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feat(harness): P1+P2+P3 harness optimization complete (VERSION 1.4.0)

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Task 5  one-line registry descriptions on the 8 biggest skills (remediation-tool,
        gc-audit, packetdial, memory-dream, human-flow, self-check, impeccable,
        mailprotector); skill-description injection ~3320 -> ~2123 tokens (~36%),
        keyword triggers preserved, frontmatter valid.
Task 7  thinned /save + /sync bodies to point at sync.sh (single source) instead of
        re-documenting internals; Phase 0 save-vs-sync, cross-user notes, exit-75
        reporting kept verbatim; mechanical sync never depends on an LLM step.
Task 10 session-logs/YYYY-MM/ forward convention for new logs (scoped-grep recall,
        no monolithic index); existing flat logs untouched (grep covers both).
Bash    now-phoenix.sh helper (fixed UTC-7 epoch math; replaces unreliable
        TZ=America/Phoenix date that silently returns UTC on Git-Bash).

P0 (1.2.0) + Task 6 CLAUDE split + Task 9 delegation (1.3.0) already shipped.
Spec: specs/claudetools-harness-optimization/plan.md.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Mike Swanson
2026-06-08 08:10:58 -07:00
parent 25fa10b405
commit 08dc9167a4
14 changed files with 1740 additions and 1710 deletions
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126
.claude/skills/remediation-tool/SKILL.md
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@@ -1,65 +1,61 @@
---
name: remediation-tool
description: |
M365 tenant investigation and remediation using the ComputerGuru tiered MSP app suite (5 apps: Security Investigator, Exchange Operator, User Manager, Tenant Admin, Defender Add-on). Auto-invoke when the user says "remediation tool", "365 remediation", "check <user>'s mailbox/box", "credential stuffing" against an M365 user, "breach check" on an M365 tenant, or needs M365 admin API work that client-credentials Graph + Exchange REST can perform. NOT for CIPP — this is the direct Graph API app suite.
Also invoke when the user needs any of: inbox rule enumeration, mailbox forwarding check, delegate/SendAs audit, OAuth consent audit, sign-in log queries, risky user lookup, directory audit queries, B2B guest invite audit against M365.
Triggers: "365 remediation", "remediation tool", "check <user> box/mailbox/account for breach", "credential stuff*", "who's getting attacked", "foreign sign-in", "inbox rule", "mailbox forward*", "oauth consent" (in MSP context), "tenant sweep", "risky user", "hidden rule", Exchange Online admin API, "adminapi/beta/{tenant}/InvokeCommand".
---
# 365 Remediation Tool
Read-only by default. All remediation actions require explicit `YES` confirmation in chat (not a permission prompt).
## App Architecture (Tiered)
Five multi-tenant apps cover distinct privilege tiers. Use only what the task requires.
| Tier | App display name | App ID | Vault file | Scope |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `investigator` | ComputerGuru Security Investigator | `bfbc12a4-f0dd-4e12-b06d-997e7271e10c` | `computerguru-security-investigator.sops.yaml` | Graph read-only |
| `investigator-exo` | ComputerGuru Security Investigator | `bfbc12a4-f0dd-4e12-b06d-997e7271e10c` | `computerguru-security-investigator.sops.yaml` | Exchange Online read |
| `exchange-op` | ComputerGuru Exchange Operator | `b43e7342-5b4b-492f-890f-bb5a4f7f40e9` | `computerguru-exchange-operator.sops.yaml` | Exchange Online write |
| `user-manager` | ComputerGuru User Manager | `64fac46b-8b44-41ad-93ee-7da03927576c` | `computerguru-user-manager.sops.yaml` | Graph user/group write |
| `tenant-admin` | ComputerGuru Tenant Admin | `709e6eed-0711-4875-9c44-2d3518c47063` | `computerguru-tenant-admin.sops.yaml` | Graph high-privilege |
| `defender` | ComputerGuru Defender Add-on | `dbf8ad1a-54f4-4bb8-8a9e-ea5b9634635b` | `computerguru-defender-addon.sops.yaml` | Defender ATP (MDE only) |
**Default for breach checks:** use `investigator` (Graph) + `investigator-exo` (Exchange read). Escalate to write tiers only when remediating.
## Auto-Invocation Behavior
When triggered automatically (vs. via `/remediation-tool`), follow the same workflow in `.claude/commands/remediation-tool.md`:
1. Parse the user's intent into a subcommand (check/sweep/signins/consent-url/remediate).
2. Resolve tenant ID from domain.
3. Acquire tokens via `get-token.sh <tenant> <tier>` — use lowest-privilege tier needed.
4. Run checks via scripts in `scripts/`.
5. Interpret findings using `references/checklist.md`.
6. Write report to `clients/{slug}/reports/YYYY-MM-DD-{action}.md` using `templates/breach-report.md`.
7. Chat summary + delegate commit to Gitea agent.
## Before calling any script, verify
- The SOPS vault is accessible via `.claude/identity.json` `vault_path` field. The scripts auto-resolve the vault location from identity.json — no hardcoded paths.
- `jq`, `curl`, `bash` are available.
- For Exchange REST checks: confirm the target tenant has **Exchange Administrator** role assigned to the **Security Investigator** SP (for reads) or **Exchange Operator** SP (for writes). If any Exchange REST call returns 403, emit the tenant-scoped Entra Roles link from `references/gotchas.md`.
- For Identity Protection checks: `IdentityRiskyUser.Read.All` is in the Security Investigator manifest AND the tenant has consented to that app. If 403, emit the per-app consent URL from `references/gotchas.md`.
- For Defender checks: confirm tenant has Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) license before using `defender` tier — it returns AADSTS650052 otherwise.
## Conventions
- **Target identifiers**: accept UPN, domain, or tenant GUID. Normalize to tenant GUID internally.
- **Token tiers**: minimum necessary privilege. Never use `tenant-admin` for a read-only check.
- **Token cache**: `/tmp/remediation-tool/{tenant-id}/{tier}.jwt`. TTL 55 minutes. Check `-mmin -55` before reuse.
- **Raw JSON artifacts**: `/tmp/remediation-tool/{tenant-id}/{check}/` — keep so the user can re-analyze.
- **Reports**: `clients/{slug}/reports/YYYY-MM-DD-{action}.md`. Derive slug from domain (strip TLD, hyphenate).
- **UTC dates everywhere**.
## Scope boundaries
- **Not a replacement for CIPP.** Use CIPP for bulk baseline configuration, templates, standards alerting. Use this tool for focused investigation and point-in-time remediation.
- **Entra app registrations stay manual in the portal** — don't create/modify the multi-tenant apps themselves via the tool.
- **Conditional Access policies CAN be managed programmatically** (Tenant Admin tier holds `Policy.ReadWrite.ConditionalAccess` + the Conditional Access Administrator role). MANDATORY discipline: (1) always create/modify in **report-only** (`state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced`) first; (2) always **exclude the tenant's break-glass account** (`conditions.users.excludeUsers`); (3) verify impact in Entra sign-in logs before enforcing; (4) get explicit user confirmation before flipping any policy to `enabled` on a tenant with real users. (CA-manual boundary relaxed 2026-05-27 at Mike's direction — break-glass + report-only keep blast radius near zero.)
- **Not for Graph permissions the apps don't have.** If a call 403s and the scope isn't in the relevant app's manifest, stop and tell the user — don't try to work around it.
- **Defender tier requires MDE license.** If the tenant doesn't have MDE, the token request succeeds but API calls return AADSTS650052. Check before using.
---
name: remediation-tool
description: "M365 tenant investigation + remediation via the ComputerGuru MSP app suite (Security Investigator/Exchange Operator/User Manager/Tenant Admin/Defender). Direct Graph+Exchange REST (not CIPP). Triggers: 365 remediation, breach/credential-stuffing check, check a mailbox, inbox rules, mailbox forwarding, delegate/SendAs audit, OAuth consent, sign-in/risky-user lookup, tenant sweep."
---
# 365 Remediation Tool
Read-only by default. All remediation actions require explicit `YES` confirmation in chat (not a permission prompt).
## App Architecture (Tiered)
Five multi-tenant apps cover distinct privilege tiers. Use only what the task requires.
| Tier | App display name | App ID | Vault file | Scope |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| `investigator` | ComputerGuru Security Investigator | `bfbc12a4-f0dd-4e12-b06d-997e7271e10c` | `computerguru-security-investigator.sops.yaml` | Graph read-only |
| `investigator-exo` | ComputerGuru Security Investigator | `bfbc12a4-f0dd-4e12-b06d-997e7271e10c` | `computerguru-security-investigator.sops.yaml` | Exchange Online read |
| `exchange-op` | ComputerGuru Exchange Operator | `b43e7342-5b4b-492f-890f-bb5a4f7f40e9` | `computerguru-exchange-operator.sops.yaml` | Exchange Online write |
| `user-manager` | ComputerGuru User Manager | `64fac46b-8b44-41ad-93ee-7da03927576c` | `computerguru-user-manager.sops.yaml` | Graph user/group write |
| `tenant-admin` | ComputerGuru Tenant Admin | `709e6eed-0711-4875-9c44-2d3518c47063` | `computerguru-tenant-admin.sops.yaml` | Graph high-privilege |
| `defender` | ComputerGuru Defender Add-on | `dbf8ad1a-54f4-4bb8-8a9e-ea5b9634635b` | `computerguru-defender-addon.sops.yaml` | Defender ATP (MDE only) |
**Default for breach checks:** use `investigator` (Graph) + `investigator-exo` (Exchange read). Escalate to write tiers only when remediating.
## Auto-Invocation Behavior
When triggered automatically (vs. via `/remediation-tool`), follow the same workflow in `.claude/commands/remediation-tool.md`:
1. Parse the user's intent into a subcommand (check/sweep/signins/consent-url/remediate).
2. Resolve tenant ID from domain.
3. Acquire tokens via `get-token.sh <tenant> <tier>` — use lowest-privilege tier needed.
4. Run checks via scripts in `scripts/`.
5. Interpret findings using `references/checklist.md`.
6. Write report to `clients/{slug}/reports/YYYY-MM-DD-{action}.md` using `templates/breach-report.md`.
7. Chat summary + delegate commit to Gitea agent.
## Before calling any script, verify
- The SOPS vault is accessible via `.claude/identity.json` `vault_path` field. The scripts auto-resolve the vault location from identity.json — no hardcoded paths.
- `jq`, `curl`, `bash` are available.
- For Exchange REST checks: confirm the target tenant has **Exchange Administrator** role assigned to the **Security Investigator** SP (for reads) or **Exchange Operator** SP (for writes). If any Exchange REST call returns 403, emit the tenant-scoped Entra Roles link from `references/gotchas.md`.
- For Identity Protection checks: `IdentityRiskyUser.Read.All` is in the Security Investigator manifest AND the tenant has consented to that app. If 403, emit the per-app consent URL from `references/gotchas.md`.
- For Defender checks: confirm tenant has Microsoft Defender for Endpoint (MDE) license before using `defender` tier — it returns AADSTS650052 otherwise.
## Conventions
- **Target identifiers**: accept UPN, domain, or tenant GUID. Normalize to tenant GUID internally.
- **Token tiers**: minimum necessary privilege. Never use `tenant-admin` for a read-only check.
- **Token cache**: `/tmp/remediation-tool/{tenant-id}/{tier}.jwt`. TTL 55 minutes. Check `-mmin -55` before reuse.
- **Raw JSON artifacts**: `/tmp/remediation-tool/{tenant-id}/{check}/` — keep so the user can re-analyze.
- **Reports**: `clients/{slug}/reports/YYYY-MM-DD-{action}.md`. Derive slug from domain (strip TLD, hyphenate).
- **UTC dates everywhere**.
## Scope boundaries
- **Not a replacement for CIPP.** Use CIPP for bulk baseline configuration, templates, standards alerting. Use this tool for focused investigation and point-in-time remediation.
- **Entra app registrations stay manual in the portal** — don't create/modify the multi-tenant apps themselves via the tool.
- **Conditional Access policies CAN be managed programmatically** (Tenant Admin tier holds `Policy.ReadWrite.ConditionalAccess` + the Conditional Access Administrator role). MANDATORY discipline: (1) always create/modify in **report-only** (`state: enabledForReportingButNotEnforced`) first; (2) always **exclude the tenant's break-glass account** (`conditions.users.excludeUsers`); (3) verify impact in Entra sign-in logs before enforcing; (4) get explicit user confirmation before flipping any policy to `enabled` on a tenant with real users. (CA-manual boundary relaxed 2026-05-27 at Mike's direction — break-glass + report-only keep blast radius near zero.)
- **Not for Graph permissions the apps don't have.** If a call 403s and the scope isn't in the relevant app's manifest, stop and tell the user — don't try to work around it.
- **Defender tier requires MDE license.** If the tenant doesn't have MDE, the token request succeeds but API calls return AADSTS650052. Check before using.