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sync: auto-sync from GURU-5070 at 2026-06-04 07:07:43

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Author: Mike Swanson
Machine: GURU-5070
Timestamp: 2026-06-04 07:07:43
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Mike Swanson
2026-06-04 07:07:48 -07:00
parent a22bc8ea06
commit 64b2d9e668
4 changed files with 137 additions and 13 deletions
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clients/glaztech/reports/2026-06-03-website-security-assessment.md
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@@ -149,7 +149,8 @@ SChannel: **TLS 1.0 Server `Enabled=1`** (and TLS 1.1 at OS default = enabled);
- Custom **Session-variable auth** (no ASP.NET Forms auth); **no session-ID regeneration on login** → session-fixation risk.
- **No `requireSSL`** and **no `httpOnlyCookies`** configured → cookies not marked Secure (site was HTTP-reachable until the 2026-06-03 HTTP→HTTPS redirect was added).
- **No MFA, no account lockout / rate limiting**; username = customer **account number** (guessable) → brute-force exposure.
- **Fix:** Secure+HttpOnly cookies, regenerate session on login, add lockout/throttling, consider MFA for employee/admin access.
- **Detection blind spot (see Appendix A):** the employee login returns **HTTP 200 on both success and failure** (no redirect-on-success), and the app logs **no failed login attempts** anywhere. App-level auth never touches the Windows Security log. The net effect is that a slow credential-guessing attack against staff or customer accounts would be **effectively invisible** — there is no lockout to stop it and no log to detect it after the fact.
- **Fix:** Secure+HttpOnly cookies, regenerate session on login, add lockout/throttling, **add failed-login logging (timestamp, username, source IP)**, consider MFA for employee/admin access.
### H6 — Database access model
Web app connects with a **single shared SQL login (`tom`)** that has full read on card and password columns (no column-level control); **connection strings with credentials are in `Web.config`** on the web server (15+ per-office DBs). **Fix:** least-privilege per-function accounts, remove blanket card/password read, protect/secret-manage connection strings, enable TDE at rest.
@@ -193,4 +194,37 @@ Web app connects with a **single shared SQL login (`tom`)** that has full read o
---
**Status:** Assessment complete 2026-06-03. **No changes were made to the application, database, or data during this assessment** (read-only). Findings to be reviewed with the client (Steve Eastman / Tom) as priority security and PCI remediation. This report contains no card numbers or passwords.
## Appendix A — Intrusion / Brute-Force Log Review (2026-06-04)
**Question asked:** Is there evidence in the logs of anyone trying to brute-force the website logins (or the server)?
**Method (read-only, via GuruRMM):** 7 days of IIS request logs (`C:\inetpub\logs\LogFiles\W3SVC4`, ~52,000 requests, May 29 – Jun 4) plus the Windows Security event log (4625 failed logons / 4624 successful logons, 7-day window; log retains 65 days back to 2026-03-31). No data was modified.
**Bottom line: NO evidence of a brute-force attack — not against the website logins, and not against the Windows server.**
### Website logins (IIS)
Two login endpoints on the live site: `/customer_login.aspx` (customer portal) and `/emp/employee-login.aspx` (staff portal).
| Endpoint | Success | Fail | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|
| `/customer_login.aspx` | 2,547 (HTTP 302) | 78 (HTTP 200) | ~97% success — normal traffic across 740 distinct IPs, each logging in a few times/week |
| `/emp/employee-login.aspx` | 77 (302) | 381 (200) | **Artifact, not failures** — see below |
- **Important interpretation correction:** the employee login returns **HTTP 200 on BOTH success and failure** (it does not use the post-redirect-get/302 pattern the customer login uses). Status code alone therefore does **not** indicate a failed staff login. The apparent "381 failures" is a measurement artifact. Confirmed by pulling full request timelines: the top "suspect" IP `160.3.157.9` (24 hits, "0 successes" by the 302 metric) is a single legitimate employee on an iPhone (consistent iOS 18.7 Safari UA all week) who POSTs the login and then loads `/emp/check-hours2.aspx` + `/emp/index.aspx` with real content — i.e. a logged-in employee checking a timecard. Every "failure-heavy" employee IP fits the same benign shape (residential IP, single consistent device UA, reaches protected pages).
- **No brute-force / credential-stuffing signature** anywhere: no single IP firing rapid high-volume login POSTs, no username-cycling at machine speed, no scanner/bot user-agents hammering the login.
- **Minor observation (not an attack):** scattered bursts of **HTTP 500** on post-login pages (`invoices.aspx`, `quotes.aspx`, `place_orders.aspx`, `billing-statements.aspx`, `online-payment-pnc.aspx`) — several IPs firing 8–17 identical 500s within a single second (automated, not human clicking). Source IPs incl. `201.146.179.166`, `64.178.182.162`, `205.185.107.49`, `172.87.137.60`. These read more like a buggy page than a campaign (different pages, different residential IPs, normal browser UAs), **but** given C3 (the SQL-injectable `quo()` path), a 500 on a login/data page is exactly what a quote character in input produces against that code — worth an app-side look at what those pages throw. IIS does not log POST bodies, so the attempted inputs are not recoverable from these logs.
### Windows server (Security log)
- **13** failed logons (4625) in 7 days — trivial volume (an internet-exposed Windows host sees thousands/day).
- **All 13 were LogonType 3 (SMB/network), 100% from internal LAN IPs, zero from any public IP.** No RDP (type 10) failures at all.
- Targeted usernames: 12 blank (null/anonymous SMB) + 1 `tomabens` (internal — a stale cached credential or service, not an attack).
- **No successful remote logons from any external IP** (4624 type 3/8/10).
- **Inference:** the absence of *any* external 4625 strongly indicates RDP/SMB are **not internet-exposed** (a reachable RDP port produces a relentless type-10 failure stream within hours). The only meaningful internet-facing attack surface is the web application on 443 — which is exactly where the risk in this report lives.
### Takeaway for remediation
The review found no attacker, but it confirmed the **detection gap** noted in H5: 200-on-both responses + no lockout + no failed-login logging mean a slow guessing attack would be invisible here. **Add failed-login logging and account lockout** (already on the roadmap) — without them, "has anyone tried to break in?" cannot be answered with confidence going forward. Re-run this same log review periodically.
*Read-only review. No card numbers, passwords, or POST bodies were retrieved or are reproduced.*
---
**Status:** Assessment complete 2026-06-03; intrusion/brute-force log review added 2026-06-04 (Appendix A). **No changes were made to the application, database, or data** (read-only throughout). Findings to be reviewed with the client (Steve Eastman / Tom) as priority security and PCI remediation. This report contains no card numbers or passwords.