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sync: auto-sync from GURU-5070 at 2026-06-03 19:39:32

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Author: Mike Swanson
Machine: GURU-5070
Timestamp: 2026-06-03 19:39:32
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Mike Swanson
2026-06-03 19:39:36 -07:00
parent a98fed14c9
commit 10e8d7b6bb
6 changed files with 158 additions and 34 deletions
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@@ -23,10 +23,10 @@ backlinks: []
## Profile
- **Contract type:** Managed (long-term — ~15 years per session logs)
- **Key contacts:** Steve Eastman — seastman@glaztech.com — internal IT, ~200 users, 9 locations. Desktop-level tech; guides technical direction, ACG implements.
- **Key contacts:** Steve Eastman — seastman@glaztech.com — internal IT, ~200 users, 9 locations. Desktop-level tech; guides technical direction, ACG implements. Tom (last name not recorded) — internal dev, author of the GTIware/GlazGTI PSA (the internal software that stores card-on-file data).
- **Billing rate:** [unverified — not recorded in session logs]
- **Syncro customer ID:** 143932
- **Active tickets:** #32186 (M365 Security Review / MFA, In Progress as of 2026-04-21), #32376 (Apex 404 + redirect, Resolved, 2026-06-03), #32377 (CyberSource TLS payment outage, Resolved, 2026-06-03), #32378 (Security assessment / PCI remediation, In Progress as of 2026-06-03)
- **Active tickets:** #32186 (M365 Security Review / MFA, In Progress as of 2026-04-21), #32376 (Apex 404 + redirect, Resolved, 2026-06-03), #32377 (CyberSource TLS payment outage, Resolved, 2026-06-03), #32378 (Security assessment / PCI remediation, **Waiting on Customer** as of 2026-06-03 — assessment + reports delivered, Tom replied, client to remediate)
- **Prepaid block remaining:** ~22.25 hrs (drew 26.5 → 22.25 on 2026-06-03)
- **GuruRMM client ID:** d857708c-5713-4ee5-a314-679f86d2f9f9
- **GuruRMM site:** SLC - Salt Lake City (Site ID: 290bd2ea-4af5-49c6-8863-c6d58c5a55de)
@@ -40,14 +40,15 @@ Multi-site Windows environment (~200 users, 9 locations). Active Directory confi
| Server | Role | OS / Build | Local IP | Public IP | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| WWW | IIS web server — customer/e-commerce site | Windows Server 2019 Standard, build 10.0.17763.8755 (patched ~May 2026) | 192.168.8.72 | 65.113.52.88 | IIS 10.0, .NET 4.8; site `glaztech_new` at `D:\web\glaztech_4`; full VB.NET source on disk (not precompiled); LE cert CN=www.glaztech.com, SAN apex+www, exp 2026-08-19 via Certify The Web (HTTP-01); GuruRMM agent 455a1bc7-1c29-42bc-b597-fa1e64f08eec; **doubles as dev workstation** (VS 2015+2022 installed — see Security Posture) |
| SQL backend | SQL Server — 15 per-office databases + Sage 100 + TimeForce | [unverified — Server 2019 assumed, co-located with Glaztech infra] | 192.168.8.62,3436 | — | Login `tom` (creds in site Web.config, NOT vaulted); DBs: glaz_prod (tuc), glaz_prod_phx, glaz_prod_slc, glaz_prod_elp, glaz_prod_den, glaz_prod_alb, glaz_prod_boi, glaz_prod_brl, glaz_prod_shp, glaz_prod_corp + mas_gti (Sage 100) + qqest (TimeForce) |
| GTI-INV-SQL | SQL Server — website backend + GTIware PSA (shared instance) | [unverified — Server OS not confirmed; co-located with GTI/Glaztech infra] | 192.168.8.62,3436 | — | **Hostname: GTI-INV-SQL.** Login `tom` = named SQL login (SQL auth, created 2018), **member of `sysadmin` server role** (also securityadmin, dbcreator, db_owner); password embedded in site `Web.config` (NOT vaulted). **46 databases total:** all offices' `glaz_prod*` + `*_archive` databases, PDF stores, `qqest` (TimeForce payroll), `gti_samsara`, `mas_gti` (Sage 100), system DBs (`master`, `msdb`). Other sysadmin logins on instance: `GTI-INV-SQL\Administrator`, `NT SERVICE\*`, `sa` (enabled), `tom`. |
| Service | Details | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| M365 tenant | glaztechindustries.onmicrosoft.com | ~200 users, basic licensing (no Entra P1) |
| Exchange Online | glaztech.com | MailProtector inbound filter (MX 5 primary) |
| Active Directory | glaztech.com domain | [unverified — AD inferred from OU references in scripts] |
| Payment processing | CyberSource REST (api.cybersource.com/pts/v2/payments) — PNC merchant processor for card payments; CyberSource SOAP toolkit for eCheck/ACH (cybs.log) | Card path: online-payment-pnc.aspx; eCheck path: ach.aspx; card-on-file auto-pay via gt_auto_process_2020.dll |
| Payment processing | CyberSource REST (api.cybersource.com/pts/v2/payments) — PNC merchant processor for card payments; CyberSource SOAP toolkit for eCheck/ACH (cybs.log) | Card path: online-payment-pnc.aspx; eCheck path: ach.aspx. Card-on-file auto-pay engine is GTIware (`gt_auto_process_2020.dll`) — not the website. |
| GTIware PSA | Internal PSA (Tom's software): `glaztech_utilities_2020.dll` + `gt_auto_process_2020.dll` — staff-operated card-on-file system. Writes `cc_file` rows stamped with staff usernames. Shares `GTI-INV-SQL` with the public website. | Cards stored by GTIware, NOT by the website (website's `.aspx`/`.vb` has zero `cc_file`/`save_cc_data` references). |
### Email & Identity
@@ -110,7 +111,7 @@ Note on Priority 1: The "GTIMail No-Reply - Reject Inbound" rule rejects ALL inb
- **DNS access:** `root@172.16.3.10` (IX server)
- **Deploy (endpoints):** GuruRMM (preferred) or ScreenConnect
- **MailProtector / CloudFilter partner portal:** NO credentials in vault — manual partner-portal login required for any MailProtector changes (provisioning, spam summary enable). Consider vaulting.
- **Glaztech SQL login (`tom`):** present in `D:\web\glaztech_4\Web.config` connectionStrings — NOT in vault. Read-only access for assessment only; do NOT use outside of authorized sessions.
- **Glaztech SQL login (`tom`):** present in `D:\web\glaztech_4\Web.config` connectionStrings — NOT in vault. Used read-only for the 2026-06-03 assessment only; do NOT use outside of authorized sessions. This login has sysadmin rights on `GTI-INV-SQL` — treat with corresponding care.
## Security Posture — CRITICAL (Active Issue — Ticket #32378)
@@ -120,12 +121,32 @@ Note on Priority 1: The "GTIMail No-Reply - Reject Inbound" rule rejects ALL inb
A full read-only security assessment of the Glaztech e-commerce web application and SQL backend was performed 2026-06-03. Overall risk: **CRITICAL**. Key findings (no card numbers or passwords are reproduced here):
### C0 (TOP CRITICAL) — Website connects to `GTI-INV-SQL` as `sysadmin`
**This is the single most dangerous finding.** The public website at `D:\web\glaztech_4` logs into the SQL server `GTI-INV-SQL` (192.168.8.62,3436) using SQL login **`tom`** — a **named SQL login** (SQL auth, created 2018, NOT the built-in `sa`) that is a **member of the `sysadmin` server role** (also securityadmin, dbcreator, db_owner). The password is **embedded in the site's `Web.config`** on the internet-facing server.
That same SQL instance (`GTI-INV-SQL`) is **shared with GTIware** (Tom's internal PSA) and hosts **46 databases**: all offices' `glaz_prod*` + `*_archive`, PDF stores, `qqest` (TimeForce payroll), `gti_samsara`, `mas_gti` (Sage 100), and system DBs.
Because a SQL injection executes as the connecting login, the website's `quo()` SQLi flaw executes with **full sysadmin rights across the entire instance**. Cross-database reach was confirmed live: from a single injectable page on the Tucson connection, other offices' `cc_file` tables were read (`glaz_prod_phx` = 141 rows, `glaz_prod_den` = 190, `glaz_prod_elp` = 179).
**Attack chain:** (1) guess one website customer login (no lockout, username = account number, passwords as short as 3 chars, plaintext) → (2) hit an injectable payment page → (3) inject as sysadmin → total control of `GTI-INV-SQL`. As sysadmin an attacker can: steal every stored card PAN+CVV and password; DROP/encrypt all 46 databases (every office, all archives); commit fraud; enable `xp_cmdshell` → OS-level code execution on the SQL server → network pivot into the GTI/Glaztech environment.
**One guessed website login + the SQLi = full theft, destruction, or ransom of the entire GTIware database server.**
**Required remediation — do this FIRST:**
1. Pull the `tom` sysadmin login from the website. Give the site a **dedicated least-privilege login** scoped only to the tables/views/procs it needs, with **no access to GTIware databases** (no `cc_file`, no other offices, no archives).
2. **Separate the website's data from GTIware.** The internet-facing app must not share a SQL instance with the internal PSA's cardholder data.
3. **Stop storing cards on-prem** — call the processor's API/hosted vault directly (no card data lands on Glaztech systems), or at minimum tokenize (store a token, never the PAN). CVV must never be stored — PCI Req 3.2, no exception.
4. Fix the SQLi (parameterize all queries, remove `quo()`); add login lockout/rate-limiting.
### Cardholder Data — PCI-DSS Violations (Req 3.2 + 3.4)
**Storage attribution (IMPORTANT):** The website stores **NO** cards. The website's `.aspx`/`.vb` files have zero `cc_file`/`save_cc_data`/`gt_auto_process` references; the quick-pay pages even carry a disclaimer that no card info is saved. The plaintext cards are written by **GTIware** — Tom's internal PSA (`glaztech_utilities_2020.dll` + `gt_auto_process_2020.dll`, compiled libs in the site `Bin` but not called by the site). Recent `cc_file` rows are stamped with staff usernames (Victoria, Bryce, Diana) and notes like "RUN CARD WHEN REQUESTED" — a back-office card-on-file workflow. The website is the **access vector** (C0), not the storer.
- **`cc_file` (~780 saved cards):** Full PAN stored in plaintext in every per-office database (`glaz_prod`, `glaz_prod_phx`, `glaz_prod_slc`, `glaz_prod_elp`, `glaz_prod_den`, `glaz_prod_alb`, `glaz_prod_boi`, `glaz_prod_brl`, `glaz_prod_shp`, `glaz_prod_corp`). Zero encrypted rows. `cc_file.cc_code` retains CVV/CID (50/54 rows in tuc; mirrors expected in all offices). **CVV retention is a PCI Req 3.2 violation — indefensible; no exception even if encrypted.**
- **`cof_payments_header` (historical payments):** Phoenix alone: 14,496 rows, 11,794 plaintext PANs. Tuc: 2,245 rows, ~367 plaintext + ~597 formatted. Years of transaction history with recoverable card numbers.
- **Why cards are stored:** Card-on-file invoice auto-pay. `i_get_cc_on_file_invoices` joins `invoice` × `cc_file`; `gt_auto_process_2020.dll` reads stored PANs and bills them via CyberSource. `get_cc_data` is `SELECT * FROM cc_file` (returns full PAN+CVV; IDOR-shaped on `@acctno`). Stale copies in `Old_bin`/`Old_code\Bin`. **Feature can be preserved by migrating to the chosen processor's token vault — store a token reference instead of the raw PAN.**
- **Containment:** Exposure is limited to the 15 custom web-app databases on 192.168.8.62. The Sage 100 ERP DB (`mas_gti`) stores **no** cardholder data — its native CC module is **disabled** (`SY_Company.CreditCardEnable=N`, `AR_CustomerCreditCard`=0 rows; tokenization columns exist in the schema but are unused). **Database backups also contain plaintext PANs — cleanup must address backups, not just live data.**
- **Containment:** Exposure is contained to the GTIware card-on-file tables (`cc_file`, `cof_payments_header`) in the 15 custom web-app databases on `GTI-INV-SQL` (192.168.8.62). The Sage 100 ERP DB (`mas_gti`) stores **no** cardholder data — its native CC module is **disabled** (`SY_Company.CreditCardEnable=N`, `AR_CustomerCreditCard`=0 rows; tokenization columns exist in the schema but are unused). Sage is **not** a cardholder-data location. **Database backups also contain plaintext PANs — cleanup must address backups, not just live data.**
- **Processor reality (verified 2026-06-03):** despite a belief that processing moved to "Payrilla/Paya," the website is **still on CyberSource/PNC** (no Payrilla anywhere in site code/config) and **still writing plaintext cards daily** (`cc_file` last write tuc 2026-06-03 14:15, phx 10:19; live `CC-WebPayment-PNC` txns today). Sage's CC module is off. Payrilla, if used, is a **separate channel not visible in either system and not connected to the website** — the website exposure is unchanged. Anomaly: `cc_file` absent in the `corp` DB though present earlier 2026-06-03 — needs a look.
### Authentication — Plaintext Passwords
@@ -142,7 +163,7 @@ Function quo(stext) As String
Return "'" + stext + "'" ' wraps in quotes, does NOT escape embedded quotes
End Function
```
Used to build concatenated dynamic SQL in payment pages (`ach.aspx.vb`, `quick-pay-ach.aspx.vb`, `quick-pay-pnc.aspx.vb`, `quick-pay.aspx.vb`, `order-detail*`). 59 concatenated SQL statements identified (~10 joining user input). The login path itself is parameterized (sproc) and not injectable; 948 parameterized calls elsewhere. **Any input containing `'` breaks out and allows injection; a logged-in attacker can UNION-inject full PANs + CVV.**
Used to build concatenated dynamic SQL in payment pages (`ach.aspx.vb`, `quick-pay-ach.aspx.vb`, `quick-pay-pnc.aspx.vb`, `quick-pay.aspx.vb`, `order-detail*`). 59 concatenated SQL statements identified (~10 joining user input). The login path itself is parameterized (sproc) and not injectable; 948 parameterized calls elsewhere. **Any input containing `'` breaks out and allows injection; because the site connects as sysadmin, injection = full instance compromise (see C0).**
### Other Critical/High Findings
@@ -153,30 +174,31 @@ Used to build concatenated dynamic SQL in payment pages (`ach.aspx.vb`, `quick-p
| Production server is also a dev workstation: VS Community 2015 + 2022, .NET 8 SDKs, MSBuild, IIS Express, full VB.NET source on disk | High |
| Remote-access sprawl: RealVNC Enterprise E4.2.8 (~2009, EoL), stale ScreenConnect v6.0.11622 (2018), Splashtop, Datto RMM+EDR, Syncro, GuruRMM (6+ agents) | High |
| Server listener accepts TLS 1.0 + 1.1 (SChannel Enabled=1) | High |
| Single shared SQL login (`tom`) with full read on card + password columns; creds in `Web.config` in cleartext | High |
| Single shared SQL login (`tom`) with sysadmin rights; creds in `Web.config` in cleartext | High |
| No Secure/HttpOnly cookies; no session regeneration on login; session-fixation risk | High |
### Attack Chain Summary
Obtain a customer login (LOW difficulty — no lockout, guessable username = account number, plaintext passwords as short as 3 chars) → access payment pages → SQL inject with `quo()` to UNION-dump `cc_file` → full PAN + CVV for all saved cards in the office, plaintext. **Every compensating control (lockout, password hashing, PAN encryption, parameterized queries) is absent; first failure is last failure.**
Obtain a customer login (LOW difficulty — no lockout, guessable username = account number, plaintext passwords as short as 3 chars) → access payment pages → SQL inject with `quo()` → executes as **sysadmin** on `GTI-INV-SQL` → full read/write/DROP of all 46 databases, `xp_cmdshell` OS takeover, network pivot. **Every compensating control (lockout, password hashing, PAN encryption, parameterized queries, least-privilege DB login) is absent; first failure is last failure.**
### Remediation Roadmap (Ticket #32378 — In Progress)
### Remediation Roadmap (Ticket #32378 — Waiting on Customer)
**Now (days):**
1. Purge stored CVV (`cc_file.cc_code`, backup-first — needs Tom/Steve explicit sign-off)
2. `debug="false"` + `customErrors="On"`; HTML-encode `gt_errorpage.aspx`; stop echoing exception text to users
3. Remove RealVNC 4.2.8 and stale ScreenConnect v6
4. Disable TLS 1.0/1.1 on the IIS/SChannel listener
**Now (days) — requires client sign-off:**
1. Pull sysadmin login from the website: give the site a dedicated least-privilege login with no access to GTIware/card data (this alone cuts the blast radius of a breach from "total GTIware compromise" to "website DB only")
2. Purge stored CVV (`cc_file.cc_code`, backup-first — needs Tom/Steve explicit sign-off)
3. `debug="false"` + `customErrors="On"`; HTML-encode `gt_errorpage.aspx`; stop echoing exception text to users
4. Remove RealVNC 4.2.8 and stale ScreenConnect v6
5. Disable TLS 1.0/1.1 on the IIS/SChannel listener
**Short term (weeks):**
5. Hash all passwords (PBKDF2/bcrypt/Argon2); replace email-the-password flow with reset-token flow; force global reset
6. Parameterize all concatenated SQL in payment pages; delete `quo()`
7. Add Secure+HttpOnly cookies, session regeneration on login, login throttling/lockout
8. Migrate card-on-file to the chosen processor's token vault (CyberSource or the new provider — confirm which flows actually route through "Payrilla"); purge/encrypt historical `cc_number` columns; address backups
6. Hash all passwords (PBKDF2/bcrypt/Argon2); replace email-the-password flow with reset-token flow; force global reset
7. Parameterize all concatenated SQL in payment pages; delete `quo()`
8. Add Secure+HttpOnly cookies, session regeneration on login, login throttling/lockout
9. Migrate card-on-file to the chosen processor's token vault (CyberSource or new provider — confirm which flows actually route through "Payrilla"); purge/encrypt historical `cc_number` columns; address backups
**Structural:**
9. Separate dev from production; deploy precompiled; remove SDKs/IDE/source from prod host
10. Least-privilege SQL accounts; secret management for Web.config connection strings; TDE at rest; re-scope merchant PCI SAQ after remediation
10. Separate dev from production; deploy precompiled; remove SDKs/IDE/source from prod host
11. Least-privilege SQL accounts per function; secret management for Web.config connection strings; TDE at rest; re-scope merchant PCI SAQ after remediation
## Patterns & Known Issues
@@ -195,8 +217,9 @@ Obtain a customer login (LOW difficulty — no lockout, guessable username = acc
- **IIS apex binding — always add both http:80 and https:443 for the bare domain:** The glaztech_new IIS site originally had only a www host-header binding. Apex (glaztech.com) returned 404 from HTTP.sys (not a 301 redirect, a real 404) because no binding matched. Fix: add `http/IP:80:glaztech.com` + `https/IP:443:glaztech.com` bindings reusing the existing SAN cert. When adding HTTP→HTTPS redirect via URL Rewrite, always include a negate condition on `/.well-known/acme-challenge/` so Certify The Web (HTTP-01) LE renewals are not blocked.
- **Legacy .NET + modern payment gateway TLS:** .NET Framework 4.x apps on Windows Server 2019 do NOT automatically use TLS 1.2 unless the registry keys `SchUseStrongCrypto=1` + `SystemDefaultTlsVersions=1` are set under BOTH `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\.NETFramework\v4.0.30319` AND `HKLM\SOFTWARE\WOW6432Node\Microsoft\.NETFramework\v4.0.30319`. Payment gateways (CyberSource, etc.) that drop TLS 1.0/1.1 will silently fail with "Could not create SSL/TLS secure channel" without this fix. App pool recycle required after registry change. Verify via the payments DB (look for fresh approvals), not just a TLS probe.
- **MailProtector digest provisioning is per-mailbox on the MailProtector side:** The SCL=-1 transport rule (Priority 4) ensures digest emails from `noreply@azcomputerguru.com` are not spam-filtered by EOP — but a mailbox that was never provisioned in MailProtector will never receive a digest regardless of EOP rules. Confirmed via message trace (shannon@glaztech.com: 629 digests sent to ~60 recipients over 10 days, 0 to Shannon). Fix is on the MailProtector partner portal — no Exchange change needed.
- **Glaztech custom web app — stored card feature requires tokenization to remediate safely:** Cards in `cc_file` are there for auto-pay via `gt_auto_process_2020.dll`. Deleting the PANs without a replacement breaks the auto-billing feature. The safe path is CyberSource token vault migration (tokenize on write, replace stored PAN with token, update `gt_auto_process` to bill by token). Quick win: purge CVV (`cc_code`) immediately — this has no functional impact and is the fastest PCI Req 3.2 remediation.
- **Glaztech SQL login (`tom`) + Web.config creds are NOT in the SOPS vault.** Do not commit these credentials. If future automation needs SQL access, vault them first.
- **Glaztech custom web app — stored card feature requires tokenization to remediate safely:** Cards in `cc_file` are there for GTIware auto-pay via `gt_auto_process_2020.dll`. Deleting the PANs without a replacement breaks the auto-billing feature. The safe path is processor token vault migration (tokenize on write, replace stored PAN with token, update `gt_auto_process` to bill by token). Quick win: purge CVV (`cc_code`) immediately — this has no functional impact and is the fastest PCI Req 3.2 remediation.
- **Glaztech SQL login (`tom`) + Web.config creds are NOT in the SOPS vault.** Do not commit these credentials. If future automation needs SQL access, vault them first. This login has sysadmin rights — treat any use with corresponding care.
- **Internet-facing website + internal PSA (GTIware) share one SQL instance; website connects as sysadmin → any website SQLi = full internal-DB compromise.** The public website (`WWW`, 65.113.52.88) and GTIware (the internal card-on-file PSA) both use `GTI-INV-SQL` (192.168.8.62,3436). The web login `tom` is sysadmin. A SQL injection on the website executes as sysadmin against the entire 46-DB instance — cross-DB reads confirmed live. Public web apps must use least-privilege DB logins isolated from internal data. Internet-facing apps must never share a SQL instance with an internal PSA without strict permission partitioning.
## Active Work
@@ -222,9 +245,12 @@ Waiting on Steve's reply to:
MFA rollout plan: Phase 1 — user communication (install Authenticator); Phase 2 — enable enforcement; Phase 3 — follow-up stragglers; Phase 4 (future/P1) — Conditional Access with trusted IPs for office locations.
### Website Security Remediation (Ticket #32378 — In Progress)
### Website Security Remediation (Ticket #32378 — Waiting on Customer)
Security assessment complete 2026-06-03. Awaiting Mike/Steve direction to begin remediation. See Security Posture section and reports in `clients/glaztech/reports/` for full detail. Key actions queued but not yet executed (require client sign-off):
Security assessment complete 2026-06-03. Assessment and reports delivered to client (Steve/Tom). Tom replied 2026-06-03 confirming that the website stores no cards (correct); investigation of his reply surfaced C0 (sysadmin login). Reply posted on #32378 explaining the sysadmin+SQLi chain and the four required remediations. Ticket set to **Waiting on Customer** — Tom/Steve to remediate. ACG can execute quick wins (CVV purge, least-privilege login, debug-off) on client go-ahead.
Key actions queued but not yet executed (require client sign-off):
- Pull `tom` sysadmin login from the website → replace with least-privilege login that cannot see GTIware data (HIGHEST PRIORITY)
- Purge CVV from `cc_file.cc_code` (backup-first; needs explicit go-ahead from Tom)
- `debug="false"` + `customErrors="On"` — can apply quickly with low risk
- Remove RealVNC 4.2.8 and stale ScreenConnect v6
@@ -250,6 +276,8 @@ Message trace confirmed shannon@glaztech.com receives no MailProtector digests a
- Consider creating retroactive Syncro ticket for 2026-05-28 SHVSALES email delivery work
- Monitor continued card payment success on WWW after 2026-06-03 TLS fix (verify `web_payment_header` for ongoing approvals)
- Tom code fallback (`ServicePointManager.SecurityProtocol = Tls12` in app code) staged but not deployed — can apply if registry fix ever regresses
- Investigate `corp` DB `cc_file` "Invalid object name" anomaly (existed 2026-06-03 morning with 3 rows, then returned "Invalid object name" later same day — per-office DBs unaffected)
- Confirm with Tom/Payrilla which flows actually route through Payrilla, and whether a migration to tokenized card storage via the new provider is planned for the website
## History Highlights
@@ -260,7 +288,8 @@ Message trace confirmed shannon@glaztech.com receives no MailProtector digests a
- **2026-04-21** — clearcutglass.com DNS fixed by Team Logic IT (Jordan Fox). Transport rule removed. External Global Admin (glaztechadmin from tomakkglass.com / Team Logic IT) removed from tenant. M365 security review surfaced: no MFA, 38 OAuth grants, unlicensed accounts, service account audit needed. Ticket #32186 opened for MFA implementation. Feedback: use expert-partner tone with Steve, not open-ended discovery questions.
- **2026-05-28** — SHVSALES@glaztech.com vendor email delivery failure. Root cause: vendors (centurytel.net, eastexglass.com) publish DMARC p=reject; Enhanced Filtering re-evaluates past MailProtector relay, producing 550 5.7.509 NDR. Fix: two SCL=-1 transport rules created (Priority 2: specific addresses for hartsglass, olemons, SSales, bossier; Priority 3: aaaglassinc.com domain). glassservices.com SPF broken (`-all`) — workaround only, vendor must fix.
- **2026-06-02** — MailProtector quarantine digest messages from `noreply@azcomputerguru.com` confirmed hitting `FilteredAsSpam` for some recipients (e.g., tshaw@glaztech.com). Transport rule created: "SCL Bypass - noreply@azcomputerguru.com (MailProtector digests)" at Priority 4 (From=noreply@azcomputerguru.com, SetSCL=-1). Message trace via `Get-MessageTraceV2` also revealed `gtimail@glaztech.com` failing daily due to pre-existing Priority-1 reject rule — flagged for Steve review.
- **2026-06-03** — Three tickets on web server `WWW` (192.168.8.72 / 65.113.52.88), all via GuruRMM. (1) **Apex 404 emergency:** glaztech.com returned 404 (IIS site `glaztech_new` had www-only binding); added apex http:80+https:443 bindings (cert SAN already covered apex), then added HTTP→HTTPS 301 URL Rewrite redirect with `/.well-known/acme-challenge/` exclusion (Certify/LE HTTP-01 renewal safe). `web.config.bak-20260603-090701` created. Ticket #32376 — Resolved, 1h remote. (2) **CyberSource payment outage ("Could not create SSL/TLS secure channel"):** CyberSource (PNC merchant processor) disabled TLS 1.0/1.1; .NET 4.x on Server 2019 defaulted to old TLS. Fix: `SchUseStrongCrypto=1` + `SystemDefaultTlsVersions=1` in both `.NETFramework\v4.0.30319` hives + app pool `glaztech_new` recycle. Verified via payments DB (credit-card approval at 09:36 post-fix). Ticket #32377 — Resolved, 1.5h emergency remote. (3) **Security assessment:** read-only deep inspection of IIS config, VB.NET source, and SQL backend revealed CRITICAL posture: full PANs + CVV plaintext, ~9,000+ plaintext passwords, SQL injection via `quo()` helper in payment pages, reflected XSS, debug mode on, dev workstation on prod, RealVNC 4.2.8, TLS 1.0/1.1 listener, single shared SQL login. Exposure contained to custom web-app DBs (not Sage 100 which tokenizes). Two reports created. Ticket #32378 opened and left In Progress for remediation. Billed 1h remote. Prepaid block: 26.5 → 22.25 hrs. Also: shannon@glaztech.com digest-not-received confirmed as MailProtector provisioning issue (not Exchange) — requires MailProtector partner-portal fix.
- **2026-06-03 (earlier)** — Three tickets on web server `WWW` (192.168.8.72 / 65.113.52.88), all via GuruRMM. (1) **Apex 404 emergency:** glaztech.com returned 404 (IIS site `glaztech_new` had www-only binding); added apex http:80+https:443 bindings (cert SAN already covered apex), then added HTTP→HTTPS 301 URL Rewrite redirect with `/.well-known/acme-challenge/` exclusion (Certify/LE HTTP-01 renewal safe). `web.config.bak-20260603-090701` created. Ticket #32376 — Resolved, 1h remote. (2) **CyberSource payment outage ("Could not create SSL/TLS secure channel"):** CyberSource (PNC merchant processor) disabled TLS 1.0/1.1; .NET 4.x on Server 2019 defaulted to old TLS. Fix: `SchUseStrongCrypto=1` + `SystemDefaultTlsVersions=1` in both `.NETFramework\v4.0.30319` hives + app pool `glaztech_new` recycle. Verified via payments DB (credit-card approval at 09:36 post-fix). Ticket #32377 — Resolved, 1.5h emergency remote. (3) **Security assessment:** read-only deep inspection of IIS config, VB.NET source, and SQL backend revealed CRITICAL posture. Sage 100 (`mas_gti`) confirmed NOT a cardholder-data location — CC module disabled (0 stored cards). Two reports created. Ticket #32378 opened. Billed 1h remote. Prepaid block: 26.5 → 22.25 hrs. Also: shannon@glaztech.com digest-not-received confirmed as MailProtector provisioning issue (not Exchange) — requires MailProtector partner-portal fix. Payrilla/CyberSource reconciliation: live system confirmed website is still on CyberSource/PNC with daily ongoing card writes.
- **2026-06-03 (late — ~19:32 PT)** — **Tom (GTIware dev) replied to #32378** clarifying that the website's online payment system stores no card data — he is correct. Investigation of Tom's reply surfaced the **top critical finding (C0):** the website connects to the shared SQL server `GTI-INV-SQL` (192.168.8.62,3436) as SQL login `tom`, a **named SQL login that is a member of the `sysadmin` role** (created 2018; password in `Web.config`). The instance hosts 46 databases shared between GTIware and the website. Because SQLi executes as the connecting login, the website's `quo()` injection = sysadmin over the entire `GTI-INV-SQL` instance; cross-database card-table reads confirmed live. **Attribution corrected in both reports:** the website is the access path (C0); GTIware (staff-operated) writes the cards. Sage CC module confirmed disabled (0 stored cards, not a CHD location). Both reports updated. Plain-English reply posted to Tom on #32378 (public+emailed, comment 417070212) explaining the sysadmin+SQLi chain and the four required fixes. Ticket set to **Waiting on Customer**.
## Backlinks

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wiki/index.md
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@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Run `/wiki-lint` to check for stale entries and broken backlinks.
| [ACG Internal Infrastructure](clients/internal-infrastructure.md) | ACG's own hosting infra — Neptune Exchange (cert expires 2026-05-31, DkimSigner disabled), IX server, Cloudflare tunnel workaround, ACG M365 tenant gaps | 2026-05-24 |
| [BirthBiologic](clients/birth-biologic.md) | Bio/healthcare; BB-SERVER (WS2016) GuruRMM enrolled; Datto→SharePoint migration incomplete; M365 apps partially consented | 2026-05-24 |
| [CryoWeave](clients/cryoweave.md) | Custom cryogenic cable assemblies; cPanel on IX; website redesign + SEO project in progress; Syncro ID not documented | 2026-05-24 |
| [Glaz-Tech Industries](clients/glaztech.md) | ~200 users, 9 locations; prepaid ~22.25 hrs; web server WWW (192.168.8.72 / 65.113.52.88) — IIS 10/VB.NET e-commerce; CRITICAL security posture (plaintext PANs+CVV, plaintext passwords, SQLi, XSS); apex 404 fixed + payment TLS fixed 2026-06-03; #32378 open for PCI remediation; M365 no MFA; SCL bypass rules for vendor DMARC + MailProtector digests | 2026-06-03 |
| [Glaz-Tech Industries](clients/glaztech.md) | ~200 users, 9 locations; prepaid ~22.25 hrs; web server WWW (192.168.8.72 / 65.113.52.88) — IIS 10/VB.NET e-commerce; CRITICAL security posture: website connects to GTI-INV-SQL as sysadmin (login `tom`, named SQL login, C0 top finding) + plaintext PANs+CVV (stored by GTIware PSA, not website) + plaintext passwords + SQLi via `quo()` + XSS; apex 404 fixed + payment TLS fixed 2026-06-03; #32378 Waiting on Customer (assessment + reports delivered, Tom replied); M365 no MFA; SCL bypass rules for vendor DMARC + MailProtector digests | 2026-06-03 |
| [Grabb & Durando Law Office](clients/grabb-durando.md) | Personal injury law firm; GND-SERVER GuruRMM enrolled; AI demand review app scoped ($4K–$7K); website migration pending; plaintext DB password in README needs vaulting | 2026-05-24 |
| [Pavon](clients/pavon.md) | Former/archive client; GeoVision NVR surveillance; OwnCloud at 172.16.3.22 backed by Uranus; cron stacking fixed; Nextcloud migration deferred 3–6 months | 2026-05-24 |
| [Rednour Law Offices](clients/rednour.md) | Law firm; M365 rednourlaw.com (tenant 4a4ca18a) fully onboarded 2026-05-31; all 5 ComputerGuru SPs consented; no MDE license; 3 workstations GuruRMM enrolled (FRONTDESKRECEPT/LEGALASST/REDNOURCARRIEVI); Carla Skinner renamed from Emma; prior MSP agents (ScreenConnect/Splashtop/Datto) still present; shared-drive access for Nick Pafford deferred | 2026-06-02 |