# Session Log — Kittle BEC Incident Remediation ## User - **User:** Mike Swanson (mike) - **Machine:** GURU-BEAST-ROG - **Role:** admin --- ## Session Summary Full BEC (Business Email Compromise) investigation and remediation on kittlearizona.com tenant (ID: `3d073ebe-806a-4a5e-9035-3c7c4a264fc0`). Triggered by Howard receiving a phishing email that appeared to originate from Ken@kittlearizona.com. Mike had already manually blocked Ken's sign-in and set a temp password by the time investigation began. Investigation used the ComputerGuru MSP app suite (Security Investigator for Graph reads, Exchange Operator for EXO reads/writes, Tenant Admin for directory and policy actions). Initial consent was obtained via admin consent URLs at the start of the session; additional consent URLs were provided and accepted mid-session for remaining app permissions. The attacker accessed Ken's account via OWA starting at 13:24 UTC using IP 64.44.131.168 (Chicago, Nexeon Technologies — a VPN/hosting provider). They harvested contacts via python-httpx/0.28.1 from Azure IP 40.126.41.96 during 18:36–18:53 UTC, then sent 1,000 phishing emails in 5 batches from 45.134.224.220 (Kansas City, PacketHub S.A.) between 21:14–21:26 UTC. The phishing subject was "Ken Schagel shared a file with you" — a fake OneDrive file-share lure. 747 delivered, 227 failed/bounced, 740 victim notifications dispatched via EWS SOAP from admin@kittlearizona.com. Remediation actions completed: Ken's sessions revoked and admin roles stripped (all 10); Wrex sessions revoked and password reset; 5 malicious inbox rules deleted across 3 mailboxes (Ken x2, Alexis x1, Accounting x2 — Accounting rules were actively suppressing ALL incoming mail at time of discovery, immediately restoring mail flow); Alexis PERFECTDATA and Alignable OAuth grants revoked; Lori's 10 admin roles (including Global Administrator) stripped and re-assigned User Administrator only (confirmed via directoryAudits that Lori's GA was pre-existing, not attacker-planted); victim notification sent to 740 filtered addresses; Syncro ticket #32393 updated with public comment containing temp passwords; breach report written to `clients/kittle/reports/2026-06-08-breach-check.md`; SharePoint confirmed clean; Security Defaults confirmed enabled; Ken's MFA verified clean (single iPhone 12 Pro Max, no attacker-registered devices). --- ## Key Decisions - **EXO hidden rule sweep used Exchange Operator (not Security Investigator):** `Get-InboxRule -IncludeHidden:true` requires `Exchange.ManageAsApp` permission, which only the Exchange Operator app holds. Security Investigator has `full_access_as_app` (EWS), not the Exchange admin cmdlets tier. Switched on first 401. - **Phishing send via EWS SOAP (not Graph SendMail):** 740-recipient victim notification sent using EWS SOAP from admin@kittlearizona.com. Graph SendMail would have required a delegated token or app-only send permission not available on this tenant. EWS worked with Exchange Operator EXO token. HTML body wrapped in `` to prevent schema validation errors on `
` tags. - **Lori's 10 admin roles stripped even though origin unknown:** At time of stripping, it was unknown whether roles were attacker-planted or pre-existing. Decision to strip all and re-assign legitimate scope afterward. Confirmed post-session via directoryAudits that roles were pre-existing (no "Add member to role" events in last 30 days from any non-ACG initiator). Re-assigned User Administrator as legitimate scope. - **Victim notification filtered 7 automated/non-human addresses:** vzwpix, mms.att.net, Microsoft internal, streaming service addresses removed from the 747 delivered list before sending notifications. 740 addresses used. - **Did not revoke Ken's MFA devices:** Ken's MFA verified clean — single iPhone 12 Pro Max, no attacker-registered devices. Advised Ken to verify at mysignins.microsoft.com himself; no forced MFA reset needed. - **Used Search-UnifiedAuditLog (EXO REST) instead of Graph signIns:** Tenant is on O365 E3, which lacks Entra P1. Graph `/auditLogs/signIns` returns `Authentication_RequestFromNonPremiumTenantOrB2CTenant` 403. UAL via EXO REST is available without P1 and provided the full attack timeline. - **Message trace used Get-MessageTraceV2:** `Get-MessageTrace` deprecated September 2025. Switched to `Get-MessageTraceV2` which returned full 1,000-record phishing campaign data. - **PERFECTDATA OAuth revoked immediately, Alignable deferred then revoked:** PERFECTDATA was clearly malicious (Mail.ReadWrite, Files.ReadWrite scopes, unknown publisher). Alignable was initially deferred pending Alexis's input — later revoked at Mike's direction (offline_access + Contacts.Read, unverified publisher). --- ## Problems Encountered - **EXO /adminapi/beta 401 with Security Investigator token:** `full_access_as_app` is an EWS permission, not the Exchange admin cmdlets tier. Fixed by switching to Exchange Operator token which holds `Exchange.ManageAsApp`. HTTP 200 after switch. - **Remove-InboxRule JSON escaping error (400 "unrecognized escape sequence \4"):** The rule Identity string contains backslashes (e.g. `Ken\4160878082195980289`). Passing via shell variable without escaping caused malformed JSON. Fixed using `jq -n --arg identity "$IDENTITY"` to properly escape. - **Remove-InboxRule "can't use Identity and Mailbox together":** Identity already contains mailbox prefix, so separate Mailbox parameter caused conflict. Fixed by removing Mailbox parameter from the payload. - **EWS SOAP body schema error on HTML:** `
` tags in email body treated as XML elements, breaking SOAP schema validation. Fixed by wrapping body in ``. - **Sign-in logs 403 from all token tiers:** Tenant Admin lacked `AuditLog.Read.All` in manifest. Security Investigator has `AuditLog.Read.All` in roles but tenant returns `Authentication_RequestFromNonPremiumTenantOrB2CTenant`. O365 E3 does not include Entra P1 — sign-in log API requires P1. No fix available. Worked around via Search-UnifiedAuditLog (EXO REST) which does not require P1. - **Get-MessageTrace deprecated:** Returned deprecation warning. Switched to Get-MessageTraceV2. Also removed PageSize parameter (invalid for V2). - **directoryAudits `ne` operator not supported:** `activityDisplayName ne 'Remove member from role'` returned UnknownError. Workaround: fetch all RoleManagement events and filter via `jq` client-side. - **UAL search returned 0 results for Lori role events:** EXO REST `Search-UnifiedAuditLog` with `Operations:Add member to role` returned empty for Lori. Resolved via Graph directoryAudits API (which did work with Security Investigator token after consent) — confirmed no role assignment events for Lori in 30 days, meaning roles were pre-existing. --- ## Configuration Changes - **Created:** `vault/clients/kittle/m365-ken-schagel-incident.sops.yaml` — SOPS-encrypted vault entry for Ken's temp password and incident notes - **Created:** `clients/kittle/reports/2026-06-08-breach-check.md` — Full breach incident report (attack timeline, attacker IPs, all remediation actions, open items) - **Created:** `clients/kittle/session-logs/2026-06/2026-06-08-mike-bec-incident-remediation.md` — this file --- ## Credentials & Secrets **Ken Schagel temp password:** `B/947405806521av` - Vaulted at: `vault/clients/kittle/m365-ken-schagel-incident.sops.yaml` - Communicated to Mike via Syncro ticket #32393 (public comment with temp passwords for Ken + Wrex) - Ken's account re-enabled by Mike mid-session **Wrex password reset:** `Kittle@1426Wrx!47E742` - Communicated via Syncro ticket #32393 --- ## Infrastructure & Servers | Item | Value | |------|-------| | Tenant | kittlearizona.com | | Tenant ID | `3d073ebe-806a-4a5e-9035-3c7c4a264fc0` | | ACG MSP tenant ID | `ce61461e-81a0-4c84-bb4a-7b354a9a356d` | | Syncro ticket | #32393 | | Attacker IP 1 | 64.44.131.168 — OWA browser access, Chicago IL, AS20278 Nexeon Technologies (VPN/hosting) | | Attacker IP 2 | 40.126.41.96 — Contact scraping via python-httpx, Microsoft Azure | | Attacker IP 3 | 45.134.224.220 — Bulk phishing send, Kansas City MO, AS147049 PacketHub S.A. | | Attacker tool | python-httpx/0.28.1, OAuth token for Microsoft Desktop app `d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c` | | Attacker AAD session | `0031c64a-94a8-7629-20ad-c42db69d76c7` | | Compromise window | 13:24–21:41 UTC 2026-06-08 | ### MSP App Credentials Used | App | Client ID | |-----|-----------| | Security Investigator | `bfbc12a4-f0dd-4e12-b06d-997e7271e10c` | | Exchange Operator | `b43e7342-5b4b-492f-890f-bb5a4f7f40e9` | | User Manager | `64fac46b-8b44-41ad-93ee-7da03927576c` | | Tenant Admin | `709e6eed-0711-4875-9c44-2d3518c47063` | --- ## Commands & Outputs ### Attack timeline (from UAL + message trace) ``` 09:03 UTC Normal Outlook sync (Microsoft IPs) — pre-compromise 13:24 UTC [BREACH START] OWA login — 64.44.131.168 (Chicago, Nexeon VPN) 13:37 UTC Ken's T-Mobile phone (legitimate, unaware) 15:00 UTC Attacker returns — 64.44.131.168 15:17 UTC Ken sends legitimate email via Cox (Phoenix AZ) 15:32 UTC Attacker sends test email from OWA — concurrent with Ken 16:14 UTC Attacker sends second test email 18:36 UTC Contact harvest starts — python-httpx/0.28.1 from Azure 40.126.41.96 18:52 UTC Attacker reviews Sent/Deleted/RSS Feeds from OWA 18:53 UTC Contact harvest ends (250+ MailItemsAccessed events) 21:14 UTC Phishing batch 1: 17 recipients 21:16 UTC Phishing batch 2: 300 recipients 21:20 UTC Phishing batch 3: 300 recipients 21:23 UTC Phishing batch 4: 300 recipients 21:26 UTC Phishing batch 5: 83 recipients — from 45.134.224.220 (PacketHub) 21:27 UTC Ken's SSPR password reset attempt ~21:30 UTC Howard (ACG) receives phishing email — incident detected 21:41 UTC Mike manually blocks Ken sign-in in portal, sets temp password ~22:00 UTC ACG investigation and remediation begins 22:05 UTC ACG removes Lori's 10 admin roles (Tenant Admin app) 22:06 UTC Lori sessions revoked ``` ### Malicious inbox rules deleted ``` Ken@kittlearizona.com "." Move ALL mail → RSS Feeds, MarkAsRead, StopProcessing [DELETED] Ken@kittlearizona.com "Admin" Move ALL mail → RSS Feeds, MarkAsRead, StopProcessing [DELETED] alexis@kittlearizona.com "..." Move ALL mail → RSS Feeds, MarkAsRead, StopProcessing [DELETED] Accounting@kittlearizona.com ".." Move mail FROM Ken → RSS Feeds, Priority 1 [DELETED] Accounting@kittlearizona.com "..." Move ALL mail → RSS Feeds, Priority 2 [DELETED] ``` Note: Accounting ".." + "..." were actively suppressing ALL incoming mail at time of discovery. ### Phishing campaign stats ``` Total sent: 1,000 Delivered: 747 Failed/bounced: 227 Pending: 25 Notifications sent: 740 (7 automated addresses filtered) Subject: "Ken Schagel shared a file with you" ``` ### OAuth grants revoked ``` PERFECTDATA app Mail.ReadWrite, Files.ReadWrite, offline_access [REVOKED] Alignable app offline_access, User.Read, Contacts.Read [REVOKED] Grant ID: jB3LklISEEOHpW2kH5IbQLz8wKqAnj1KmLeBzb1HLJrh6qF03cBERamPOhj4CXha Client SP: 92cb1d8c-1252-4310-87a5-6da41f921b40 ``` ### Lori role changes ``` Stripped (all pre-existing): Global Administrator, Exchange Administrator, User Administrator, Teams Administrator, SharePoint Administrator, Helpdesk Administrator, AI Administrator, Global Reader, Service Support Administrator, User Experience Success Manager Re-assigned: User Administrator (roleTemplateId: fe930be7-5e62-47db-91af-98c3a49a38b1) Role object ID in tenant: 1321d5cd-17bb-40de-891b-1e85667e1c5a Lori user ID: 5817629b-5832-43c6-b74c-86a05c29c852 ``` ### Key user IDs ``` Ken Schagel Ken@kittlearizona.com (admin roles stripped, re-enabled by Mike) Lori Schagel Lori@kittlearizona.com ID: 5817629b-5832-43c6-b74c-86a05c29c852 Alexis alexis@kittlearizona.com ID: 74a1eae1-c0dd-4544-a98f-3a18f809785a Wrex Wrex@kittlearizona.com (sessions revoked, password reset) ``` --- ## Pending / Incomplete Tasks 1. **Christina Micek inbox rule on Ken** — `StopProcessingRules:true`, no action, no filter. Unknown if legitimate or attacker-planted. Needs Ken to confirm. Delete if he doesn't recognize it. 2. **Re-add admin roles to Ken** — All 10 stripped during containment. Ken is Global Admin by function; re-add Global Administrator and Exchange Administrator once incident is declared closed and Ken's account is fully verified clean. 3. **Lori GA access review** — Confirmed pre-existing (not attacker-planted). Recommend discussing with Ken whether Lori legitimately needs any admin role at all. Downscoped to User Administrator for now. 4. **MFA cleanup** — Alexis has duplicate Authenticator registrations ("iPhone 12 Pro Max" x2). Lori has two Authenticator devices (SM-G975U + SM-F766U, likely old phone not removed). Users can self-serve at mysignins.microsoft.com or ACG can reset. 5. **Phishing URL unknown** — Email body purged when Ken's account was disabled. Send IP 45.134.224.220 (PacketHub S.A., AS147049) is known. Submit to threat intel if needed. 6. **Entra P1 licensing** — Sign-in logs blind without it. Tenant on O365 E3, not M365 E3. Recommend Entra P1 add-on or upgrade. Without P1, a Conditional Access policy for foreign IP blocking also cannot be enforced. 7. **DKIM/DMARC** — Not configured on kittlearizona.com. DMARC reject/quarantine would reduce future phishing deliverability from this domain. 8. **Alexis MFA duplicate** — One "iPhone 12 Pro Max" Authenticator entry is likely a stale registration. Should be cleaned up but is low priority now that PERFECTDATA and Alignable are revoked. --- ## Reference Information - **Syncro ticket:** #32393 (public comment added with temp passwords for Ken + Wrex) - **Breach report:** `clients/kittle/reports/2026-06-08-breach-check.md` - **Vault entry:** `vault/clients/kittle/m365-ken-schagel-incident.sops.yaml` - **Victim notification:** sent from admin@kittlearizona.com via EWS SOAP, 3 batches, 740 recipients - **Attacker OAuth app (Microsoft Desktop):** `d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c` - **Attacker AAD session:** `0031c64a-94a8-7629-20ad-c42db69d76c7` - **Security Defaults:** enabled (`isEnabled: true`) on this tenant - **SharePoint:** clean — no attacker-created files, pages, or external sharing links - **EXO REST endpoint:** `https://outlook.office365.com/adminapi/beta/{tenantId}/InvokeCommand` - **EWS endpoint:** `https://outlook.office365.com/EWS/Exchange.asmx` - **Graph directoryAudits:** confirmed working with Security Investigator token (no P1 needed for this endpoint) - **Graph signIns:** blocked — requires Entra P1 (`Authentication_RequestFromNonPremiumTenantOrB2CTenant`) --- ## Update: 16:23 PT — Post-save follow-up actions ### Additional actions completed after initial save **Alignable OAuth on Alexis — revoked:** At Mike's direction, revoked the Alignable OAuth grant on alexis@kittlearizona.com. - Grant ID: `jB3LklISEEOHpW2kH5IbQLz8wKqAnj1KmLeBzb1HLJrh6qF03cBERamPOhj4CXha` - App SP client ID: `92cb1d8c-1252-4310-87a5-6da41f921b40` - Scopes: `offline_access User.Read Contacts.Read` - HTTP 204 [OK] **Lori Schagel — downscoped to User Administrator:** All 10 pre-existing admin roles had been stripped during containment. Re-assigned User Administrator only (confirmed pre-existing GA was unnecessary exposure, not attacker-planted). - Lori user ID: `5817629b-5832-43c6-b74c-86a05c29c852` - User Administrator role object ID: `1321d5cd-17bb-40de-891b-1e85667e1c5a` - roleTemplateId: `fe930be7-5e62-47db-91af-98c3a49a38b1` - HTTP 204 [OK] **Lori role assignment timing — confirmed pre-existing:** directoryAudits query (last 30 days, all RoleManagement events) returned only ACG-initiated removals. Zero "Add member to role" events from any other initiator in the 30-day window. Lori's GA was assigned more than 30 days before the incident — pre-existing, not attacker-planted. Breach report updated to reflect this finding. **Victim notification confirmed sent:** Mike asked explicitly — confirmed 740 emails sent via EWS SOAP from admin@kittlearizona.com in 3 batches. All NoError. 747 delivered by phishing campaign; 7 automated addresses filtered (vzwpix, att.net MMS, Microsoft internal, streaming service) before notification send. **All consent links accepted by Mike** — confirmed all 5 MSP apps (Security Investigator, Exchange Operator, User Manager, Tenant Admin, Defender Add-on) have admin consent in Kittle tenant. **Thread deletion failed:** Bot received HTTP 403 Missing Permissions attempting to delete Discord thread 1513652236444504197. Thread remains open. ### Breach report updates `clients/kittle/reports/2026-06-08-breach-check.md` updated with: - Lori role assignment confirmed pre-existing (not attacker-planted) - Alignable OAuth revocation added to remediation table - Lori User Administrator re-assignment added to remediation table - Open items updated to reflect resolved items (Ken MFA clean, Lori role timing resolved) - New open item: Lori GA access review (recommend discussing with Ken whether she needs any admin role)