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claudetools/clients/valleywide/reports/2026-06-29-offboarding-teresa-carpio.md
Mike Swanson 9a6e1157a7 sync: auto-sync from GURU-5070 at 2026-06-29 15:30:34
Author: Mike Swanson
Machine: GURU-5070
Timestamp: 2026-06-29 15:30:34
2026-06-29 15:31:35 -07:00

4.3 KiB

Offboarding Lockdown — Teresa Carpio (VWP)

  • Date (UTC): 2026-06-29
  • Tech: Mike Swanson (GURU-5070)
  • Reason: Employee quit unexpectedly — lock out of all access, primarily email.
  • Tenant: valleywideplastering.com (5c53ae9f-7071-4248-b834-8685b646450f)
  • Target: teresa@valleywideplastering.com (objectId 615d8ef9-e3cc-49a8-bd56-19921cafea4e)
  • Tooling: remediation-tool skill (ComputerGuru tiered app suite)

Pre-action state (read-only check — clean)

  • Account enabled; created 2023-03-17; last password change 2025-09-04.
  • Mailbox: 0 inbox rules, no forwarding, no hidden rules, no foreign delegates/SendAs.
  • Auth methods (3): password, SMS +1 602-228-3396, Microsoft Authenticator (iPhone 14 Plus).
  • Licenses: M365 Business Premium (no Teams), Flow Free.
  • Directory role: User Administrator (privileged — unusual for payroll staff).
  • Group memberships: Estimating Archive, Office Archive, QB, Valley Wide Plastering.
  • Sign-ins (30d interactive): 0 flagged / none non-US. No risky-user/risk detections.
  • Sent/Deleted review (per request): no exfiltration. Sent = routine internal pay sheets/orders/estimating to coworkers + legit vendors (henryproducts.com, engagebp.com); last send 2026-06-29 07:58 MST. Deleted = newsletters/automated notices only (no record destruction / track-covering).

Actions taken (confirmed by Mike)

Action Result
Reset password to random value (permanent) OK — required JIT elevation (she holds User Admin)
Delete SMS auth method (+1 602-228-3396) HTTP 204
Delete Microsoft Authenticator (iPhone 14 Plus) HTTP 204
Revoke all sign-in sessions value: true
Block sign-in (accountEnabled=false) HTTP 204 — verified false
Remove User Administrator directory role HTTP 204 — role now has zero members; user has no roles
Verify auth methods Only passwordAuthenticationMethod remains (no MFA)

Account is cloud-only (onPremisesSyncEnabled: null) — the on-prem AD account is a separate identity. New password stored in vault: clients/valleywide/teresa-m365-offboarded. License + mailbox retained for handoff (account disabled, not deleted).

Billing: Syncro #32487 (Emergency offboarding) — 1.0 hr emergency remote billed as 26184 @ qty 1.5 (prepaid premium); invoice $0.00, block 15.5 → 14.0 hrs.

Rose access: could not verify delegate/SendAs — EXO read returns HTTP 401 (Security Investigator SP lacks Exchange Admin role on this tenant). Earlier breach check showed no foreign delegates.

[CRITICAL] Cleanup required — human Global Admin action

The password reset JIT-granted Privileged Authentication Administrator to the ComputerGuru Tenant Admin SP (fccda86c-77ca-4248-b876-b0cdba8605d4). The script could not auto-remove it: an app-only SP cannot remove its own privileged role ("no privilege to remove self"). Standing PAA is now on our SP in the VWP tenant and must be removed by a human Global Admin:

Entra portal → Roles and administrators → Privileged Authentication Administrator → remove ComputerGuru Tenant Admin. (Assignment id ikzke6-tKk6E1qsmSeCKE2yozfzKd0hCuHawzbqGBdQ-1.)

This is a script design flaw (logged to errorlog) — likely also left standing PAA on birthbiologic.com (the 2026-06-08 reset). Worth a fleet sweep.

Still open

  • On-prem AD VWP.US — disable her personal user. BLOCKED on VPN (no route to 192.168.0.25; needs VWP OpenVPN connected). The VWP\Payroll account she used on the XP Orders VM is likely shared — confirm before disabling.
  • Shared mailboxes payroll@ / orders@ — rotate / remove her access if delegated.
  • VPN (OpenVPN on UDM), RDP/RemoteApp to VWP-QBS, QuickBooks login.

Handoff (done 2026-06-29)

Granted payroll@valleywideplastering.com FullAccess on teresa@ (InheritanceType All, AutoMapping on) via Exchange Operator — Teresa's mailbox auto-mounts in the payroll Outlook profile. FullAccess only; no Send-As/Send-on-Behalf. Verified (not inherited, Deny: False). Documented on Syncro #32487 (public + emailed comment). Note: the Exchange Operator SP IS consented + Exchange-Admin-roled on VWP — the earlier 401 was the Security Investigator SP (different app); gotchas tenant table is stale on VWP.