Files
claudetools/wiki/clients/kittle-design.md
Mike Swanson f4fb131529 wiki: seed remaining clients and projects (batch 3)
Adds 11 client articles and 5 project articles:

Clients: kittle, khalsa, anaise, azcomputerguru.com, bg-builders,
evs, furrier, horseshoe-management, kittle-design, scileppi-law,
western-tire

Projects: discord-bot, radio-show, msp-pricing, wrightstown-smarthome,
wrightstown-solar

Updates wiki/index.md with all new entries, cross-references, and
removes seeded client:birthbiologic from compilation queue.

Critical findings surfaced:
- Kittle: WS2025 EVAL license, no backups, 3 plaintext creds in Syncro
- Western Tire: SSL cert *.westerntire.com expires 2026-05-30
- Kittle Design: active compromise (Ken inbox rule unresolved)
- Horseshoe Mgmt: plaintext creds for 5+ users in Syncro notes

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-24 19:59:40 -07:00

5.9 KiB

type, name, display_name, last_compiled, compiled_by, sources
type name display_name last_compiled compiled_by sources
client kittle-design Kittle Design & Construction 2026-05-24 DESKTOP-0O8A1RL/claude-main
clients/kittle-design/session-logs/2026-04-24-session.md

Kittle Design & Construction

Overview

  • Business type: Design & construction firm
  • M365 tenant: kittlearizona.com
  • Billing model: Time and materials [unverified — one ticket observed]
  • Billing rate: Unknown (Labor - Remote Business, product_id 1190473)
  • Contract status: Unknown
  • Syncro ticket: #32207

Contacts

Name UPN Notes
Alexis alexis@kittlearizona.com Confirmed compromise — hidden inbox rule, duplicate Authenticator, password reset issued
Ken Ken@kittlearizona.com Suspicious inbox rule "Admin" (Capital One/Bill.com) — status unconfirmed as of session end
Lori Lori@kittlearizona.com Two Authenticator entries (different Samsung models — likely phone upgrade)
Scott scott@kittlearizona.com Phone-only MFA, no Authenticator enrolled

Infrastructure

  • On-premises servers/workstations: Not documented.
  • Entra P1/P2: NOT licensed — sign-in logs and Identity Protection unavailable.
  • Token cache location (local): /tmp/remediation-tool/3d073ebe-806a-4a5e-9035-3c7c4a264fc0/

Network

(not documented)

Cloud / M365

Property Value
Tenant domain kittlearizona.com
Tenant ID 3d073ebe-806a-4a5e-9035-3c7c4a264fc0
Entra P1/P2 No — sign-in logs unavailable
Exchange Admin role Assigned to Security Investigator SP (manually)

Service Principals (Remediation Tool)

App SP Object ID Role
Security Investigator 26e16c7a-0ac8-4f85-bdd7-992611bbd271 Exchange Administrator
Exchange Operator 775ec856-f032-4dcf-a499-ccf7f9bce07b Exchange Administrator
User Manager ea0277ab-497c-45f7-b88a-e2d53f54a4c7 User Administrator + Authentication Administrator
Tenant Admin 0caa0dde-3f8d-4d46-ab26-aa0d38add0b5 (role not documented)

[WARNING] Alexis's temp password KittleGwiNUK#2026 was in the session log. This is a force-change-on-login temp password issued 2026-04-23 — it should already be changed. Do not use. Store any active credentials in vault only.

Alexis — Compromise Details

  • Hidden inbox rule "." — was routing Howmet-related emails to Conversation History folder. Deleted.
  • Emails recovered (moved back to inbox, HTTP 201):
  • Duplicate Authenticator entries — two entries, same device name "iPhone 12 Pro Max" but different app versions. Suspicious entry ID: c927402a-75c6-4a55-840a-86d1eea43a9b (app version 6.8.40). Pending removal after confirmation from Alexis.
  • Sessions revoked — revokeSignInSessions returned true.
  • Password reset — temp password issued, force-change enforced.
  • User object ID: 74a1eae1-c0dd-4544-a98f-3a18f809785a
  • Exchange identity: alexis\2866869517449953281

OAuth Consents Revoked

c5df10ae-2aa7-4283-86ef-1884c267a9ac (AllPrincipals — 7 grants deleted):

  • Had Directory.ReadWrite.All, RoleManagement, Mail.Send, 50+ scopes — extremely broad.

9b504397-914d-4af2-b6d9-9081e80da54e (IMAP legacy auth — 1 grant deleted):

  • IMAP.AccessAsUser.All, openid, offline_access — consented by unknown user.

GuruRMM

(not documented)

Active Projects / Open Items

Priority Action Owner
P1 Ask Alexis: count Authenticator entries on phone. If only one, remove suspicious entry c927402a Mike
P1 Ask Ken: does he recognize the "Admin" inbox rule (Capital One, Bill.com, @flystucson.com)? If no → escalate (password reset, session revocation, rule deletion, check Bill.com/Capital One transactions) Mike
P2 Verify Alexis received temp password KittleGwiNUK#2026 and has changed it Mike
P3 Remove Lori's old Authenticator (SM-G975U Samsung S10+) after confirming current phone Mike
P3 Enroll Scott in Microsoft Authenticator (currently phone-only MFA) Mike
P3 Invoice ticket #32207 (1.0 hr Labor - Remote Business, product_id 1190473) Mike

Key Events / History

2026-04-23/24 — Full M365 breach check and remediation

Full report: clients/kittle-design/reports/2026-04-23-breach-check.md

  • Onboarded Exchange Operator and Tenant Admin apps (consent + role assignment).
  • Exchange Administrator role was NOT assigned to Security Investigator at time of initial breach check — assigned manually during remediation. SMTP forwarding check was therefore incomplete during the breach check phase.
  • Two high-severity findings: Alexis's hidden inbox rule and duplicate Authenticator.
  • One unresolved finding: Ken's "Admin" rule — awaiting his response.
  • Seven OAuth grants deleted from the AllPrincipals consent (c5df10ae) — very broad scopes including Directory.ReadWrite.All.

Anti-Patterns / Warnings

  • [WARNING] Ken's inbox rule "Admin" (filtering Capital One, Bill.com, @flystucson.com) is unresolved. If Ken cannot explain it, treat as active compromise: password reset, session revocation, rule deletion, check financial accounts immediately.
  • [WARNING] SMTP forwarding check was NOT completed — Exchange Admin role was missing on Security Investigator during initial sweep. Re-run SMTP forwarding check on all mailboxes.
  • [WARNING] Kittle has NO Entra P1/P2 — sign-in log queries and Identity Protection risky user signals are unavailable. Rely on Exchange audit logs and consent audits only.
  • Do not use the AllPrincipals consent app ID c5df10ae for anything — it was a malicious/overbroad app and all its grants have been revoked.
  • (no related wiki articles yet)