Session log: Cascades audit retention design + Pro-Tech Services email investigation

Cascades:
- Approved Howard's corrected 4-policy CA bypass design
- Caught + fixed policy 3 GDAP bug (Service provider users exclusion)
- Decided hybrid LAW + Storage Account audit retention (ACG-billed,
  reuse existing Trusted Signing Azure subscription, westus2)
- Wrote full audit retention runbook for Howard
- Reshaped break-glass to two accounts (split-storage YubiKeys)
- Documented Cascades M365 admin model (admin@/sysadmin@ Connect-excluded
  by design; local AD Administrator separate identity layer)
- Decided Howard gets Owner on ACG sub with guardrails (resource lock +
  cost alert) instead of per-RG Contributor

Pro-Tech Services:
- DNS recon of pro-techhelps.com + pro-techservices.co
- Diagnosed calendar invite delivery issue (DKIM domain mismatch +
  no DMARC = strict receivers silently drop invites)
- Drafted non-technical IT-provider migration email to Michelle Sora

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-04-29 17:05:41 -07:00
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@@ -21,6 +21,28 @@ Full contact list + Wi-Fi, KPAX, M365 admin, UniFi hardware MACs, GoDaddy are in
| `svc-audit-upload` | service account for Syncro audit upload to `AuditDrop$` share | `clients/cascades-tucson/svc-audit-upload.sops.yaml` |
| `\\CS-SERVER\homes` | file share at `D:\Homes`; per-user subfolders for folder redirection. Domain Users: Change. Domain Admins: Full. **EncryptData currently false — HIPAA workitem to flip on.** | — |
## M365 admin model
Tenant ID: `207fa277-e9d8-4eb7-ada1-1064d2221498`
Mike's design intent (confirmed 2026-04-29): **the cloud admin layer is fully separated from the on-prem AD admin layer.**
| Account | Layer | Synced via Connect? | Purpose |
|---|---|---|---|
| On-prem AD `Administrator` | On-prem only | No (separate identity layer) | DC + file server admin, GPO, on-prem services. Never authenticates to M365. |
| `admin@cascadestucson.com` | Cloud-only | **No — intentionally Connect-excluded** | Cascades day-to-day cloud GA |
| `sysadmin@cascadestucson.com` | Cloud-only | **No — intentionally Connect-excluded** | Howard's tech account / cloud admin work |
| ACG GDAP partner principals | Foreign principals | N/A | MSP delivery (Mike + Howard from `@azcomputerguru.com`) |
| `breakglass1-csc@cascadestucson.com` | Cloud-only | No (definitionally) | Emergency primary — FIDO2 YubiKey at Cascades sealed envelope |
| `breakglass2-csc@cascadestucson.com` | Cloud-only | No (definitionally) | Emergency secondary — FIDO2 YubiKey at ACG safe |
**When Entra Connect exits staging mode** (Wave 0.5 G3-G5), admin@ and sysadmin@ stay cloud-only — they must remain in the Connect filter exclusion. Verify after every Connect sync rule change.
CA targeting consequences:
- admin@/sysadmin@: subject to all Cascades CA; must be in `SG-External-Signin-Allowed` for off-network admin work
- `SG-Break-Glass`: excluded from all CA (must add exclusion to every new policy)
- ACG GDAP foreign principals: excluded from blocking policies via the "Service provider users" condition (Microsoft's CA UI), NOT via group membership
## GuruRMM
- Client: **Cascades of Tucson** (code `CASC`, id `42e1b0e3-f8b7-4fc5-86bd-06bdbb073b7f`)