claudetools/clients/kittle/reports/2026-06-09-ic3-bec-fraud-report.md

FBI IC3 Complaint Package — BEC / ACH Payment-Redirection Fraud

Prepared by Arizona Computer Guru (ACG) for Kittle Design & Construction LLC Incident date: 2026-06-08 to 2026-06-09 (UTC) · Package date: 2026-06-09 Complaint type: Business Email Compromise (BEC) / EAC — Wire/ACH fraud FILED: FBI IC3 complaint aa2ef50482ca4c05a54ae0f6cb56ffa0 — 2026-06-09 12:46 PM EST

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1. VICTIM INFORMATION

Primary victim (compromised business):

• Kittle Design & Construction LLC — Tucson, Arizona
• Domain / M365 tenant: kittlearizona.com (tenant ID 3d073ebe-806a-4a5e-9035-3c7c4a264fc0)
• EIN on the fraudulent form: 86-0942406 (purported Kittle EIN — verify; attacker likely copied the real EIN)
• Point of contact: Ken Schagel (owner), ken@kittlearizona.com, cell 520-310-1525
• Compromised mailboxes: Ken@kittlearizona.com (entry point, Global Admin), Accounting@kittlearizona.com (finance — accessed via Ken's delegate rights)

Intended payer targeted by the fraud:

• City of Tucson, Business Services Department (BSD) — Accounts Payable
• Finance contact in the fraud thread: Randi Arnett, Finance Manager (Randi.Arnett@tucsonaz.gov); AP: HCDAccountsPayable-Finance@tucsonaz.gov
• Other City staff CC'd by the attacker: Monica Barcenas, Angelica Favela, Alexa Johnson, Katharine Mitchell; Buyer: Casey Adams (Casey.Adams@tucsonaz.gov)

Reporting party / IT provider: Arizona Computer Guru (Managed Service Provider). Contact: Mike Swanson.

2. FINANCIAL TRANSACTION INFORMATION

Nature: Attacker submitted a fraudulent ACH/EFT banking-change ("BSD ACH Application", "Change" box) to the City of Tucson, impersonating Kittle's bookkeeper, to redirect Kittle's incoming City payments to attacker-controlled accounts.

Targeted / exposed payments (City of Tucson → Kittle, EFT):

• Invoice #31468 — Job #5654.25, "MMC Generator Upgrade" — $123,776.75 (confirmed from the City payment thread).
• Invoice #31400 — KDC Job #5700.25B, "COT Knights Inn — Fire Suppression" (PO-007291); City indicated EFT processing 2026-06-09. Amount ~$8,818.00 (approximate per thread; confirm exact with City).
• Additional open Kittle invoices were identified in the mailbox (e.g. Invoice #31453, $41,231.00, due 2026-06-28); any billed to the City would also have been exposed.
• Total identified exposure: $130,000+ (≥ $123,776.75 + ~$8,818). Because an approved ACH banking change redirects ALL future City-of-Tucson payments to Kittle, exposure is NOT limited to a single invoice and the true figure may be higher.

Fraudulent receiving (mule) accounts:

#	Bank	Routing/ABA	Account #	Name on account	Source
1 (submitted to City)	Truist Bank	053201607	1410020505238	"Kittle Design & Construction"	BSD ACH Application form attached to the attacker's 2026-06-08 email
2 (second form in mailbox)	First State Bank (Eastpoint, MI)	072410165	62100616	FOAM FACTORY INCORPORATED	ACH-FoamFactory.pdf found in Ken's mailbox
2b	JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (New York, NY)	021000021 (wire) / 072000326 (ACH); SWIFT CHASUS33	2906183268	FOAM FACTORY INCORPORATED	same form

Attacker contact phone on the fraudulent form: (659) 221-9243

Loss status — PREVENTED (no completed loss). Confirmed 2026-06-09 by Kittle's bookkeeper (Darline Cabrera), after speaking with the City of Tucson: the City stopped the payment before any funds were transferred to the attacker. No completed financial loss occurred. Attempted / exposed amount: $130,000+ (as above). Kittle also confirmed it has no business relationship with Foam Factory Incorporated, confirming both receiving accounts are attacker-controlled mule accounts. The fraudulent accounts should still be reported and frozen, and the perpetrator pursued (this complaint documents an attempted wire/ACH fraud).

3. SUBJECT (PERPETRATOR) INFORMATION

IP addresses used:

IP	Use	Geolocation	ASN
64.44.131.168	OWA access to Ken + Accounting mailboxes; sent the fraudulent ACH emails; deleted evidence	Chicago, IL	AS20278 Nexeon Technologies (VPN/hosting)
40.126.41.96	Contact harvesting via python-httpx	Microsoft Azure	Microsoft Corp
45.134.224.220	Bulk phishing send (1,000 emails)	Kansas City, MO	AS147049 PacketHub S.A. (hosting)

Impersonation infrastructure:

• Accounting.kittlearizona@gmx.com — GMX free account impersonating Kittle's Accounting dept (inserted into the City invoice thread starting 2026-06-05)
• tucsonoz.com — lookalike domain of the City's tucsonaz.gov (e.g. randi.arnett@tucsonoz.com)
• Attacker tooling: python-httpx/0.28.1 using an OAuth token for the Microsoft Desktop app (d3590ed6-52b3-4102-aeff-aad2292ab01c)

4. INCIDENT NARRATIVE

On 2026-06-08, an external attacker compromised the Microsoft 365 account of Ken Schagel (owner / Global Administrator) of Kittle Design & Construction LLC, accessing it via Outlook on the Web from IP 64.44.131.168 beginning 13:24 UTC. Ken's account held standing FullAccess (delegate) permission to the company's Accounting (finance) mailbox (a legitimate permission Ken granted himself on 2026-05-15, ~3 weeks before the incident). The attacker used that delegate access to enter the Accounting mailbox.

From the Accounting mailbox, the attacker — impersonating Kittle's bookkeeper ("Darline Cabrera") — submitted a fraudulent ACH/EFT banking-change form to the City of Tucson's Accounts Payable, attempting to redirect Kittle's incoming City payments (including Invoice #31400, EFT scheduled 2026-06-09) to a Truist Bank account they controlled. The attacker had pre-positioned by inserting a GMX lookalike address (Accounting.kittlearizona@gmx.com) into the legitimate Kittle↔City invoice thread as early as 2026-06-05. The attacker hard-deleted the EFT and invoice emails from both Ken's and Accounting's mailboxes to conceal the activity (recovered by ACG from the audit-log dumpster).

Separately/concurrently, the attacker harvested contacts (18:36–18:53 UTC) and sent ~1,000 phishing emails ("Ken Schagel shared a file with you") from 45.134.224.220 between 21:14–21:26 UTC (747 delivered). ACG detected the incident ~21:30 UTC and performed containment/remediation. The payment-redirection fraud was identified by ACG on 2026-06-09 via mailbox-audit and message-trace analysis.

5. TIMELINE (UTC)

• 2026-06-05 ~11:52 — Attacker (via Accounting.kittlearizona@gmx.com) inserts into the Kittle↔City invoice thread.
• 2026-06-08 13:24 — First attacker OWA login to Ken's account (64.44.131.168).
• 2026-06-08 14:51–21:09 — Attacker accesses Accounting mailbox as delegate (21 access events); reads Inbox\Customers, Assured Partners, Employees, Sent, Deleted.
• 2026-06-08 15:52 / 16:45 / 18:52 / 20:29 — Attacker sends "EFT UPDATE" / ACH-change emails on behalf of Accounting@ to Randi Arnett (City of Tucson); hard-deletes the thread after each.
• 2026-06-08 18:36–18:53 — Contact harvest (python-httpx, 40.126.41.96).
• 2026-06-08 21:14–21:26 — 1,000-recipient phishing blast (45.134.224.220).
• 2026-06-08 ~21:30 — ACG detects, begins containment.
• 2026-06-09 — ACG identifies the ACH payment-redirection fraud; password resets; client notified; this package prepared.

6. EVIDENCE INVENTORY (preserved by ACG)

• Downloads/kittle-bec-attachments/FRAUD_BSD_ACH_APPLICATION.pdf — the fraudulent ACH change form submitted to the City (shows Truist 053201607 / 1410020505238).
• Downloads/kittle-bec-attachments/Ken_ACH-FoamFactory.pdf — second ACH form (Foam Factory Inc accounts).
• Recovered email thread (EFT UPDATE / ACH, Accounting@ ↔ Randi Arnett) — recovered from the M365 Recoverable Items dumpster via Graph (the attacker hard-deleted the originals).
• Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Log: MailItemsAccessed (delegate, IP 64.44.131.168), SendOnBehalf, SoftDelete/HardDelete events for Accounting@ and Ken@ — exportable on request.
• Message trace confirming delivery of the fraud emails and the original recalled message.
• Prior incident report: clients/kittle/reports/2026-06-08-breach-check.md (full BEC remediation, phishing campaign, inbox rules).

7. ACTIONS TAKEN BY ACG / VICTIM

• Compromised accounts' sessions revoked; passwords reset (Ken's password changed in person 2026-06-09).
• Malicious inbox rules removed; mailbox forwarding, transport rules, and delegate access re-verified clean (2026-06-09).
• Kittle contacted the City of Tucson; the City stopped the fraudulent payment before any funds were transferred (confirmed 2026-06-09). Kittle confirmed no relationship with Foam Factory Incorporated.
• Ken's account was auto-restricted from sending by outbound-spam protection during the phishing blast; ACG verified nothing malicious was queued (Outbox/Drafts empty) and removed the restriction (sending restored 2026-06-09).
• Client advised to file this IC3 complaint and notify Truist / First State Bank / JPMorgan Chase fraud departments to freeze the receiving accounts.

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Package compiled from M365 unified audit log, message trace, and recovered mailbox evidence. Dollar amounts to be confirmed with the City of Tucson. ACG can provide raw audit-log exports and the recovered emails/attachments on request.