The skill/command DOCS instructed Claude to run a bare `py ...`, which is the
Windows py-launcher — absent on Linux/macOS (exit 127, hit on GURU-KALI). A blind
py->python3 swap is wrong too: python3 is a broken MS Store shim on some Windows
boxes where `py` is the correct launcher.
Fix mirrors the resolution the .sh skill scripts already do:
- New .claude/scripts/py.sh: picks the interpreter that actually RUNS —
identity.json python.command first, then py -> python3 -> python, each
validated with `-c 'import sys'` so the MS Store stub is skipped. exec's it.
- Repointed all DOC invocations (10 files, ~70 sites) from `py ...` to
`bash "$CLAUDETOOLS_ROOT/.claude/scripts/py.sh" ...` (incl. the `py -c` and
`py -` heredoc forms in checkpoint.md / mailbox.md).
- Left the .sh skill scripts untouched — they already resolve py/python/python3.
- errorlog.md: marked the GURU-KALI entry RESOLVED.
Depends on CLAUDETOOLS_ROOT (seeded by ensure-settings-env.py); py.sh also
self-resolves the repo root via git/cwd as a fallback.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Several bugs found and fixed during live testing against the ACG GravityZone
tenant:
- security_sweep_all_clients: iterate each company (the companies container is
not a valid endpoint parent; passing it 400'd the whole sweep)
- list_quarantine: use service-scoped path quarantine/computers with companyId
(bare quarantine module 404'd; param is companyId not parentId)
- rename GZEndpointSummary.detection_active -> threat_detected with corrected
semantics (True = active threat, tracks with infected; not an engine-on flag)
- status: readable sectioned table renderer for the nested apiKey/license dict
- portable CLAUDETOOLS_ROOT resolution (derive from file path, not a Windows
literal) so it works on the Mac/Linux fleet
Adds scripts/selftest.py: a 29-check read-only harness (all passing) covering
every read command, --json, error exit codes, and destructive-action gating.
EDR/incident commands (blocklist, isolate/unisolate, blocklist-add/remove) and
raw destructive-method gating are included from this session's work.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- raw now refuses destructive methods (delete/uninstall/remove/reconfigure)
without --confirm (it previously bypassed all gating)
- --json is now accepted after the subcommand (shared via a common parent
parser), matching the documented usage
- drop a placeholder-less f-string
- SKILL.md: document raw gating + that raw echoes upstream responses verbatim
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a /bitdefender skill that drives the ACG GravityZone partner tenant
via the JSON-RPC Public API. Read + management ops (companies, endpoints,
live security sweep, policies [read-only/shallow], packages, quarantine,
scans, groups, move/delete). Identity-tier JSON cache (24h TTL,
--refresh); volatile status is always pulled live, never cached.
Security hardening: API key loaded from SOPS vault at runtime (never on
disk/logs/argv/cache); destructive deletes gated behind --confirm; `raw`
also gates destructive methods; upstream error bodies truncated. UNVERIFIED
API methods reachable only via `raw`. Reuses the auth/JSON-RPC pattern from
api/services/gravityzone_service.py.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
