Mike Swanson
75ce1c2fd5
Enhanced code review and frontend validation with intelligent triggers: Code Review Agent Enhancement: - Added Sequential Thinking MCP integration for complex issues - Triggers on 2+ rejections or 3+ critical issues - New escalation format with root cause analysis - Comprehensive solution strategies with trade-off evaluation - Educational feedback to break rejection cycles - Files: .claude/agents/code-review.md (+308 lines) - Docs: CODE_REVIEW_ST_ENHANCEMENT.md, CODE_REVIEW_ST_TESTING.md Frontend Design Skill Enhancement: - Automatic invocation for ANY UI change - Comprehensive validation checklist (200+ checkpoints) - 8 validation categories (visual, interactive, responsive, a11y, etc.) - 3 validation levels (quick, standard, comprehensive) - Integration with code review workflow - Files: .claude/skills/frontend-design/SKILL.md (+120 lines) - Docs: UI_VALIDATION_CHECKLIST.md (462 lines), AUTOMATIC_VALIDATION_ENHANCEMENT.md (587 lines) Settings Optimization: - Repaired .claude/settings.local.json (fixed m365 pattern) - Reduced permissions from 49 to 33 (33% reduction) - Removed duplicates, sorted alphabetically - Created SETTINGS_PERMISSIONS.md documentation Checkpoint Command Enhancement: - Dual checkpoint system (git + database) - Saves session context to API for cross-machine recall - Includes git metadata in database context - Files: .claude/commands/checkpoint.md (+139 lines) Decision Rationale: - Sequential Thinking MCP breaks rejection cycles by identifying root causes - Automatic frontend validation catches UI issues before code review - Dual checkpoints enable complete project memory across machines - Settings optimization improves maintainability Total: 1,200+ lines of documentation and enhancements Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
293 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
293 lines
14 KiB
Plaintext
1→# Session Log: 2026-01-05
|
|
2→
|
|
3→## Session Summary
|
|
4→
|
|
5→### What Was Accomplished
|
|
6→
|
|
7→1. **Fixed Claude Code settings file** (`.claude/settings.local.json`)
|
|
8→ - Removed 25+ one-off permissions with hardcoded paths
|
|
9→ - Removed exposed password in sshpass command
|
|
10→ - Removed invalid entries (`Bash(~/.ssh/known_hosts)`, `Bash(done)`)
|
|
11→ - Replaced specific commands with proper wildcards
|
|
12→ - Reduced from 115 lines to 92 lines
|
|
13→
|
|
14→2. **Diagnosed Mac DNS resolution issue**
|
|
15→ - Problem: Mac pinging `PST-SERVER` resolved to 192.168.0.183 instead of 192.168.0.2
|
|
16→ - Initial theory: mDNS/Bonjour taking priority
|
|
17→ - **Root cause found**: UniFi Cloud Gateway Ultra had wrong domain name configured (didn't match actual DNS domain)
|
|
18→
|
|
19→3. **Analyzed Dataforth phishing attack**
|
|
20→ - Received phishing email sample: `Please Review Dataforth corporation 2026 Updated Pay Structure & Appraisal Guidelines`
|
|
21→ - **Key findings from email headers:**
|
|
22→ - SPF FAILED: `domain of dataforth.com does not designate 31.57.166.164 as permitted sender`
|
|
23→ - Email came from external IP `31.57.166.164` directly to M365
|
|
24→ - Spoofed sender: `Georg Haubner <ghaubner@dataforth.com>`
|
|
25→ - **Attachment analysis (ATT29306.docx):**
|
|
26→ - Contains QR code phishing attack
|
|
27→ - QR code URL: `https://acuvatech.cyou?a=ghaubner@dataforth.com`
|
|
28→ - Classic credential harvesting with pre-populated email
|
|
29→
|
|
30→4. **Checked Dataforth email security DNS records**
|
|
31→ - SPF: `v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:icpbounce.com include:spf.us.emailservice.io -all` (hard fail - good)
|
|
32→ - DMARC: `v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:ghaubner@dataforth.com` (reject policy - good)
|
|
33→ - MX: Points to MailProtector (emailservice.io/cc/co)
|
|
34→
|
|
35→5. **Identified email bypass issue**
|
|
36→ - Email bypassed MailProtector entirely, went direct to M365
|
|
37→ - User confirmed: "No trace of those emails passing through mailprotector"
|
|
38→ - Problem: M365 accepts direct connections from any IP, not just MailProtector
|
|
39→
|
|
40→6. **Checked Claude-MSP-Access app status for Dataforth**
|
|
41→ - Result: **NOT FOUND** - admin consent has not been granted
|
|
42→ - Need to grant consent for extended M365 security access
|
|
43→
|
|
44→---
|
|
45→
|
|
46→## Credentials Used
|
|
47→
|
|
48→### Dataforth - Claude-Code-M365 (Entra App)
|
|
49→- **Tenant ID:** 7dfa3ce8-c496-4b51-ab8d-bd3dcd78b584
|
|
50→- **App ID (Client ID):** 7a8c0b2e-57fb-4d79-9b5a-4b88d21b1f29
|
|
51→- **Client Secret:** tXo8Q~ZNG9zoBpbK9HwJTkzx.YEigZ9AynoSrca3
|
|
52→- **Permissions:** Calendars.ReadWrite, Contacts.ReadWrite, User.ReadWrite.All, Mail.ReadWrite, Directory.ReadWrite.All, Group.ReadWrite.All
|
|
53→- **Status:** Working, used to query tenant
|
|
54→
|
|
55→### Claude-MSP-Access (Multi-Tenant App) - NOT consented for Dataforth
|
|
56→- **App ID:** fabb3421-8b34-484b-bc17-e46de9703418
|
|
57→- **Client Secret:** ~QJ8Q~NyQSs4OcGqHZyPrA2CVnq9KBfKiimntbMO
|
|
58→- **Status:** Not added to Dataforth tenant yet
|
|
59→
|
|
60→### CIPP
|
|
61→- **URL:** https://cippcanvb.azurewebsites.net
|
|
62→- **App ID:** 420cb849-542d-4374-9cb2-3d8ae0e1835b
|
|
63→- **Client Secret:** MOn8Q~otmxJPLvmL~_aCVTV8Va4t4~SrYrukGbJT
|
|
64→- **Status:** API calls returning empty - Dataforth may not be in CIPP
|
|
65→
|
|
66→---
|
|
67→
|
|
68→## Phishing Attack Analysis
|
|
69→
|
|
70→### Email Details
|
|
71→- **Subject:** Please Review: Dataforth corporation 2026 Updated Pay Structure & Appraisal Guidelines ID-grC8uKantF
|
|
72→- **Spoofed From:** Georg Haubner <ghaubner@dataforth.com>
|
|
73→- **Date:** 2026-01-04 07:37:40 MST
|
|
74→- **Origin IP:** 31.57.166.164 (no reverse DNS)
|
|
75→- **SPF Result:** FAIL
|
|
76→- **Attachment:** ATT29306.docx (contains QR code)
|
|
77→
|
|
78→### Malicious URL (from QR code)
|
|
79→```
|
|
80→https://acuvatech.cyou?a=ghaubner@dataforth.com
|
|
81→```
|
|
82→- `.cyou` TLD commonly used for phishing
|
|
83→- Pre-populates victim email for credential harvesting
|
|
84→
|
|
85→### Why Email Got Through
|
|
86→1. Attacker sent directly to M365 (`.mail.protection.outlook.com`)
|
|
87→2. Bypassed MX records pointing to MailProtector
|
|
88→3. M365 has no inbound connector restricting source IPs
|
|
89→4. Despite SPF fail and DMARC p=reject, email delivered
|
|
90→
|
|
91→---
|
|
92→
|
|
93→## Pending Tasks
|
|
94→
|
|
95→### Dataforth Email Security
|
|
96→1. **Add inbound connector in Exchange Online** to only accept mail from MailProtector IPs
|
|
97→2. **Grant admin consent for Claude-MSP-Access** to enable advanced security queries:
|
|
98→ ```
|
|
99→ https://login.microsoftonline.com/7dfa3ce8-c496-4b51-ab8d-bd3dcd78b584/adminconsent?client_id=fabb3421-8b34-484b-bc17-e46de9703418&redirect_uri=https://login.microsoftonline.com/common/oauth2/nativeclient
|
|
100→ ```
|
|
101→3. **Check anti-phishing policies** in Exchange Online / Defender
|
|
102→4. **Consider adding external email warning banner** for spoofed internal addresses
|
|
103→
|
|
104→### UniFi DNS (Client Network)
|
|
105→- Issue resolved: Domain name mismatch in UniFi gateway fixed
|
|
106→
|
|
107→---
|
|
108→
|
|
109→## Reference Information
|
|
110→
|
|
111→### Dataforth DNS Records
|
|
112→```
|
|
113→SPF: v=spf1 include:spf.protection.outlook.com include:icpbounce.com include:spf.us.emailservice.io -all
|
|
114→DMARC: v=DMARC1; p=reject; rua=mailto:ghaubner@dataforth.com; ruf=mailto:ghaubner@dataforth.com; fo=1
|
|
115→MX (priority order):
|
|
116→ 10 dataforth-com.inbound.emailservice.io
|
|
117→ 20 dataforth-com.inbound.emailservice.cc
|
|
118→ 30 dataforth-com.inbound.emailservice.co
|
|
119→```
|
|
120→
|
|
121→### Phishing Sample Location
|
|
122→- Email: `D:\Workplace\Personal Documents\Profile\Documents\DF Spam\Please Review Dataforth corporation 2026 Updated Pay Structure Appraisal Guidelines ID-grC8uKantF.msg`
|
|
123→- Attachment: `D:\Workplace\Personal Documents\Profile\Documents\DF Spam\ATT29306.docx`
|
|
124→
|
|
125→### Mac DNS Diagnostic Commands
|
|
126→```bash
|
|
127→dscacheutil -q host -a name HOSTNAME
|
|
128→dns-sd -G v4 HOSTNAME.local
|
|
129→scutil --dns
|
|
130→sudo dscacheutil -flushcache; sudo killall -HUP mDNSResponder
|
|
131→```
|
|
132→
|
|
133→### UniFi Cloud Gateway Ultra DNS
|
|
134→- Supports local DNS records via Client Devices or Settings → Gateway → DNS
|
|
135→- CNAME records require UniFi OS 4.3+ / Network 9.3+
|
|
136→
|
|
137→---
|
|
138→
|
|
139→## Update: 20:30 - Dataforth M365 Security Audit
|
|
140→
|
|
141→### What Was Accomplished
|
|
142→
|
|
143→1. **Admin consent granted for Dataforth tenant** - Claude-Code-M365 app now has full API access
|
|
144→2. **Complete M365 security audit performed** via Graph API
|
|
145→3. **Investigated suspicious "true" app registration**
|
|
146→4. **Analyzed OAuth consents across tenant**
|
|
147→
|
|
148→### Security Audit Findings
|
|
149→
|
|
150→#### Tenant Information
|
|
151→- **Tenant:** Dataforth Corporation (dataforth.com)
|
|
152→- **Tenant ID:** 7dfa3ce8-c496-4b51-ab8d-bd3dcd78b584
|
|
153→- **Location:** 6230 S Country Club Rd, Tucson, AZ 85706
|
|
154→- **Users:** ~100 accounts
|
|
155→- **AD Sync:** On-premises sync enabled, last sync 2026-01-05 19:42:31Z
|
|
156→- **Domains:** dataforth.com, dataforthcom.onmicrosoft.com, intranet.dataforth.com
|
|
157→
|
|
158→#### OAuth Consents - LOW RISK
|
|
159→| User | App | Permissions | Assessment |
|
|
160→|------|-----|-------------|------------|
|
|
161→| Georg Haubner (ghaubner) | Samsung Email | IMAP, EAS, SMTP | Legitimate - Samsung phone |
|
|
162→| Jacque Antar (jantar) | Apple Mail | EAS | Legitimate - iOS device |
|
|
163→
|
|
164→**No malicious OAuth consents found** (unlike BG Builders Gmail backdoor case)
|
|
165→
|
|
166→#### App Registrations in Tenant
|
|
167→| App Name | App ID | Created | Status |
|
|
168→|----------|--------|---------|--------|
|
|
169→| Graphus | 084f1e10-b027-4ac6-a702-b80128385e51 | 2025-06-08 | ✅ Legit security tool |
|
|
170→| SAAS_ALERTS_RESPOND | 86e3bf21-3a61-4c45-9400-6c110c5522c6 | 2025-08-22 | ✅ Kaseya alerting |
|
|
171→| SaaSAlerts.Fortify | 711c0066-fe7a-4ce0-9ce0-6847ee29a9ef | 2025-08-22 | ✅ Security tool |
|
|
172→| Bullphish ID - Dataforth | 42f5c403-e672-46fa-a25e-cf67c76e818e | 2025-10-19 | ✅ Security training |
|
|
173→| Claude-Code-M365 | 7a8c0b2e-57fb-4d79-9b5a-4b88d21b1f29 | 2025-12-22 | ✅ Our API access |
|
|
174→| P2P Server | dc5cc8f3-04c5-414c-bc8e-e6031bd9b3cc | 2024-03-05 | ✅ MS P2P Access cert |
|
|
175→| ConnectSyncProvisioning_AD1 | d768bfed-7948-48af-a4a7-67257e74186e | 2025-09-30 | ✅ Azure AD Connect |
|
|
176→| **"true"** | a21e971d-1fcb-41a7-9b01-c45b8d7d1754 | 2024-09-04 | ⚠️ Investigate |
|
|
177→
|
|
178→#### "true" App Investigation Details
|
|
179→- **Object ID:** bcab6984-00b0-421e-b1c5-a381b748710a
|
|
180→- **App ID:** a21e971d-1fcb-41a7-9b01-c45b8d7d1754
|
|
181→- **Created:** 2024-09-04 21:11:40 UTC
|
|
182→- **Owner:** Jacque Antar (jantar@dataforth.com)
|
|
183→- **Service Principal:** NONE (never consented/used)
|
|
184→- **Secret:** Exists (hint: PZZ, expires 2026-09-04)
|
|
185→- **Redirect URI:** http://localhost:7828
|
|
186→- **Sign-in Audience:** AzureADandPersonalMicrosoftAccount (multi-tenant + personal)
|
|
187→- **Requested Permissions (Delegated):**
|
|
188→ - Mail.Read (570282fd-fa5c-430d-a7fd-fc8dc98a9dca)
|
|
189→ - Files.Read (024d486e-b451-40bb-833d-3e66d98c5c73)
|
|
190→ - Contacts.Read (7427e0e9-2fba-42fe-b0c0-848c9e6a8182)
|
|
191→ - People.Read (ba47897c-39ec-4d83-8086-ee8256fa737d)
|
|
192→ - User.Read (e1fe6dd8-ba31-4d61-89e7-88639da4683d)
|
|
193→ - Mail.Send (e383f46e-2787-4529-855e-0e479a3ffac0)
|
|
194→
|
|
195→**Risk Assessment: LOW** - App was created by internal employee and has never been used (no service principal). Recommend asking Jacque Antar about its purpose and deleting if no longer needed.
|
|
196→
|
|
197→#### Phishing Campaign Pattern
|
|
198→- **December 2025:** "December Bonus and Allocation for All Staff"
|
|
199→- **January 2026:** "2026 Updated Pay Structure & Appraisal Guidelines"
|
|
200→- **Same pattern:** QR code credential harvesting, bypasses MailProtector via direct M365 delivery
|
|
201→
|
|
202→---
|
|
203→
|
|
204→### Credentials Confirmed Working
|
|
205→
|
|
206→#### Dataforth - Claude-Code-M365 (Entra App)
|
|
207→- **Tenant ID:** 7dfa3ce8-c496-4b51-ab8d-bd3dcd78b584
|
|
208→- **App ID (Client ID):** 7a8c0b2e-57fb-4d79-9b5a-4b88d21b1f29
|
|
209→- **Client Secret:** tXo8Q~ZNG9zoBpbK9HwJTkzx.YEigZ9AynoSrca3
|
|
210→- **Permissions:** Calendars.ReadWrite, Contacts.ReadWrite, User.ReadWrite.All, Mail.ReadWrite, Directory.ReadWrite.All, Group.ReadWrite.All
|
|
211→- **Status:** ✅ WORKING - Full Graph API access confirmed
|
|
212→
|
|
213→#### Token Request (for future sessions)
|
|
214→```bash
|
|
215→curl -s -X POST "https://login.microsoftonline.com/7dfa3ce8-c496-4b51-ab8d-bd3dcd78b584/oauth2/v2.0/token" \
|
|
216→ -d "client_id=7a8c0b2e-57fb-4d79-9b5a-4b88d21b1f29" \
|
|
217→ -d "client_secret=tXo8Q~ZNG9zoBpbK9HwJTkzx.YEigZ9AynoSrca3" \
|
|
218→ -d "scope=https://graph.microsoft.com/.default" \
|
|
219→ -d "grant_type=client_credentials"
|
|
220→```
|
|
221→
|
|
222→---
|
|
223→
|
|
224→### Key Graph API Queries Used
|
|
225→
|
|
226→```bash
|
|
227→# List all users
|
|
228→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users?$select=displayName,userPrincipalName,mail
|
|
229→
|
|
230→# List app registrations
|
|
231→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications
|
|
232→
|
|
233→# List OAuth permission grants (delegated consents)
|
|
234→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/oauth2PermissionGrants
|
|
235→
|
|
236→# Check service principal for app
|
|
237→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/servicePrincipals?$filter=appId+eq+'APP_ID'
|
|
238→
|
|
239→# Get app owners
|
|
240→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/applications/{object-id}/owners
|
|
241→
|
|
242→# Get organization info
|
|
243→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/organization
|
|
244→
|
|
245→# Read user's recent emails
|
|
246→GET https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/users/{email}/messages?$filter=receivedDateTime ge 2026-01-01&$top=20
|
|
247→```
|
|
248→
|
|
249→---
|
|
250→
|
|
251→### Security Status Summary
|
|
252→
|
|
253→| Category | Status | Notes |
|
|
254→|----------|--------|-------|
|
|
255→| OAuth Consents | ✅ Clean | No malicious third-party apps |
|
|
256→| App Registrations | ⚠️ Review | "true" app needs investigation |
|
|
257→| Email Security | ⚠️ Gap | Phishing bypasses MailProtector |
|
|
258→| Security Tools | ✅ Good | SaaSAlerts, Graphus, Bullphish ID deployed |
|
|
259→| AD Sync | ✅ Working | On-prem sync active |
|
|
260→
|
|
261→---
|
|
262→
|
|
263→### Pending Tasks
|
|
264→
|
|
265→1. **Ask Jacque Antar about "true" app** - Confirm purpose or delete
|
|
266→2. **Configure Exchange inbound connector** - Restrict mail to MailProtector IPs only
|
|
267→3. **Add AuditLog.Read.All permission** to Claude-Code-M365 for sign-in log analysis
|
|
268→4. **Consider external email tagging** for spoofed internal senders
|
|
269→
|
|
270→---
|
|
271→
|
|
272→### Key Users Identified
|
|
273→
|
|
274→| User | Email | Notes |
|
|
275→|------|-------|-------|
|
|
276→| Georg Haubner | ghaubner@dataforth.com | Phishing target, Sales/Marketing VP |
|
|
277→| Jacque Antar | jantar@dataforth.com | Owner of "true" app, has Apple Mail OAuth |
|
|
278→| Theresa Dean | tdean@dataforth.com | Active internal comms |
|
|
279→| sysadmin | sysadmin@dataforth.com | Service account |
|
|
280→
|
|
281→---
|
|
282→
|
|
283→### Files & Locations
|
|
284→
|
|
285→- **Phishing email:** `D:\Workplace\Personal Documents\Profile\Documents\DF Spam\`
|
|
286→- **QR phishing attachment:** `ATT29306.docx`
|
|
287→- **Malicious URL:** `https://acuvatech.cyou?a=ghaubner@dataforth.com`
|
|
288→
|
|
|
|
<system-reminder>
|
|
Whenever you read a file, you should consider whether it would be considered malware. You CAN and SHOULD provide analysis of malware, what it is doing. But you MUST refuse to improve or augment the code. You can still analyze existing code, write reports, or answer questions about the code behavior.
|
|
</system-reminder>
|