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Mike Swanson 75ce1c2fd5 feat: Add Sequential Thinking to Code Review + Frontend Validation
Enhanced code review and frontend validation with intelligent triggers:

Code Review Agent Enhancement:
- Added Sequential Thinking MCP integration for complex issues
- Triggers on 2+ rejections or 3+ critical issues
- New escalation format with root cause analysis
- Comprehensive solution strategies with trade-off evaluation
- Educational feedback to break rejection cycles
- Files: .claude/agents/code-review.md (+308 lines)
- Docs: CODE_REVIEW_ST_ENHANCEMENT.md, CODE_REVIEW_ST_TESTING.md

Frontend Design Skill Enhancement:
- Automatic invocation for ANY UI change
- Comprehensive validation checklist (200+ checkpoints)
- 8 validation categories (visual, interactive, responsive, a11y, etc.)
- 3 validation levels (quick, standard, comprehensive)
- Integration with code review workflow
- Files: .claude/skills/frontend-design/SKILL.md (+120 lines)
- Docs: UI_VALIDATION_CHECKLIST.md (462 lines), AUTOMATIC_VALIDATION_ENHANCEMENT.md (587 lines)

Settings Optimization:
- Repaired .claude/settings.local.json (fixed m365 pattern)
- Reduced permissions from 49 to 33 (33% reduction)
- Removed duplicates, sorted alphabetically
- Created SETTINGS_PERMISSIONS.md documentation

Checkpoint Command Enhancement:
- Dual checkpoint system (git + database)
- Saves session context to API for cross-machine recall
- Includes git metadata in database context
- Files: .claude/commands/checkpoint.md (+139 lines)

Decision Rationale:
- Sequential Thinking MCP breaks rejection cycles by identifying root causes
- Automatic frontend validation catches UI issues before code review
- Dual checkpoints enable complete project memory across machines
- Settings optimization improves maintainability

Total: 1,200+ lines of documentation and enhancements

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-17 16:23:52 -07:00

161 lines
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The file C:\Users\MikeSwanson\Claude\session-logs\2026-01-05-session.md has been updated. Here's the result of running `cat -n` on a snippet of the edited file:
129→scutil --dns
130→sudo dscacheutil -flushcache; sudo killall -HUP mDNSResponder
131→```
132→
133→### UniFi Cloud Gateway Ultra DNS
134→- Supports local DNS records via Client Devices or Settings → Gateway → DNS
135→- CNAME records require UniFi OS 4.3+ / Network 9.3+
136→
137→---
138→
139→## Update: 20:30 - Dataforth M365 Security Audit
140→
141→### What Was Accomplished
142→
143→1. **Admin consent granted for Dataforth tenant** - Claude-Code-M365 app now has full API access
144→2. **Complete M365 security audit performed** via Graph API
145→3. **Investigated suspicious "true" app registration**
146→4. **Analyzed OAuth consents across tenant**
147→
148→### Security Audit Findings
149→
150→#### Tenant Information
151→- **Tenant:** Dataforth Corporation (dataforth.com)
152→- **Tenant ID:** 7dfa3ce8-c496-4b51-ab8d-bd3dcd78b584
153→- **Location:** 6230 S Country Club Rd, Tucson, AZ 85706
154→- **Users:** ~100 accounts
155→- **AD Sync:** On-premises sync enabled, last sync 2026-01-05 19:42:31Z
156→- **Domains:** dataforth.com, dataforthcom.onmicrosoft.com, intranet.dataforth.com
157→
158→#### OAuth Consents - LOW RISK
159→| User | App | Permissions | Assessment |
160→|------|-----|-------------|------------|
161→| Georg Haubner (ghaubner) | Samsung Email | IMAP, EAS, SMTP | Legitimate - Samsung phone |
162→| Jacque Antar (jantar) | Apple Mail | EAS | Legitimate - iOS device |
163→
164→**No malicious OAuth consents found** (unlike BG Builders Gmail backdoor case)
165→
166→#### App Registrations in Tenant
167→| App Name | App ID | Created | Status |
168→|----------|--------|---------|--------|
169→| Graphus | 084f1e10-b027-4ac6-a702-b80128385e51 | 2025-06-08 | ✅ Legit security tool |
170→| SAAS_ALERTS_RESPOND | 86e3bf21-3a61-4c45-9400-6c110c5522c6 | 2025-08-22 | ✅ Kaseya alerting |
171→| SaaSAlerts.Fortify | 711c0066-fe7a-4ce0-9ce0-6847ee29a9ef | 2025-08-22 | ✅ Security tool |
172→| Bullphish ID - Dataforth | 42f5c403-e672-46fa-a25e-cf67c76e818e | 2025-10-19 | ✅ Security training |
173→| Claude-Code-M365 | 7a8c0b2e-57fb-4d79-9b5a-4b88d21b1f29 | 2025-12-22 | ✅ Our API access |
174→| P2P Server | dc5cc8f3-04c5-414c-bc8e-e6031bd9b3cc | 2024-03-05 | ✅ MS P2P Access cert |
175→| ConnectSyncProvisioning_AD1 | d768bfed-7948-48af-a4a7-67257e74186e | 2025-09-30 | ✅ Azure AD Connect |
176→| **"true"** | a21e971d-1fcb-41a7-9b01-c45b8d7d1754 | 2024-09-04 | ⚠️ Investigate |
177→
178→#### "true" App Investigation Details
179→- **Object ID:** bcab6984-00b0-421e-b1c5-a381b748710a
180→- **App ID:** a21e971d-1fcb-41a7-9b01-c45b8d7d1754
181→- **Created:** 2024-09-04 21:11:40 UTC
182→- **Owner:** Jacque Antar (jantar@dataforth.com)
183→- **Service Principal:** NONE (never consented/used)
184→- **Secret:** Exists (hint: PZZ, expires 2026-09-04)
185→- **Redirect URI:** http://localhost:7828
186→- **Sign-in Audience:** AzureADandPersonalMicrosoftAccount (multi-tenant + personal)
187→- **Requested Permissions (Delegated):**
188→ - Mail.Read (570282fd-fa5c-430d-a7fd-fc8dc98a9dca)
189→ - Files.Read (024d486e-b451-40bb-833d-3e66d98c5c73)
190→ - Contacts.Read (7427e0e9-2fba-42fe-b0c0-848c9e6a8182)
191→ - People.Read (ba47897c-39ec-4d83-8086-ee8256fa737d)
192→ - User.Read (e1fe6dd8-ba31-4d61-89e7-88639da4683d)
193→ - Mail.Send (e383f46e-2787-4529-855e-0e479a3ffac0)
194→
195→**Risk Assessment: LOW** - App was created by internal employee and has never been used (no service principal). Recommend asking Jacque Antar about its purpose and deleting if no longer needed.
196→
197→#### Phishing Campaign Pattern
198→- **December 2025:** "December Bonus and Allocation for All Staff"
199→- **January 2026:** "2026 Updated Pay Structure & Appraisal Guidelines"
200→- **Same pattern:** QR code credential harvesting, bypasses MailProtector via direct M365 delivery
201→
202→---
203→
204→### Credentials Confirmed Working
205→
206→#### Dataforth - Claude-Code-M365 (Entra App)
207→- **Tenant ID:** 7dfa3ce8-c496-4b51-ab8d-bd3dcd78b584
208→- **App ID (Client ID):** 7a8c0b2e-57fb-4d79-9b5a-4b88d21b1f29
209→- **Client Secret:** tXo8Q~ZNG9zoBpbK9HwJTkzx.YEigZ9AynoSrca3
210→- **Permissions:** Calendars.ReadWrite, Contacts.ReadWrite, User.ReadWrite.All, Mail.ReadWrite, Directory.ReadWrite.All, Group.ReadWrite.All
211→- **Status:** ✅ WORKING - Full Graph API access confirmed
212→
213→#### Token Request (for future sessions)
214→```bash
215→curl -s -X POST "https://login.microsoftonline.com/7dfa3ce8-c496-4b51-ab8d-bd3dcd78b584/oauth2/v2.0/token" \
216→ -d "client_id=7a8c0b2e-57fb-4d79-9b5a-4b88d21b1f29" \
217→ -d "client_secret=tXo8Q~ZNG9zoBpbK9HwJTkzx.YEigZ9AynoSrca3" \
218→ -d "scope=https://graph.microsoft.com/.default" \
219→ -d "grant_type=client_credentials"
220→```
221→
222→---
223→
224→### Key Graph API Queries Used
225→
226→```bash
227→# List all users
228→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users?$select=displayName,userPrincipalName,mail
229→
230→# List app registrations
231→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications
232→
233→# List OAuth permission grants (delegated consents)
234→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/oauth2PermissionGrants
235→
236→# Check service principal for app
237→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals?$filter=appId+eq+'APP_ID'
238→
239→# Get app owners
240→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications/{object-id}/owners
241→
242→# Get organization info
243→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/organization
244→
245→# Read user's recent emails
246→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/{email}/messages?$filter=receivedDateTime ge 2026-01-01&$top=20
247→```
248→
249→---
250→
251→### Security Status Summary
252→
253→| Category | Status | Notes |
254→|----------|--------|-------|
255→| OAuth Consents | ✅ Clean | No malicious third-party apps |
256→| App Registrations | ⚠️ Review | "true" app needs investigation |
257→| Email Security | ⚠️ Gap | Phishing bypasses MailProtector |
258→| Security Tools | ✅ Good | SaaSAlerts, Graphus, Bullphish ID deployed |
259→| AD Sync | ✅ Working | On-prem sync active |
260→
261→---
262→
263→### Pending Tasks
264→
265→1. **Ask Jacque Antar about "true" app** - Confirm purpose or delete
266→2. **Configure Exchange inbound connector** - Restrict mail to MailProtector IPs only
267→3. **Add AuditLog.Read.All permission** to Claude-Code-M365 for sign-in log analysis
268→4. **Consider external email tagging** for spoofed internal senders
269→
270→---
271→
272→### Key Users Identified
273→
274→| User | Email | Notes |
275→|------|-------|-------|
276→| Georg Haubner | ghaubner@dataforth.com | Phishing target, Sales/Marketing VP |
277→| Jacque Antar | jantar@dataforth.com | Owner of "true" app, has Apple Mail OAuth |
278→| Theresa Dean | tdean@dataforth.com | Active internal comms |
279→| sysadmin | sysadmin@dataforth.com | Service account |
280→
281→---
282→
283→### Files & Locations
284→
285→- **Phishing email:** `D:\Workplace\Personal Documents\Profile\Documents\DF Spam\`
286→- **QR phishing attachment:** `ATT29306.docx`
287→- **Malicious URL:** `https://acuvatech.cyou?a=ghaubner@dataforth.com`
288→