# v2 Stable Machine Identity + Session Reaping + Operator Removal — Implementation Plan

> Status: planned 2026-05-30. Parent: [SPEC-004](../../docs/specs/SPEC-004-session-lifecycle-and-removal.md)
> (v2 Phase 1/2). Builds on the v2-secure-session-core per-agent `cak_` keys.
> Unblocks the fleet per-agent-key migration (task #7) → retire shared key (task #5).

## Why now

Live evidence of the problem: `connect_machines` holds **15 persistent rows for 5 real hosts**
(`DESKTOP-I66IM5Q` ×9) — the duplicate-registration bug. Until the fleet is deduped, you
cannot mint one `cak_` key per real machine, so the shared `AGENT_API_KEY` can't be retired.

## The core integration: `machine_uid` vs. per-agent `cak_` key

Worked out against the current code so this composes with the just-built auth, not against it:

- **Today:** `agent_id` = random UUID from `generate_agent_id()` (`agent/src/config.rs:90`), persisted
  in the config file. Lost/missing config → a fresh UUID → a new row, because
  `connect_machines.agent_id` is `UNIQUE` and `upsert_machine` dedups on `ON CONFLICT (agent_id)`
  (`server/src/db/machines.rs:101,111`). Unstable id → duplicates.
- **Per-agent keys already prevent duplicates for KEYED agents:** a `cak_` key binds to a
  `connect_machines` row via `connect_agent_keys.machine_id`, and reattach uses the **key's** machine
  identity, ignoring a client-supplied `agent_id`. The duplicate problem is the **shared-key /
  support-code / config-loss** fleet, which has no stable identity.
- **`machine_uid` = deterministic hardware identity** (Windows `MachineGuid` from
  `HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Cryptography\MachineGuid`, hashed; optionally folded with a board serial),
  **recomputable** so a lost config self-heals to the *same* id. It is the IDENTITY (who this box is);
  the `cak_` key is the CREDENTIAL (proof it's authorized as that box). They compose: **one `cak_` key
  per `machine_uid` = one key per real machine** — exactly what task #7 needs.
- **Security stance (unchanged from SPEC-004):** a client-asserted `machine_uid` is spoofable, so it is
  **not** a trust boundary on its own. For keyed agents the `cak_` key stays authoritative (server uses
  the key's machine, not the claimed uid). For un-keyed agents `machine_uid` is **dedup-only**
  (correctness, not trust). Reimage/clone caveats per SPEC-004 (MachineGuid regenerates on sysprep,
  clones collide — caught by the key binding).

## Tasks (ordered; each Coding Agent + Code Review, gates green)

### Task 1 — Agent derives + reports `machine_uid`
- New `agent/src/identity.rs`: `machine_uid()` = stable hash of `MachineGuid` (Windows; registry read),
  recomputable; non-Windows fallback = a persisted random UUID. Cache in config but **recompute if
  absent** (don't depend on the config file for correctness).
- Send `machine_uid` in the connect handshake (`agent/src/transport/websocket.rs:40` query) and on
  `AgentStatus` (proto). Keep the legacy random `agent_id` as a migration fallback only.
- Tests: deterministic (same machine inputs → same uid); a wiped config recomputes the same uid.

### Task 2 — Server schema + dedup on `machine_uid`
- Migration `008_machine_uid.sql`: add `connect_machines.machine_uid TEXT` (nullable for legacy) +
  a unique index `WHERE machine_uid IS NOT NULL`. Idempotent; startup-applied.
- `upsert_machine` keys on `machine_uid` when present (`ON CONFLICT (machine_uid)`), falling back to
  `agent_id` for legacy agents. Session reuse / reattach key on `machine_uid`. The `cak_` key's machine
  binding stays authoritative for keyed agents.
- Tests: same `machine_uid` with varying `agent_id` → ONE row; legacy (no uid) path unchanged.

### Task 3 — Reconcile existing duplicate rows
- Prefer **age-out + operator removal over a risky backfill** (per the #7 audit note): once Tasks 4/5
  land, the 14 duplicate ghost rows reap/purge naturally. If a deterministic collapse is wanted later,
  map duplicates by hostname→`machine_uid` and repoint sessions/keys — but only as a separate, reviewed
  migration. v1 of this plan does NOT auto-collapse.

### Task 4 — Session lifecycle reaping (`server/src/session/mod.rs`)
- `reap_stale_persistent(ttl)` on `SessionManager`: periodic sweep (spawned at startup, ~60s) removing
  persistent sessions offline (`is_online == false`) past a TTL (default 10 min, via `last_heartbeat_instant`).
- On reconnect, **supersede** prior same-machine (`machine_uid`) sessions so a fresh `agent_id` can't
  strand the old one.
- Tests: offline-past-TTL reaped; online / within-TTL spared; same-machine reconnect supersedes; never
  reap an online or viewer-attached session.

### Task 5 — Operator removal API + dashboard
- `deleted_at` on `connect_sessions` (+ machines as needed); `DELETE …?purge=true` (in-memory remove +
  DB soft-delete) distinct from the live-only disconnect; a bulk endpoint; per-row + multi-select removal
  on the dashboard machines/sessions views. Admin-gated, audited to `events`.
- This is also the **immediate fix for the live ghost rows** — once it lands, purge the 14 duplicates.

## Exit criteria
One machine = one record/session; a config-loss or portable run can't duplicate; admins can purge stale
rows individually and in bulk; the fleet is deduped enough to mint one `cak_` key per real machine —
unblocking task #7 (fleet key migration) → task #5 (retire shared `AGENT_API_KEY`).

## Open questions
1. `machine_uid` recipe — `MachineGuid` alone vs. folded with a board/BIOS serial? (Proposed: MachineGuid
   primary, hashed.)
2. Should `machine_uid` REPLACE `agent_id` as the primary key, or sit alongside it (legacy fallback)?
   (Proposed: alongside, dedup prefers `machine_uid`; agent_id retained for legacy + transition.)
3. Reap TTL default (10 min proposed) and whether managed vs. support sessions differ.
