The file C:\Users\MikeSwanson\Claude\session-logs\2026-01-05-session.md has been updated. Here's the result of running `cat -n` on a snippet of the edited file:
   129→scutil --dns
   130→sudo dscacheutil -flushcache; sudo killall -HUP mDNSResponder
   131→```
   132→
   133→### UniFi Cloud Gateway Ultra DNS
   134→- Supports local DNS records via Client Devices or Settings → Gateway → DNS
   135→- CNAME records require UniFi OS 4.3+ / Network 9.3+
   136→
   137→---
   138→
   139→## Update: 20:30 - Dataforth M365 Security Audit
   140→
   141→### What Was Accomplished
   142→
   143→1. **Admin consent granted for Dataforth tenant** - Claude-Code-M365 app now has full API access
   144→2. **Complete M365 security audit performed** via Graph API
   145→3. **Investigated suspicious "true" app registration**
   146→4. **Analyzed OAuth consents across tenant**
   147→
   148→### Security Audit Findings
   149→
   150→#### Tenant Information
   151→- **Tenant:** Dataforth Corporation (dataforth.com)
   152→- **Tenant ID:** 7dfa3ce8-c496-4b51-ab8d-bd3dcd78b584
   153→- **Location:** 6230 S Country Club Rd, Tucson, AZ 85706
   154→- **Users:** ~100 accounts
   155→- **AD Sync:** On-premises sync enabled, last sync 2026-01-05 19:42:31Z
   156→- **Domains:** dataforth.com, dataforthcom.onmicrosoft.com, intranet.dataforth.com
   157→
   158→#### OAuth Consents - LOW RISK
   159→| User | App | Permissions | Assessment |
   160→|------|-----|-------------|------------|
   161→| Georg Haubner (ghaubner) | Samsung Email | IMAP, EAS, SMTP | Legitimate - Samsung phone |
   162→| Jacque Antar (jantar) | Apple Mail | EAS | Legitimate - iOS device |
   163→
   164→**No malicious OAuth consents found** (unlike BG Builders Gmail backdoor case)
   165→
   166→#### App Registrations in Tenant
   167→| App Name | App ID | Created | Status |
   168→|----------|--------|---------|--------|
   169→| Graphus | 084f1e10-b027-4ac6-a702-b80128385e51 | 2025-06-08 | ✅ Legit security tool |
   170→| SAAS_ALERTS_RESPOND | 86e3bf21-3a61-4c45-9400-6c110c5522c6 | 2025-08-22 | ✅ Kaseya alerting |
   171→| SaaSAlerts.Fortify | 711c0066-fe7a-4ce0-9ce0-6847ee29a9ef | 2025-08-22 | ✅ Security tool |
   172→| Bullphish ID - Dataforth | 42f5c403-e672-46fa-a25e-cf67c76e818e | 2025-10-19 | ✅ Security training |
   173→| Claude-Code-M365 | 7a8c0b2e-57fb-4d79-9b5a-4b88d21b1f29 | 2025-12-22 | ✅ Our API access |
   174→| P2P Server | dc5cc8f3-04c5-414c-bc8e-e6031bd9b3cc | 2024-03-05 | ✅ MS P2P Access cert |
   175→| ConnectSyncProvisioning_AD1 | d768bfed-7948-48af-a4a7-67257e74186e | 2025-09-30 | ✅ Azure AD Connect |
   176→| **"true"** | a21e971d-1fcb-41a7-9b01-c45b8d7d1754 | 2024-09-04 | ⚠️ Investigate |
   177→
   178→#### "true" App Investigation Details
   179→- **Object ID:** bcab6984-00b0-421e-b1c5-a381b748710a
   180→- **App ID:** a21e971d-1fcb-41a7-9b01-c45b8d7d1754
   181→- **Created:** 2024-09-04 21:11:40 UTC
   182→- **Owner:** Jacque Antar (jantar@dataforth.com)
   183→- **Service Principal:** NONE (never consented/used)
   184→- **Secret:** Exists (hint: PZZ, expires 2026-09-04)
   185→- **Redirect URI:** http://localhost:7828
   186→- **Sign-in Audience:** AzureADandPersonalMicrosoftAccount (multi-tenant + personal)
   187→- **Requested Permissions (Delegated):**
   188→  - Mail.Read (570282fd-fa5c-430d-a7fd-fc8dc98a9dca)
   189→  - Files.Read (024d486e-b451-40bb-833d-3e66d98c5c73)
   190→  - Contacts.Read (7427e0e9-2fba-42fe-b0c0-848c9e6a8182)
   191→  - People.Read (ba47897c-39ec-4d83-8086-ee8256fa737d)
   192→  - User.Read (e1fe6dd8-ba31-4d61-89e7-88639da4683d)
   193→  - Mail.Send (e383f46e-2787-4529-855e-0e479a3ffac0)
   194→
   195→**Risk Assessment: LOW** - App was created by internal employee and has never been used (no service principal). Recommend asking Jacque Antar about its purpose and deleting if no longer needed.
   196→
   197→#### Phishing Campaign Pattern
   198→- **December 2025:** "December Bonus and Allocation for All Staff"
   199→- **January 2026:** "2026 Updated Pay Structure & Appraisal Guidelines"
   200→- **Same pattern:** QR code credential harvesting, bypasses MailProtector via direct M365 delivery
   201→
   202→---
   203→
   204→### Credentials Confirmed Working
   205→
   206→#### Dataforth - Claude-Code-M365 (Entra App)
   207→- **Tenant ID:** 7dfa3ce8-c496-4b51-ab8d-bd3dcd78b584
   208→- **App ID (Client ID):** 7a8c0b2e-57fb-4d79-9b5a-4b88d21b1f29
   209→- **Client Secret:** tXo8Q~ZNG9zoBpbK9HwJTkzx.YEigZ9AynoSrca3
   210→- **Permissions:** Calendars.ReadWrite, Contacts.ReadWrite, User.ReadWrite.All, Mail.ReadWrite, Directory.ReadWrite.All, Group.ReadWrite.All
   211→- **Status:** ✅ WORKING - Full Graph API access confirmed
   212→
   213→#### Token Request (for future sessions)
   214→```bash
   215→curl -s -X POST "https://login.microsoftonline.com/7dfa3ce8-c496-4b51-ab8d-bd3dcd78b584/oauth2/v2.0/token" \
   216→  -d "client_id=7a8c0b2e-57fb-4d79-9b5a-4b88d21b1f29" \
   217→  -d "client_secret=tXo8Q~ZNG9zoBpbK9HwJTkzx.YEigZ9AynoSrca3" \
   218→  -d "scope=https://graph.microsoft.com/.default" \
   219→  -d "grant_type=client_credentials"
   220→```
   221→
   222→---
   223→
   224→### Key Graph API Queries Used
   225→
   226→```bash
   227→# List all users
   228→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users?$select=displayName,userPrincipalName,mail
   229→
   230→# List app registrations
   231→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications
   232→
   233→# List OAuth permission grants (delegated consents)
   234→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/oauth2PermissionGrants
   235→
   236→# Check service principal for app
   237→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals?$filter=appId+eq+'APP_ID'
   238→
   239→# Get app owners
   240→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications/{object-id}/owners
   241→
   242→# Get organization info
   243→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/organization
   244→
   245→# Read user's recent emails
   246→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/{email}/messages?$filter=receivedDateTime ge 2026-01-01&$top=20
   247→```
   248→
   249→---
   250→
   251→### Security Status Summary
   252→
   253→| Category | Status | Notes |
   254→|----------|--------|-------|
   255→| OAuth Consents | ✅ Clean | No malicious third-party apps |
   256→| App Registrations | ⚠️ Review | "true" app needs investigation |
   257→| Email Security | ⚠️ Gap | Phishing bypasses MailProtector |
   258→| Security Tools | ✅ Good | SaaSAlerts, Graphus, Bullphish ID deployed |
   259→| AD Sync | ✅ Working | On-prem sync active |
   260→
   261→---
   262→
   263→### Pending Tasks
   264→
   265→1. **Ask Jacque Antar about "true" app** - Confirm purpose or delete
   266→2. **Configure Exchange inbound connector** - Restrict mail to MailProtector IPs only
   267→3. **Add AuditLog.Read.All permission** to Claude-Code-M365 for sign-in log analysis
   268→4. **Consider external email tagging** for spoofed internal senders
   269→
   270→---
   271→
   272→### Key Users Identified
   273→
   274→| User | Email | Notes |
   275→|------|-------|-------|
   276→| Georg Haubner | ghaubner@dataforth.com | Phishing target, Sales/Marketing VP |
   277→| Jacque Antar | jantar@dataforth.com | Owner of "true" app, has Apple Mail OAuth |
   278→| Theresa Dean | tdean@dataforth.com | Active internal comms |
   279→| sysadmin | sysadmin@dataforth.com | Service account |
   280→
   281→---
   282→
   283→### Files & Locations
   284→
   285→- **Phishing email:** `D:\Workplace\Personal Documents\Profile\Documents\DF Spam\`
   286→- **QR phishing attachment:** `ATT29306.docx`
   287→- **Malicious URL:** `https://acuvatech.cyou?a=ghaubner@dataforth.com`
   288→