Files
claudetools/.claude/skills/remediation-tool/references/graph-endpoints.md
Mike Swanson 26df2c47b9 Session log: remediation skill rewrite (5-app tiered arch) + Cascades breach check John Trozzi
- Rewrote get-token.sh: tiered app system (investigator/exchange-op/user-manager/tenant-admin/defender)
- Updated SKILL.md, command, gotchas, checklist, graph-endpoints for new app suite
- Cascades breach check: mailbox clean, inbound phishing received by John, DMARC gap noted

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-20 11:35:18 -07:00

5.4 KiB
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Graph + Exchange REST Cheatsheet

All examples assume:

  • $GT = Graph token (investigator tier)
  • $EXO_R = Exchange read token (investigator-exo tier) — Get-* cmdlets
  • $EXO_W = Exchange write token (exchange-op tier) — Set-/Remove- cmdlets
  • $UT = User Manager graph token (user-manager tier) — user write ops
  • $TID = tenant ID, $UPN/$UID = user identifiers

Acquire tokens:

GT=$(bash .claude/skills/remediation-tool/scripts/get-token.sh $TID investigator)
EXO_R=$(bash .claude/skills/remediation-tool/scripts/get-token.sh $TID investigator-exo)
EXO_W=$(bash .claude/skills/remediation-tool/scripts/get-token.sh $TID exchange-op)   # remediation only
UT=$(bash .claude/skills/remediation-tool/scripts/get-token.sh $TID user-manager)     # remediation only

Graph API (https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0)

User lookup / status

# By UPN
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $GT" \
  "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/$UPN?\$select=id,displayName,userPrincipalName,mail,accountEnabled,createdDateTime,lastPasswordChangeDateTime"

# All users (filter, paged)
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $GT" \
  "https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users?\$top=999&\$filter=accountEnabled%20eq%20true"

Mailbox

# Visible inbox rules (Graph v1.0 — does NOT return hidden rules)
/users/$UPN/mailFolders/inbox/messageRules

# Mailbox settings (auto-reply, delegates meeting option, NOT forwarding flags)
/users/$UPN/mailboxSettings

# Recent sent / deleted
/users/$UPN/mailFolders/sentitems/messages?$top=25&$orderby=sentDateTime%20desc
/users/$UPN/mailFolders/deleteditems/messages?$top=25&$orderby=receivedDateTime%20desc

Authentication methods

/users/$UPN/authentication/methods
# Watch for new methods added within the attack window

OAuth + app role assignments

/users/$UPN/oauth2PermissionGrants      # user-level consents
/users/$UPN/appRoleAssignments          # apps assigned to this user
/servicePrincipals/$SP_ID/appRoleAssignments  # what scopes a SP has

Sign-ins (needs Entra ID P1 or higher)

# Interactive sign-ins v1.0 (does NOT include non-interactive/service-principal)
/auditLogs/signIns?$filter=userId eq '$UID' and createdDateTime ge $FROM&$top=200

# All sign-in event types (beta endpoint)
/beta/auditLogs/signIns?$filter=userId eq '$UID' and (signInEventTypes/any(t:t eq 'nonInteractiveUser'))

# Foreign successful sign-ins tenant-wide
/auditLogs/signIns?$filter=(status/errorCode eq 0) and (location/countryOrRegion ne 'US')

Directory audits

# Changes targeting a specific user
/auditLogs/directoryAudits?$filter=targetResources/any(t:t/id eq '$UID')

# Tenant-wide consent / auth-method / role events
/auditLogs/directoryAudits?$filter=activityDateTime ge $FROM
# Then client-side filter by activityDisplayName ~ Consent|Authentication Method|Add service principal|Add member to role

Identity Protection (needs IdentityRiskyUser.Read.All)

/identityProtection/riskyUsers
/identityProtection/riskyUsers/$UID
/identityProtection/riskDetections?$filter=userId eq '$UID'

B2B guests

# Get guest by gmail/external address
/users?$filter=startswith(userPrincipalName,'dunedolly21')

# Invite audits
/auditLogs/directoryAudits?$filter=activityDisplayName eq 'Invite external user'

Exchange Online REST (https://outlook.office365.com/adminapi/beta/{tenant-id}/InvokeCommand)

POST with JSON body {"CmdletInput":{"CmdletName":"<cmdlet>","Parameters":{...}}}.

  • Read ops (Get-*): use $EXO_R — Security Investigator token (investigator-exo tier)
  • Write ops (Set-, Remove-): use $EXO_W — Exchange Operator token (exchange-op tier)

Inbox rules (INCLUDING hidden)

{"CmdletInput":{"CmdletName":"Get-InboxRule","Parameters":{"Mailbox":"user@domain.com","IncludeHidden":true}}}

Why this matters: attackers commonly create hidden rules that Graph v1.0 cannot see.

Mailbox forwarding / properties

{"CmdletInput":{"CmdletName":"Get-Mailbox","Parameters":{"Identity":"user@domain.com"}}}

Check: ForwardingAddress, ForwardingSmtpAddress, DeliverToMailboxAndForward, GrantSendOnBehalfTo, HiddenFromAddressListsEnabled.

Mailbox permissions (delegates / FullAccess)

{"CmdletInput":{"CmdletName":"Get-MailboxPermission","Parameters":{"Identity":"user@domain.com"}}}

Filter out NT AUTHORITY\\SELF — anything else is a delegate.

SendAs permissions

{"CmdletInput":{"CmdletName":"Get-RecipientPermission","Parameters":{"Identity":"user@domain.com"}}}

Transport rules (tenant-wide mail flow)

{"CmdletInput":{"CmdletName":"Get-TransportRule","Parameters":{}}}

Check for rules that reroute, delete, or exfiltrate mail.

SMTP AUTH

{"CmdletInput":{"CmdletName":"Get-CASMailbox","Parameters":{"Identity":"user@domain.com"}}}

Check SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled. To disable SMTP AUTH on a single mailbox (remediation): Set-CASMailbox -SmtpClientAuthenticationDisabled $true.

Rate limits / pagination

  • Graph signIns endpoints cap $top at 999. For >999 results, follow @odata.nextLink.
  • Exchange REST has undocumented throttling — if you hit 429, back off 3060s.
  • Token is valid ~60 minutes. Script caches for 55 min.