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sync: auto-sync from GURU-BEAST-ROG at 2026-06-08 15:55:24

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Author: Mike Swanson
Machine: GURU-BEAST-ROG
Timestamp: 2026-06-08 15:55:24
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Mike Swanson
2026-06-08 15:55:29 -07:00
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# Breach Incident Report — Kittle Design & Construction (kittlearizona.com)
**Date:** 2026-06-08 UTC
**Requested by:** Mike Swanson
**Tenant ID:** 3d073ebe-806a-4a5e-9035-3c7c4a264fc0
**Syncro Ticket:** #32393
**Status:** ACTIVE INCIDENT — CONTAINED
---
## Incident Summary
Active BEC (Business Email Compromise). Ken Schagel's Global Admin account was compromised. Attacker accessed the account for ~8 hours before launching a 1,000-recipient phishing campaign posing as an OneDrive file share. Attacker planted malicious inbox rules on 3 mailboxes and created a Global Admin backdoor on Lori Schagel's account. All remediated.
---
## Attack Timeline
| UTC | Event |
|-----|-------|
| 09:03 | Normal Outlook sync (Microsoft IPs) — pre-compromise |
| 13:24 | **[BREACH START]** First OWA login — 64.44.131.168 (Chicago, Nexeon Technologies VPN/hosting) |
| 13:37 | Ken's T-Mobile phone access (legitimate, unaware) |
| 15:00 | Attacker returns — 64.44.131.168 |
| 15:17 | Ken sends legitimate email via Cox Communications (Phoenix AZ) |
| 15:32 | Attacker sends test email from OWA — **concurrent with Ken's legitimate use** |
| 16:14 | Attacker sends second test email from OWA |
| 18:36 | Contact harvest starts — python-httpx/0.28.1 from Azure 40.126.41.96 (250+ MailItemsAccessed events) |
| 18:52 | Attacker reviews Sent/Deleted/RSS Feeds folders from OWA |
| 18:53 | Contact harvest ends |
| 21:14 | Phishing batch 1: 17 recipients |
| 21:16 | Phishing batch 2: 300 recipients |
| 21:20 | Phishing batch 3: 300 recipients |
| 21:23 | Phishing batch 4: 300 recipients |
| 21:26 | Phishing batch 5: 83 recipients — 45.134.224.220 (Kansas City MO, PacketHub S.A.) |
| 21:27 | Ken's password reset (SSPR) |
| ~21:30 | Howard (ACG) receives phishing email, incident detected |
| 21:41 | Mike manually blocks Ken's sign-in in portal, sets temp password |
| ~22:00 | ACG investigation and remediation begins |
---
## Attacker Infrastructure
| IP | Use | Geolocation | ASN |
|----|-----|-------------|-----|
| 64.44.131.168 | OWA browser access (initial + ongoing) | Chicago, IL | AS20278 Nexeon Technologies (VPN/hosting) |
| 40.126.41.96 | Contact scraping via python-httpx | Microsoft Azure | Microsoft Corp |
| 45.134.224.220 | Bulk phishing send | Kansas City, MO | AS147049 PacketHub S.A. (hosting) |
**Attacker tool:** python-httpx/0.28.1 with OAuth token for Microsoft Desktop app (`d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c`)
**AAD Session:** `0031c64a-94a8-7629-20ad-c42db69d76c7`
---
## Phishing Campaign Stats
| Metric | Value |
|--------|-------|
| Total sent | 1,000 |
| Delivered | 747 |
| Failed/bounced | 227 |
| Pending | 25 |
| Subject | "Ken Schagel shared a file with you" |
| Lure | Fake OneDrive/SharePoint file-share notification |
| Victim notification sent | 740 (automated addresses filtered) |
---
## Malicious Artifacts Found and Removed
### Inbox Rules (planted by attacker across 3 mailboxes)
| Mailbox | Rule Name | Action | Status |
|---------|-----------|--------|--------|
| Ken@kittlearizona.com | "." | Move ALL mail → RSS Feeds, MarkAsRead, StopProcessing | DELETED |
| Ken@kittlearizona.com | "Admin" | Move ALL mail → RSS Feeds, MarkAsRead, StopProcessing | DELETED |
| alexis@kittlearizona.com | "..." | Move ALL mail → RSS Feeds, MarkAsRead, StopProcessing | DELETED |
| Accounting@kittlearizona.com | ".." | Move mail FROM Ken → RSS Feeds, Priority 1 | DELETED |
| Accounting@kittlearizona.com | "..." | Move ALL mail → RSS Feeds, Priority 2 | DELETED |
**Note:** Accounting ".." + "..." rules were actively suppressing ALL incoming mail at time of discovery. Mail flow restored on deletion.
**Note:** Ken's mailbox has a "Christina Micek" rule (StopProcessingRules:true, no action) that predates the incident. Needs investigation — possibly legitimate, possibly attacker remnant.
### Backdoor Admin Account
Lori@kittlearizona.com had 10 admin roles assigned — **including Global Administrator**. All 10 roles stripped, sessions revoked.
Roles removed: Global Administrator, Exchange Administrator, User Administrator, Teams Administrator, SharePoint Administrator, Helpdesk Administrator, AI Administrator, Global Reader, Service Support Administrator, User Experience Success Manager
**Role assignment timing — RESOLVED:** directoryAudits confirmed no "Add member to role" events for any user in the last 30 days except ACG's own remediation actions. Lori's roles were **pre-existing** (assigned >30 days before the incident). The attacker did NOT plant a backdoor — Lori was already a Global Admin before the compromise. This means the tenant had two GA accounts (Ken + Lori) going into the incident. Recommend reviewing whether Lori legitimately requires GA access, or if it was an oversight during initial tenant setup.
---
## Remediation Actions Completed
| Action | Status |
|--------|--------|
| Ken sessions revoked | [OK] |
| Ken admin roles stripped (10 roles) | [OK] |
| Ken sign-in blocked (by Mike in portal) | [OK] |
| Ken temp password set: B/947405806521av | [OK] — vaulted |
| Ken malicious inbox rules deleted: "." + "Admin" | [OK] |
| Wrex sessions revoked | [OK] |
| Wrex password reset: Kittle@1426Wrx!47E742 | [OK] |
| Alexis PERFECTDATA OAuth grant revoked | [OK] |
| Alexis Alignable OAuth grant revoked (offline_access + Contacts.Read) | [OK] |
| Alexis malicious inbox rule "..." deleted | [OK] |
| Accounting malicious rules ".." + "..." deleted | [OK] |
| Lori backdoor admin roles stripped (10 roles, all pre-existing not attacker-planted) | [OK] |
| Lori sessions revoked | [OK] |
| Lori re-assigned User Administrator (legitimate scope) | [OK] |
| Victim notification sent (740 recipients) | [OK] — via admin@kittlearizona.com |
| Syncro ticket #32393 updated with temp passwords | [OK] |
---
## Open Items / Recommendations
1. **Re-enable Ken's account** — DONE (Mike re-enabled). Ken's MFA verified clean (single iPhone 12 Pro Max, no attacker devices). Ken's admin roles still need to be re-added after incident is declared closed.
2. **Christina Micek inbox rule on Ken** — rule has StopProcessingRules:true, no action, no filter. Unknown if legitimate or attacker-planted. Needs Ken to confirm before declaring his mailbox fully clean.
3. **Lori's role assignment timing** — RESOLVED: pre-existing. Roles were assigned >30 days before the incident (no Add member to role events found in directoryAudits for the last 30 days). Attacker did NOT plant a backdoor. Recommend reviewing whether Lori legitimately needs GA access or if it should be downscoped.
4. **Phishing URL unknown** — email body not recoverable (message purged when account disabled). Submit `45.134.224.220` (PacketHub send IP) to threat intel if needed.
5. **Entra ID P1 licensing** — sign-in logs blocked. Without P1, foreign sign-in detection is blind. Tenant appears to be on O365 E3 (not M365 E3). Recommend Entra P1 add-on or upgrade to M365 E3.
6. **MFA review for all users** — Alexis duplicate Authenticator ("iPhone 12 Pro Max" x2 — one may be a legacy registration), Lori two Authenticator devices (SM-G975U + SM-F766U, likely old device not removed). Both can self-serve at mysignins.microsoft.com or ACG can reset for them.
7. **Alignable OAuth on Alexis** — Contacts.Read scope, unverified publisher. Decision deferred to Alexis — revoke if she doesn't recognize it.
8. **Ken admin roles** — all 10 stripped during remediation. Re-add appropriate roles (Global Admin + Exchange Admin at minimum) once incident is closed and Ken's account is verified clean.
9. **DKIM/DMARC** — not configured on kittlearizona.com. A DMARC policy would have allowed Microsoft to classify the phishing emails as DMARC fail, reducing delivery. Recommend implementing.
10. **Lori GA access review** — with GA confirmed pre-existing (not attacker-planted), assess if Lori legitimately needs Global Administrator. If not, downscope to Exchange Administrator or appropriate role. Two GA accounts on a small tenant is unnecessary exposure.
---
## Vault Entries Created
- `vault/clients/kittle/m365-ken-schagel-incident.sops.yaml` — Ken's temp password and incident notes
---
## Limitations
| Check | Status | Reason |
|-------|--------|--------|
| Sign-in logs (Graph API) | BLOCKED | Tenant lacks Entra P1 (O365 E3 vs M365 E3) |
| Risky users (Graph API) | BLOCKED | Same |
| Directory audit (role assignment timing) | BLOCKED | Requires AuditLog.Read.All + P1 |
| Phishing email body/URL | UNAVAILABLE | Message purged when Ken's account was disabled |

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# Session Log — Kittle BEC Incident Remediation
## User
- **User:** Mike Swanson (mike)
- **Machine:** GURU-BEAST-ROG
- **Role:** admin
---
## Session Summary
Full BEC (Business Email Compromise) investigation and remediation on kittlearizona.com tenant (ID: `3d073ebe-806a-4a5e-9035-3c7c4a264fc0`). Triggered by Howard receiving a phishing email that appeared to originate from Ken@kittlearizona.com. Mike had already manually blocked Ken's sign-in and set a temp password by the time investigation began.
Investigation used the ComputerGuru MSP app suite (Security Investigator for Graph reads, Exchange Operator for EXO reads/writes, Tenant Admin for directory and policy actions). Initial consent was obtained via admin consent URLs at the start of the session; additional consent URLs were provided and accepted mid-session for remaining app permissions.
The attacker accessed Ken's account via OWA starting at 13:24 UTC using IP 64.44.131.168 (Chicago, Nexeon Technologies — a VPN/hosting provider). They harvested contacts via python-httpx/0.28.1 from Azure IP 40.126.41.96 during 18:36–18:53 UTC, then sent 1,000 phishing emails in 5 batches from 45.134.224.220 (Kansas City, PacketHub S.A.) between 21:14–21:26 UTC. The phishing subject was "Ken Schagel shared a file with you" — a fake OneDrive file-share lure. 747 delivered, 227 failed/bounced, 740 victim notifications dispatched via EWS SOAP from admin@kittlearizona.com.
Remediation actions completed: Ken's sessions revoked and admin roles stripped (all 10); Wrex sessions revoked and password reset; 5 malicious inbox rules deleted across 3 mailboxes (Ken x2, Alexis x1, Accounting x2 — Accounting rules were actively suppressing ALL incoming mail at time of discovery, immediately restoring mail flow); Alexis PERFECTDATA and Alignable OAuth grants revoked; Lori's 10 admin roles (including Global Administrator) stripped and re-assigned User Administrator only (confirmed via directoryAudits that Lori's GA was pre-existing, not attacker-planted); victim notification sent to 740 filtered addresses; Syncro ticket #32393 updated with public comment containing temp passwords; breach report written to `clients/kittle/reports/2026-06-08-breach-check.md`; SharePoint confirmed clean; Security Defaults confirmed enabled; Ken's MFA verified clean (single iPhone 12 Pro Max, no attacker-registered devices).
---
## Key Decisions
- **EXO hidden rule sweep used Exchange Operator (not Security Investigator):** `Get-InboxRule -IncludeHidden:true` requires `Exchange.ManageAsApp` permission, which only the Exchange Operator app holds. Security Investigator has `full_access_as_app` (EWS), not the Exchange admin cmdlets tier. Switched on first 401.
- **Phishing send via EWS SOAP (not Graph SendMail):** 740-recipient victim notification sent using EWS SOAP from admin@kittlearizona.com. Graph SendMail would have required a delegated token or app-only send permission not available on this tenant. EWS worked with Exchange Operator EXO token. HTML body wrapped in `<![CDATA[...]]>` to prevent schema validation errors on `<br>` tags.
- **Lori's 10 admin roles stripped even though origin unknown:** At time of stripping, it was unknown whether roles were attacker-planted or pre-existing. Decision to strip all and re-assign legitimate scope afterward. Confirmed post-session via directoryAudits that roles were pre-existing (no "Add member to role" events in last 30 days from any non-ACG initiator). Re-assigned User Administrator as legitimate scope.
- **Victim notification filtered 7 automated/non-human addresses:** vzwpix, mms.att.net, Microsoft internal, streaming service addresses removed from the 747 delivered list before sending notifications. 740 addresses used.
- **Did not revoke Ken's MFA devices:** Ken's MFA verified clean — single iPhone 12 Pro Max, no attacker-registered devices. Advised Ken to verify at mysignins.microsoft.com himself; no forced MFA reset needed.
- **Used Search-UnifiedAuditLog (EXO REST) instead of Graph signIns:** Tenant is on O365 E3, which lacks Entra P1. Graph `/auditLogs/signIns` returns `Authentication_RequestFromNonPremiumTenantOrB2CTenant` 403. UAL via EXO REST is available without P1 and provided the full attack timeline.
- **Message trace used Get-MessageTraceV2:** `Get-MessageTrace` deprecated September 2025. Switched to `Get-MessageTraceV2` which returned full 1,000-record phishing campaign data.
- **PERFECTDATA OAuth revoked immediately, Alignable deferred then revoked:** PERFECTDATA was clearly malicious (Mail.ReadWrite, Files.ReadWrite scopes, unknown publisher). Alignable was initially deferred pending Alexis's input — later revoked at Mike's direction (offline_access + Contacts.Read, unverified publisher).
---
## Problems Encountered
- **EXO /adminapi/beta 401 with Security Investigator token:** `full_access_as_app` is an EWS permission, not the Exchange admin cmdlets tier. Fixed by switching to Exchange Operator token which holds `Exchange.ManageAsApp`. HTTP 200 after switch.
- **Remove-InboxRule JSON escaping error (400 "unrecognized escape sequence \4"):** The rule Identity string contains backslashes (e.g. `Ken\4160878082195980289`). Passing via shell variable without escaping caused malformed JSON. Fixed using `jq -n --arg identity "$IDENTITY"` to properly escape.
- **Remove-InboxRule "can't use Identity and Mailbox together":** Identity already contains mailbox prefix, so separate Mailbox parameter caused conflict. Fixed by removing Mailbox parameter from the payload.
- **EWS SOAP body schema error on HTML:** `<br>` tags in email body treated as XML elements, breaking SOAP schema validation. Fixed by wrapping body in `<![CDATA[...]]>`.
- **Sign-in logs 403 from all token tiers:** Tenant Admin lacked `AuditLog.Read.All` in manifest. Security Investigator has `AuditLog.Read.All` in roles but tenant returns `Authentication_RequestFromNonPremiumTenantOrB2CTenant`. O365 E3 does not include Entra P1 — sign-in log API requires P1. No fix available. Worked around via Search-UnifiedAuditLog (EXO REST) which does not require P1.
- **Get-MessageTrace deprecated:** Returned deprecation warning. Switched to Get-MessageTraceV2. Also removed PageSize parameter (invalid for V2).
- **directoryAudits `ne` operator not supported:** `activityDisplayName ne 'Remove member from role'` returned UnknownError. Workaround: fetch all RoleManagement events and filter via `jq` client-side.
- **UAL search returned 0 results for Lori role events:** EXO REST `Search-UnifiedAuditLog` with `Operations:Add member to role` returned empty for Lori. Resolved via Graph directoryAudits API (which did work with Security Investigator token after consent) — confirmed no role assignment events for Lori in 30 days, meaning roles were pre-existing.
---
## Configuration Changes
- **Created:** `vault/clients/kittle/m365-ken-schagel-incident.sops.yaml` — SOPS-encrypted vault entry for Ken's temp password and incident notes
- **Created:** `clients/kittle/reports/2026-06-08-breach-check.md` — Full breach incident report (attack timeline, attacker IPs, all remediation actions, open items)
- **Created:** `clients/kittle/session-logs/2026-06/2026-06-08-mike-bec-incident-remediation.md` — this file
---
## Credentials & Secrets
**Ken Schagel temp password:** `B/947405806521av`
- Vaulted at: `vault/clients/kittle/m365-ken-schagel-incident.sops.yaml`
- Communicated to Mike via Syncro ticket #32393 (public comment with temp passwords for Ken + Wrex)
- Ken's account re-enabled by Mike mid-session
**Wrex password reset:** `Kittle@1426Wrx!47E742`
- Communicated via Syncro ticket #32393
---
## Infrastructure & Servers
| Item | Value |
|------|-------|
| Tenant | kittlearizona.com |
| Tenant ID | `3d073ebe-806a-4a5e-9035-3c7c4a264fc0` |
| ACG MSP tenant ID | `ce61461e-81a0-4c84-bb4a-7b354a9a356d` |
| Syncro ticket | #32393 |
| Attacker IP 1 | 64.44.131.168 — OWA browser access, Chicago IL, AS20278 Nexeon Technologies (VPN/hosting) |
| Attacker IP 2 | 40.126.41.96 — Contact scraping via python-httpx, Microsoft Azure |
| Attacker IP 3 | 45.134.224.220 — Bulk phishing send, Kansas City MO, AS147049 PacketHub S.A. |
| Attacker tool | python-httpx/0.28.1, OAuth token for Microsoft Desktop app `d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c` |
| Attacker AAD session | `0031c64a-94a8-7629-20ad-c42db69d76c7` |
| Compromise window | 13:24–21:41 UTC 2026-06-08 |
### MSP App Credentials Used
| App | Client ID |
|-----|-----------|
| Security Investigator | `bfbc12a4-f0dd-4e12-b06d-997e7271e10c` |
| Exchange Operator | `b43e7342-5b4b-492f-890f-bb5a4f7f40e9` |
| User Manager | `64fac46b-8b44-41ad-93ee-7da03927576c` |
| Tenant Admin | `709e6eed-0711-4875-9c44-2d3518c47063` |
---
## Commands & Outputs
### Attack timeline (from UAL + message trace)
```
09:03 UTC Normal Outlook sync (Microsoft IPs) — pre-compromise
13:24 UTC [BREACH START] OWA login — 64.44.131.168 (Chicago, Nexeon VPN)
13:37 UTC Ken's T-Mobile phone (legitimate, unaware)
15:00 UTC Attacker returns — 64.44.131.168
15:17 UTC Ken sends legitimate email via Cox (Phoenix AZ)
15:32 UTC Attacker sends test email from OWA — concurrent with Ken
16:14 UTC Attacker sends second test email
18:36 UTC Contact harvest starts — python-httpx/0.28.1 from Azure 40.126.41.96
18:52 UTC Attacker reviews Sent/Deleted/RSS Feeds from OWA
18:53 UTC Contact harvest ends (250+ MailItemsAccessed events)
21:14 UTC Phishing batch 1: 17 recipients
21:16 UTC Phishing batch 2: 300 recipients
21:20 UTC Phishing batch 3: 300 recipients
21:23 UTC Phishing batch 4: 300 recipients
21:26 UTC Phishing batch 5: 83 recipients — from 45.134.224.220 (PacketHub)
21:27 UTC Ken's SSPR password reset attempt
~21:30 UTC Howard (ACG) receives phishing email — incident detected
21:41 UTC Mike manually blocks Ken sign-in in portal, sets temp password
~22:00 UTC ACG investigation and remediation begins
22:05 UTC ACG removes Lori's 10 admin roles (Tenant Admin app)
22:06 UTC Lori sessions revoked
```
### Malicious inbox rules deleted
```
Ken@kittlearizona.com "." Move ALL mail → RSS Feeds, MarkAsRead, StopProcessing [DELETED]
Ken@kittlearizona.com "Admin" Move ALL mail → RSS Feeds, MarkAsRead, StopProcessing [DELETED]
alexis@kittlearizona.com "..." Move ALL mail → RSS Feeds, MarkAsRead, StopProcessing [DELETED]
Accounting@kittlearizona.com ".." Move mail FROM Ken → RSS Feeds, Priority 1 [DELETED]
Accounting@kittlearizona.com "..." Move ALL mail → RSS Feeds, Priority 2 [DELETED]
```
Note: Accounting ".." + "..." were actively suppressing ALL incoming mail at time of discovery.
### Phishing campaign stats
```
Total sent: 1,000
Delivered: 747
Failed/bounced: 227
Pending: 25
Notifications sent: 740 (7 automated addresses filtered)
Subject: "Ken Schagel shared a file with you"
```
### OAuth grants revoked
```
PERFECTDATA app Mail.ReadWrite, Files.ReadWrite, offline_access [REVOKED]
Alignable app offline_access, User.Read, Contacts.Read [REVOKED]
Grant ID: jB3LklISEEOHpW2kH5IbQLz8wKqAnj1KmLeBzb1HLJrh6qF03cBERamPOhj4CXha
Client SP: 92cb1d8c-1252-4310-87a5-6da41f921b40
```
### Lori role changes
```
Stripped (all pre-existing): Global Administrator, Exchange Administrator, User Administrator,
Teams Administrator, SharePoint Administrator, Helpdesk Administrator, AI Administrator,
Global Reader, Service Support Administrator, User Experience Success Manager
Re-assigned: User Administrator (roleTemplateId: fe930be7-5e62-47db-91af-98c3a49a38b1)
Role object ID in tenant: 1321d5cd-17bb-40de-891b-1e85667e1c5a
Lori user ID: 5817629b-5832-43c6-b74c-86a05c29c852
```
### Key user IDs
```
Ken Schagel Ken@kittlearizona.com (admin roles stripped, re-enabled by Mike)
Lori Schagel Lori@kittlearizona.com ID: 5817629b-5832-43c6-b74c-86a05c29c852
Alexis alexis@kittlearizona.com ID: 74a1eae1-c0dd-4544-a98f-3a18f809785a
Wrex Wrex@kittlearizona.com (sessions revoked, password reset)
```
---
## Pending / Incomplete Tasks
1. **Christina Micek inbox rule on Ken** — `StopProcessingRules:true`, no action, no filter. Unknown if legitimate or attacker-planted. Needs Ken to confirm. Delete if he doesn't recognize it.
2. **Re-add admin roles to Ken** — All 10 stripped during containment. Ken is Global Admin by function; re-add Global Administrator and Exchange Administrator once incident is declared closed and Ken's account is fully verified clean.
3. **Lori GA access review** — Confirmed pre-existing (not attacker-planted). Recommend discussing with Ken whether Lori legitimately needs any admin role at all. Downscoped to User Administrator for now.
4. **MFA cleanup** — Alexis has duplicate Authenticator registrations ("iPhone 12 Pro Max" x2). Lori has two Authenticator devices (SM-G975U + SM-F766U, likely old phone not removed). Users can self-serve at mysignins.microsoft.com or ACG can reset.
5. **Phishing URL unknown** — Email body purged when Ken's account was disabled. Send IP 45.134.224.220 (PacketHub S.A., AS147049) is known. Submit to threat intel if needed.
6. **Entra P1 licensing** — Sign-in logs blind without it. Tenant on O365 E3, not M365 E3. Recommend Entra P1 add-on or upgrade. Without P1, a Conditional Access policy for foreign IP blocking also cannot be enforced.
7. **DKIM/DMARC** — Not configured on kittlearizona.com. DMARC reject/quarantine would reduce future phishing deliverability from this domain.
8. **Alexis MFA duplicate** — One "iPhone 12 Pro Max" Authenticator entry is likely a stale registration. Should be cleaned up but is low priority now that PERFECTDATA and Alignable are revoked.
---
## Reference Information
- **Syncro ticket:** #32393 (public comment added with temp passwords for Ken + Wrex)
- **Breach report:** `clients/kittle/reports/2026-06-08-breach-check.md`
- **Vault entry:** `vault/clients/kittle/m365-ken-schagel-incident.sops.yaml`
- **Victim notification:** sent from admin@kittlearizona.com via EWS SOAP, 3 batches, 740 recipients
- **Attacker OAuth app (Microsoft Desktop):** `d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c`
- **Attacker AAD session:** `0031c64a-94a8-7629-20ad-c42db69d76c7`
- **Security Defaults:** enabled (`isEnabled: true`) on this tenant
- **SharePoint:** clean — no attacker-created files, pages, or external sharing links
- **EXO REST endpoint:** `https://outlook.office365.com/adminapi/beta/{tenantId}/InvokeCommand`
- **EWS endpoint:** `https://outlook.office365.com/EWS/Exchange.asmx`
- **Graph directoryAudits:** confirmed working with Security Investigator token (no P1 needed for this endpoint)
- **Graph signIns:** blocked — requires Entra P1 (`Authentication_RequestFromNonPremiumTenantOrB2CTenant`)