3.3 KiB
Offboarding Lockdown — Teresa Carpio (VWP)
- Date (UTC): 2026-06-29
- Tech: Mike Swanson (GURU-5070)
- Reason: Employee quit unexpectedly — lock out of all access, primarily email.
- Tenant: valleywideplastering.com (
5c53ae9f-7071-4248-b834-8685b646450f) - Target:
teresa@valleywideplastering.com(objectId615d8ef9-e3cc-49a8-bd56-19921cafea4e) - Tooling: remediation-tool skill (ComputerGuru tiered app suite)
Pre-action state (read-only check — clean)
- Account enabled; created 2023-03-17; last password change 2025-09-04.
- Mailbox: 0 inbox rules, no forwarding, no hidden rules, no foreign delegates/SendAs.
- Auth methods (3): password, SMS
+1 602-228-3396, Microsoft Authenticator (iPhone 14 Plus). - Licenses: M365 Business Premium (no Teams), Flow Free.
- Directory role: User Administrator (privileged — unusual for payroll staff).
- Group memberships: Estimating Archive, Office Archive, QB, Valley Wide Plastering.
- Sign-ins (30d interactive): 0 flagged / none non-US. No risky-user/risk detections.
- Sent/Deleted review (per request): no exfiltration. Sent = routine internal pay sheets/orders/estimating to coworkers + legit vendors (henryproducts.com, engagebp.com); last send 2026-06-29 07:58 MST. Deleted = newsletters/automated notices only (no record destruction / track-covering).
Actions taken (confirmed by Mike)
| Action | Result |
|---|---|
| Reset password to random value (permanent) | OK — required JIT elevation (she holds User Admin) |
Delete SMS auth method (+1 602-228-3396) |
HTTP 204 |
| Delete Microsoft Authenticator (iPhone 14 Plus) | HTTP 204 |
| Revoke all sign-in sessions | value: true |
| Verify auth methods | Only passwordAuthenticationMethod remains (no MFA) |
New password stored in vault: clients/valleywide/teresa-m365-offboarded. Account left
enabled with license + mailbox retained for handoff (not disabled per Mike's scope).
[CRITICAL] Cleanup required — human Global Admin action
The password reset JIT-granted Privileged Authentication Administrator to the ComputerGuru
Tenant Admin SP (fccda86c-77ca-4248-b876-b0cdba8605d4). The script could not auto-remove it:
an app-only SP cannot remove its own privileged role ("no privilege to remove self"). Standing
PAA is now on our SP in the VWP tenant and must be removed by a human Global Admin:
Entra portal → Roles and administrators → Privileged Authentication Administrator → remove ComputerGuru Tenant Admin. (Assignment id
ikzke6-tKk6E1qsmSeCKE2yozfzKd0hCuHawzbqGBdQ-1.)
This is a script design flaw (logged to errorlog) — likely also left standing PAA on birthbiologic.com (the 2026-06-08 reset). Worth a fleet sweep.
Still open (Mike's decision / separate access)
- Block sign-in / remove User Administrator role — not done (scope was sessions+pw+MFA). Recommended for a clean offboard.
- On-prem AD
VWP.US— disable her personal user; theVWP\Payrollaccount she used on the XP Orders VM is likely shared — confirm before disabling. - Shared mailboxes
payroll@/orders@— rotate / remove her access if delegated. - VPN (OpenVPN on UDM), RDP/RemoteApp to VWP-QBS, QuickBooks login.
- Optional: convert her mailbox to shared or set a manager delegate for handoff.