-site LAN is `192.168.120.0/24`** — the live production subnet, distinct from the `172.16.x` ACG-office addresses LS-1 / LS-2 / Tower carried while they were in the shop for repair.
- **Network profile:** Private.
- **RDP:** Enabled. Windows Defender Firewall "Remote Desktop" rules (TCP/UDP 3389 + Shadow) are Enabled and scoped **Domain + Private** — tightened off the `Any`/Public profile on 2026-06-10. RDP listening is on (`fDenyTSConnections=0`). Reachable on the Warren LAN / site VPN, not over a Public network.

### Unraid Server

- **Status:** Running Unraid **7.1.4** as of 2026-06-02 (migrated to new USB flash drive). **GuruRMM agent enrolled 2026-06-03.**
- **Hostname:** Tower
- **LAN IP:** 172.16.1.188 (currently at ACG office, to be returned to client site week of 2026-06-08)
- **License type:** [verify — Basic / Plus / Pro]
- **Boot device:** New USB flash drive (written via Unraid USB Creator, 7.1.4), **registered and confirmed stable**. The original failed stick (label `UNRAID`, `/dev/sda1`, Generic Flash Disk 8GB) has been **RETIRED** as of 2026-06-02.
- **Config:** Old `config/` folder (array assignments `super.dat`, shares, network settings, license `.key`) copied from the failing stick onto the new one. Disk layout and array configuration preserved; only the OS files are fresh.
- **License:** Re-registered to the new USB GUID via Unraid webGUI Tools > Registration > Replace Key on 2026-06-02.
- **Root credentials:** Vaulted at `clients/lonestar-electrical/unraid-server.sops.yaml` as of 2026-06-03.
- **GuruRMM agent:** Docker container `gururmm-agent` installed 2026-06-03 (agent ID `e827f798-bab1-484b-b641-98da7ff5af87`, version 0.6.28, status: online). Container uses host networking, auto-restart policy, and proper volume mounts for device-id persistence (`/mnt/user/appdata/gururmm/lib`).
- **Array/disk layout:** [verify — deferred to future documentation]

---

## Access

- **Google Workspace admin:** sysadmin@lonestarelectrical.net — vault: `clients/lonestar-electrical/google-workspace.sops.yaml`
- **ManageEngine MDM:** mike@azcomputerguru.com (Zoho Super Admin) — https://mdm.manageengine.com/webclient
- **GWS service account (programmatic):** `ACG-MSP-Access (Google Workspace)` (vault: MSP Tools); key file `temp/acg-msp-access-8f72339997e5.json`
- **Vault root:** `clients/lonestar-electrical/` in vault repo
- **Unraid server:** root credentials vaulted at `clients/lonestar-electrical/unraid-server.sops.yaml` (2026-06-03)
- **GuruRMM Warren site:** enrollment key vaulted at `clients/lonestar-electrical/gururmm-site-warren.sops.yaml` (site code: WARM-FALCON-5891)

---

## Patterns & Known Issues

- **Inherited Sophos with no Central access — kernel-driver tamper-protection removal (procedure proven and COMPLETE on LS-1 and LS-2, 2026-06-02).** LS-1 and LS-2 came from the previous MSP running Sophos Endpoint Protection managed via the previous MSP's Sophos Central account — ACG has **no Central access**, so no remote uninstall and no way to disable tamper protection from the management plane. The procedure is now proven end-to-end and reusable. Key findings from the full execution:

  - **SophosZap's gate is a registry flag, not just the driver.** SophosZap checks `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services\Sophos Endpoint Defense\TamperProtection\Config\SEDEnabled` — if this is `1`, SophosZap exits with "does not run with tamper protection on" even when the kernel driver is renamed/disabled. The driver disable alone is not sufficient; `SEDEnabled=0` must be set.

  - **Two Sophos boot drivers — treat them differently:**
    - **`SophosED.sys`** = "Sophos Endpoint Defense" (the TAMPER driver). `Start=0` by default (Boot-start). Safe to rename/remove. Correct procedure: set service `Start=4` in the offline hive AND clear `SEDEnabled=0`. With `SEDEnabled=0`, SophosZap passes the tamper check and removes it cleanly.
    - **`SophosEL.sys`** = "Sophos ELAM" (Early Launch Anti-Malware). `Start=0`, **`ErrorControl=3` (CRITICAL)**. **NEVER rename or delete this file manually.** If `SophosEL.sys` is missing on boot, Windows drops to Automatic Repair: `SrtTrail.txt` root cause: "Boot critical file C:\WINDOWS\system32\DRIVERS\SophosEL.sys is corrupt." Recovery requires booting back to PE and restoring the file. SophosZap removes the ELAM driver and its service itself, the boot-safe way, after tamper protection is neutralized.

  - **Offline hive editing: always read the active ControlSet first.** `CurrentControlSet` does not exist in an offline hive. Read `HKLM\OFFSYS\Select\Current` to determine which numbered set is active (e.g., `0x1` = `ControlSet001`) before editing service entries. Editing the wrong ControlSet leaves the machine unchanged.

  - **Correct offline procedure (PE):**
    1. `reg load HKLM\OFFSYS X:\Windows\System32\config\SYSTEM`
    2. `reg query HKLM\OFFSYS\Select /v Current` — note the active set number
    3. Under `HKLM\OFFSYS\ControlSet00N\Services\Sophos Endpoint Defense`: set `Start=4`; under `...\TamperProtection\Config`: set `SEDEnabled=0`
    4. `reg unload HKLM\OFFSYS`
    5. Reboot to normal Windows. Do NOT rename or delete `SophosEL.sys`.
    6. Verify Defender is active. Run `SophosZap.exe --confirm` via RMM or locally. Reboot as prompted.
    7. Run `SophosZap.exe --confirm` a second time. Confirm: services/drivers/folders NONE, Defender RTP True.

  - **PE helper script:** `clients/lonestar-electrical/scripts/Remove-Sophos-Offline-PE.ps1` (hardened with top-level try/catch and guaranteed `Read-Host` pause).
  - **Reusable for any inherited-MSP Sophos/CrowdStrike/SentinelOne removal where tamper protection is enforced and the management console is inaccessible.** (Related: GuruRMM SPEC-015 safeboot-network-registration aims to automate exactly this remote-Safe-Mode removal flow.)

- **Sophos shell extensions + Datto Cloud Continuity startup conflict (LS-2).** Presented as unresponsive desktop mouse clicks (until Ctrl+Alt+Del) and dead Start-menu right-click. Root cause: Sophos shell extensions competing with the Datto Cloud Continuity `/pop` startup entry during logon. Removing the Datto startup registry entry addressed the logon contention.

- **ManageEngine + Google Workspace dual-EMM trap (resolved 2026-03-24).** A personal phone repeatedly prompted for MDM enrollment when the user added their Lonestar Google account. Root cause was **two independent triggers**: (1) ManageEngine MDM self-enrollment was enabled for all directory groups, AND (2) ManageEngine was configured as a **third-party EMM provider inside Google Workspace** (Devices > Mobile & endpoints > Settings > Third-party integrations). The Google integration enforces enrollment on any device that adds a Lonestar account — independent of ManageEngine's own self-enrollment setting. **Fix required both:** disable ManageEngine self-enrollment (Enrollment > Self Enrollment > Disable) AND remove ManageEngine as the third-party EMM in the GWS Admin Console. Disabling only one leaves the prompt in place. Company tablets enrolled directly via QR code are unaffected by either change.

- **Google Workspace, not M365.** Reach for GWS Admin Console + the ACG-MSP-Access service account for identity work. The M365 remediation-tool app suite does not apply to this client.

- **Field/mobile-first.** Most tickets are phone/tablet/field-device oriented (iPhone field setup, tablet PDF editing). Expect mobile, not desktop, as the primary support surface — the LS-1/LS-2 desktop work is the exception, not the norm.

- **Recurring `bzfirmware` checksum boot error = failing USB flash drive.** Replace the stick (Unraid USB Creator + copy old `config/` + re-register license to new GUID). Do NOT just replace the file — if the error recurs after a file-level fix, the stick itself is failing. Reusable for any Unraid box.

---

## Active Work

No open Syncro tickets as of 2026-06-02.

- **Sophos removal on LS-1 / LS-2 — COMPLETE (2026-06-02).** Both machines are fully clean: no Sophos services, drivers, folders, or Add/Remove entries; Windows Defender real-time protection active on both. Billed and closed on Syncro #32347 (2.0h in-shop, prepaid). See Patterns for the full reusable procedure including the critical SophosEL ELAM boot-driver lesson.

- **Unraid server USB replacement — COMPLETE (2026-06-02).** New stick running Unraid 7.1.4, config/ preserved, license re-registered to the new GUID, **old stick retired**. Documented and billed on Syncro #32372 (1.5h in-shop, prepaid, Closed).
  - **Remaining Unraid items handed to Mike** (todo `de75eec6`): set + vault the root password, document hostname/IP/license type, verify array integrity, and investigate a LimeTech/Unraid API skill. **Deferred until Mike posts a note** on what he has done with the machine — do not chase these until then.

- **LS-1 / LS-2 logistics:** both desktops are at the **Computer Guru office** for repair as of 2026-06-02; to be returned **onsite to Norris and reconnected the week of 2026-06-08**.

---

## History Highlights

| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| 2025-12-04 | Two company tablets (Zach, JOSE) enrolled in ManageEngine MDM via QR code, fully managed |
| 2026-03-10 | Emergency: James's account hacked (Syncro #32010, resolved) |
| 2026-03-11 | Tablet unable to edit PDFs (#32015) |
| 2026-03-23 | Lonestar MDM issue investigated — identified ManageEngine self-enrollment as the cause of joser's personal-phone prompt; fix initially blocked by a broken Zoho portal page |
| 2026-03-24 | MDM issue RESOLVED — disabled ManageEngine self-enrollment AND removed ManageEngine as GWS third-party EMM. joser's phone stopped prompting immediately |
| 2026-05-04 | Win11 upgrades on LS-1 and LS-2 (#32244) |
| 2026-05-05 | iPhone field setup (#32251) |
| 2026-05-28/29 | Sophos removal on LS-1/LS-2 begun: enrolled in GuruRMM, removed Datto startup conflict (LS-2), registered Safe Mode agents, removed user-mode Sophos; blocked by `SophosED.sys` kernel driver — WinRE offline removal staged (Ventoy USB), completion pending |
| 2026-06-01 | Recovered the (previously unlogged) Sophos removal context, reconstructed it into a session log, and handed the WinRE completion procedure to Howard via coordinator (msg `689cfb7c`) |
| 2026-06-02 | Unraid server USB flash drive failed (recurring bzfirmware checksum error); migrated to new stick (Unraid 7.1.4 via USB Creator), copied old config/, re-registered license to new GUID |
| 2026-06-02 | LS-1 Sophos offline-PE prep: BitLocker confirmed off, SophosZap staged, drive-letter check run; SED service Start=4 + SEDEnabled=0 set offline |
| 2026-06-02 | Sophos removal COMPLETED on LS-1 and LS-2 — offline tamper-disable (SED Start=4 + SEDEnabled=0) + SophosZap two-pass via GuruRMM; LS-2 hit Automatic Repair after boot-critical SophosEL.sys was renamed (recovered by restoring the file from PE, then relying on already-correct offline edits + SophosZap to remove it safely); Windows Defender active on both |
| 2026-06-02 | Syncro #32347 (Sophos removal, 2.0h in-shop) and #32372 (Unraid USB replacement, 1.5h in-shop) created, billed, and closed against prepaid block — 17.0 -> 13.5 hrs remaining |
| 2026-06-02 | Old failed Unraid USB stick retired (new one registered/stable). Remaining Unraid items (root pw vault, server docs, array verify, LimeTech/Unraid API skill) handed to Mike (todo `de75eec6`), deferred until he posts a note. LS-1/LS-2 are at the ACG office for repair; returning onsite week of 2026-06-08 |
| 2026-06-10 | LONESTAR-VM (Windows VM, Warren site, GuruRMM agent) RDP enabled in firewall via GuruRMM: Remote Desktop rules confirmed enabled and tightened from `Any` to Domain+Private (removed Public exposure); active net Private, RDP listening already on. VM documented for the first time — IP 192.168.120.197/24, Warren LAN 192.168.120.0/24. |

---

## Compilation Notes

- Surgical update 2026-06-02 ~18:10 PT (Howard-Home/claude-main): retired the old Unraid USB (new registered/stable); handed remaining Unraid items (root pw vault, server docs, array verify, LimeTech/Unraid API skill) to Mike via todo `de75eec6`, deferred until Mike posts a note; recorded that LS-1/LS-2 are at the ACG office for repair (explains the 172.16.0.0/22 ARP entries) and return onsite week of 2026-06-08.
- Refreshed 2026-06-02 ~17:45 PT (recompile by Howard-Home/claude-main) to absorb the "17:39 PT — Sophos removal COMPLETE" update section of the 2026-06-02 session log: marked Sophos removal COMPLETE on both LS-1/LS-2 in Active Work and Infrastructure; updated hours remaining to 13.5 (Syncro #32347 2.0h + #32372 1.5h billed/closed); expanded Patterns with the proven full procedure including the critical two-driver distinction (SophosEL ELAM boot-critical — never rename/delete; SophosED tamper driver — disable via Start=4+SEDEnabled=0); added LS-1/LS-2 GuruRMM agent IDs; added two new History Highlights rows (PE+SophosZap completion, billing).
- Refreshed 2026-06-02 22:10 PT (recompile by HOWARD-HOME/claude-main) to absorb the 22:10 PT update section of the 2026-06-02 session log: updated Active Work Sophos bullet to reflect execution-in-progress on LS-1 (BitLocker confirmed off, SophosZap staged, awaiting drive-letter check before PE delete); updated Patterns wording from "in progress 2026-05-28/29" to "execution started 2026-06-02"; added History Highlights row for the LS-1 PE execution start.
- Refreshed 2026-06-02 (recompile by HOWARD-HOME/claude-main) to absorb the 2026-06-02 session log: added Unraid server infrastructure subsection, new `bzfirmware` checksum pattern, history row, and pending Active Work items.
- Refreshed 2026-06-01 (full recompile) to incorporate the 2026-05-28/29 Sophos removal work, which had previously been lost — it was never written to a session log and survived only in a gitignored temp draft (`.claude/tmp/ollama_prompt.txt`) and coord message `8a5cb25c`. A proper session log was reconstructed at `clients/lonestar-electrical/session-logs/2026-05-29-sophos-removal.md` before this compile.
- Seeded 2026-05-26 from two March session logs + credentials.md + vault entry + temp provisioning scripts, enriched with live Syncro data (customer 33809612).
- **Vault slug is `lonestar-electrical`** (matches `clients/lonestar-electrical/` in the vault), though session logs and temp scripts use the un-hyphenated `lonestar`.
- Lonestar work now lives in both `clients/lonestar-electrical/` (docs + session-logs) and root session logs / `temp/` scripts.
- Flagged `[verify]`: billing rate; exact roles/names for James, Kyla, Russ; full workstation inventory; Unraid server hostname/IP/license type/root credentials.

## Backlinks

*(none yet)*
