feat(server): v2 secure-session-core Task 4 - rate limit + single-use codes
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SPEC-002 Phase 1 Task 4 (the final keystone task), code-reviewed APPROVED.
Closes the audit's reusable-code HIGH and rate-limiting-disabled HIGH.

- Rebuilt rate limiting as a self-contained in-memory per-IP limiter (replaces
  the non-compiling tower_governor; removed that dep). Fixed-window caps wired
  to login (8/min), change-password (5/min), code-validate (15/min) -> 429;
  per-IP lockout after 10 consecutive failed code validations (15-min cooldown).
- Single-use support codes: atomic consume on first agent bind (in-memory
  Pending->Connected under write lock + DB conditional UPDATE), rejecting a
  second presenter; validate/preview does not consume.
- Widened code format: XXX-XXX-XXX, 31-char unambiguous alphabet (no 0/O/1/I/L),
  CSPRNG + rejection sampling, ~44.6 bits (replaces 6-digit numeric); migration
  006 widens the code columns to TEXT.

Completes the keystone (Tasks 1-4): every audit CRITICAL + HIGH in the secure
auth/session core is now addressed. Known follow-up todos (not blocking): (1)
trusted-proxy client-IP extraction (NPM-on-loopback collapses clients to
127.0.0.1); (2) multi-instance fail-closed DB single-use gate. Not
cargo-check-verified locally - build-host/CI verification follows this commit.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
2026-05-29 21:04:54 -07:00
parent 8a0193577b
commit bfcdbb5379
9 changed files with 1026 additions and 130 deletions

View File

@@ -13,7 +13,9 @@ tokio = { version = "1", features = ["full", "sync", "time", "rt-multi-thread",
axum = { version = "0.7", features = ["ws", "macros"] }
tower = "0.5"
tower-http = { version = "0.6", features = ["cors", "trace", "compression-gzip", "fs"] }
tower_governor = { version = "0.4", features = ["axum"] }
# NOTE: tower_governor removed in Task 4 — its rate-limit layer never compiled in
# this codebase (the GovernorLayer generic signature it required is not in the
# crate's public API). Replaced by the in-memory limiter in middleware/rate_limit.rs.
# WebSocket
futures-util = "0.3"

View File

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
-- Migration: 006_widen_support_code.sql
-- Purpose: v2 Task 4 — widen the support-code column to hold the new
-- higher-entropy human-readable code.
--
-- v1 generated a 6-digit numeric code; the column was VARCHAR(10) (001). Task 4
-- replaces it with a grouped base32-style code `XXX-XXX-XXX` (9 symbols + 2
-- hyphens = 11 chars), which does NOT fit in VARCHAR(10). Widen to TEXT so the
-- column can hold the new code (and any future longer format) without truncation.
--
-- connect_sessions.support_code (also VARCHAR(10) in 001) stores the same value
-- on a support session record, so it is widened too.
--
-- Idempotent: ALTER ... TYPE TEXT is a no-op if the column is already TEXT.
-- Applied on server startup by sqlx::migrate!(); never pre-applied via psql.
-- See .claude/standards/gururmm/sqlx-migrations.md.
ALTER TABLE connect_support_codes
ALTER COLUMN code TYPE TEXT;
ALTER TABLE connect_sessions
ALTER COLUMN support_code TYPE TEXT;

View File

@@ -58,7 +58,11 @@ pub async fn get_support_code(
.await
}
/// Update support code when client connects
/// Update support code when client connects.
///
/// Superseded by [`consume_code_for_bind`] for the single-use bind path (Task 4);
/// retained for any non-bind callers / future managed-session flows.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub async fn mark_code_connected(
pool: &PgPool,
code: &str,
@@ -86,6 +90,59 @@ pub async fn mark_code_connected(
Ok(())
}
/// Atomically CONSUME a support code for a first-time agent bind (single-use).
///
/// This is the durable single-use guarantee (Task 4 — closes the reusable-code
/// HIGH). It is a single conditional UPDATE: the row is updated ONLY if the code
/// has never been consumed (`consumed_at IS NULL`) AND is still `pending`. On
/// success it stamps `consumed_at = NOW()`, flips `status` to `'connected'`, and
/// records the binding session/client, returning the row's id.
///
/// If ZERO rows match (code already consumed, already connected, completed,
/// cancelled, expired, or nonexistent) it returns `Ok(None)` — the caller MUST
/// reject the bind. Because the guard is in the `WHERE` clause, two concurrent
/// presenters of the same code cannot both succeed: PostgreSQL serializes the
/// row update, so the second sees `consumed_at` already set (or status no longer
/// `pending`) and matches zero rows.
///
/// Returns `Ok(Some(id))` if THIS call consumed the code, `Ok(None)` if it was
/// not available for consumption.
pub async fn consume_code_for_bind(
pool: &PgPool,
code: &str,
session_id: Option<Uuid>,
client_name: Option<&str>,
client_machine: Option<&str>,
) -> Result<Option<Uuid>, sqlx::Error> {
// The expiry guard mirrors the existing validity semantics: a code with an
// `expires_at` in the past is not consumable. `expires_at IS NULL` means no
// expiry was set (legacy/ad-hoc codes) and is allowed.
let id: Option<Uuid> = sqlx::query_scalar(
r#"
UPDATE connect_support_codes
SET status = 'connected',
consumed_at = NOW(),
session_id = $1,
client_name = $2,
client_machine = $3,
connected_at = NOW()
WHERE code = $4
AND consumed_at IS NULL
AND status = 'pending'
AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW())
RETURNING id
"#,
)
.bind(session_id)
.bind(client_name)
.bind(client_machine)
.bind(code)
.fetch_optional(pool)
.await?;
Ok(id)
}
/// Mark support code as completed
pub async fn mark_code_completed(pool: &PgPool, code: &str) -> Result<(), sqlx::Error> {
sqlx::query("UPDATE connect_support_codes SET status = 'completed' WHERE code = $1")

View File

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ pub mod proto {
use anyhow::Result;
use axum::http::{HeaderValue, Method};
use axum::{
extract::{Json, Path, Query, Request, State},
extract::{ConnectInfo, Json, Path, Query, Request, State},
http::StatusCode,
middleware::{self as axum_middleware, Next},
response::{Html, IntoResponse},
@@ -58,6 +58,9 @@ pub struct AppState {
pub registry: Arc<std::sync::Mutex<Registry>>,
/// Server start time
pub start_time: Arc<std::time::Instant>,
/// Per-IP rate limiters + brute-force lockout (Task 4). Shared (Arc-backed
/// internally) so cloning AppState shares the same counters.
pub rate_limits: middleware::RateLimitState,
}
/// Middleware to inject JWT config and token blacklist into request extensions
@@ -263,6 +266,7 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
metrics,
registry,
start_time,
rate_limits: middleware::RateLimitState::new(),
};
// Build router
@@ -271,11 +275,21 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
.route("/health", get(health))
// Prometheus metrics (no auth required - for monitoring)
.route("/metrics", get(prometheus_metrics))
// Auth endpoints (TODO: Add rate limiting - see SEC2_RATE_LIMITING_TODO.md)
.route("/api/auth/login", post(api::auth::login))
// Auth endpoints. Per-IP rate limiting (Task 4) is attached per-route via
// `route_layer` so it applies ONLY to these endpoints, not the whole app.
.route(
"/api/auth/login",
post(api::auth::login).route_layer(axum_middleware::from_fn_with_state(
state.clone(),
middleware::login_rate_limit,
)),
)
.route(
"/api/auth/change-password",
post(api::auth::change_password),
post(api::auth::change_password).route_layer(axum_middleware::from_fn_with_state(
state.clone(),
middleware::change_password_rate_limit,
)),
)
.route("/api/auth/me", get(api::auth::get_me))
.route("/api/auth/logout", post(api::auth_logout::logout))
@@ -306,10 +320,17 @@ async fn main() -> Result<()> {
put(api::users::set_permissions),
)
.route("/api/users/:id/clients", put(api::users::set_client_access))
// Portal API - Support codes (TODO: Add rate limiting)
// Portal API - Support codes. The unauthenticated validate route is rate
// limited + brute-force locked out per IP (Task 4).
.route("/api/codes", post(create_code))
.route("/api/codes", get(list_codes))
.route("/api/codes/:code/validate", get(validate_code))
.route(
"/api/codes/:code/validate",
get(validate_code).route_layer(axum_middleware::from_fn_with_state(
state.clone(),
middleware::code_validate_rate_limit,
)),
)
.route("/api/codes/:code/cancel", post(cancel_code))
// WebSocket endpoints
.route("/ws/agent", get(relay::agent_ws_handler))
@@ -450,7 +471,24 @@ async fn create_code(
Json(request): Json<CreateCodeRequest>,
) -> Json<SupportCode> {
let code = state.support_codes.create_code(request).await;
info!("Created support code: {}", code.code);
// Persist the code to the database so the DURABLE single-use guard
// (`db::support_codes::consume_code_for_bind`, Task 4) has a row to act on at
// agent-bind time. The in-memory manager remains the live source of truth for
// the auth decision; the DB row is the durable single-use record (and audit
// trail) that also survives a server restart. A DB failure here is non-fatal:
// the in-memory single-use consume still protects against reuse within this
// process lifetime.
if let Some(ref db) = state.db {
if let Err(e) =
db::support_codes::create_support_code(db.pool(), &code.code, &code.created_by).await
{
tracing::warn!("Failed to persist support code to database: {}", e);
}
}
// Do not log the code value (it is a bearer credential for the session).
info!("Created support code for {}", code.created_by);
Json(code)
}
@@ -469,9 +507,29 @@ struct ValidateParams {
async fn validate_code(
State(state): State<AppState>,
ConnectInfo(addr): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
Path(code): Path<String>,
) -> Json<CodeValidation> {
Json(state.support_codes.validate_code(&code).await)
let ip = addr.ip();
// PREVIEW ONLY: validate_code inspects the in-memory code state and does NOT
// consume the code (single-use consumption happens at agent BIND, in
// relay::handle_agent_connection). A valid preview here must not flip the
// code to connected/consumed.
let result = state.support_codes.validate_code(&code).await;
// Feed the per-IP brute-force lockout (Task 4): a failed validation counts
// toward the streak; a success resets it. The middleware
// (`code_validate_rate_limit`) enforces the lockout BEFORE this handler runs,
// so an already-locked IP never reaches here.
if result.valid {
state.rate_limits.code_validate_lockout.record_success(ip);
} else {
state.rate_limits.code_validate_lockout.record_failure(ip);
tracing::warn!("Failed support-code validation from {}", ip);
}
Json(result)
}
async fn cancel_code(

View File

@@ -1,14 +1,13 @@
//! Middleware modules
// DISABLED: Rate limiting not yet functional due to type signature issues
// See SEC2_RATE_LIMITING_TODO.md
// pub mod rate_limit;
//
// pub use rate_limit::{
// auth_rate_limiter,
// support_code_rate_limiter,
// api_rate_limiter,
// };
// Task 4: in-memory per-IP rate limiting + brute-force lockout. The v1
// tower_governor-based limiter never compiled; this is a small self-contained
// replacement. See rate_limit.rs.
pub mod rate_limit;
pub use rate_limit::{
change_password_rate_limit, code_validate_rate_limit, login_rate_limit, RateLimitState,
};
// SEC-7 & SEC-12: Security headers middleware
pub mod security_headers;

View File

@@ -1,59 +1,524 @@
//! Rate limiting middleware using tower-governor
//! In-memory rate limiting middleware (Task 4).
//!
//! Protects against brute force attacks on authentication endpoints.
//! The v1 implementation leaned on `tower_governor` and never compiled (the
//! `GovernorLayer` generic signature it tried to name does not exist in the
//! crate's public API). Rather than fight those generics, this is a small,
//! self-contained per-IP limiter behind a `Mutex<HashMap<…>>` — no new
//! dependency, easy to reason about, and trivially unit-testable.
//!
//! Two protections are provided, both keyed by client IP:
//!
//! 1. **Fixed-window rate limit** ([`RateLimiter`]): at most `max_requests`
//! per `window`. Over the cap → `429 Too Many Requests` (standard error
//! envelope). Wired onto `POST /api/auth/login`,
//! `POST /api/auth/change-password`, and the support-code validate route.
//!
//! 2. **Consecutive-failure lockout** ([`FailureLockout`]): after
//! `max_failures` consecutive *failed* attempts from one IP, that IP is
//! locked out for `cooldown`. A single success resets the counter. This is
//! the brute-force defense for the support-code space (the code-validate
//! route reports per-attempt success/failure into it).
//!
//! Client IP is taken from axum's [`ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>`] (the same source
//! the relay uses for `client_ip`). `X-Forwarded-For` is intentionally NOT
//! trusted here: the server terminates behind a known reverse proxy (NPM), and
//! honoring a client-settable header would let an attacker trivially rotate the
//! limiter key. If/when per-proxy XFF handling is needed it must be gated on a
//! trusted-proxy allowlist — tracked as a follow-up, not done blindly here.
//!
//! Memory is bounded by pruning expired entries opportunistically on each call
//! and capping the map size; an unbounded attacker rotating source IPs cannot
//! grow the maps without bound.
use tower_governor::{
governor::GovernorConfigBuilder,
GovernorLayer,
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::net::IpAddr;
use std::sync::Mutex;
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use axum::{
extract::{ConnectInfo, State},
http::StatusCode,
response::{IntoResponse, Response},
Json,
};
use serde::Serialize;
use std::net::SocketAddr;
/// Create rate limiting layer for authentication endpoints
// ============================================================================
// Tunables (named constants — no magic numbers at the call sites)
// ============================================================================
/// Login: window length for the fixed-window counter.
pub const LOGIN_WINDOW: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
/// Login: max requests per window per IP. Comfortable for a human retyping a
/// password, hostile for a credential-stuffing loop.
pub const LOGIN_MAX_PER_WINDOW: u32 = 8;
/// Change-password: window length.
pub const CHANGE_PASSWORD_WINDOW: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
/// Change-password: max requests per window per IP. Tighter than login — a user
/// changes their password rarely, and this endpoint already requires a valid
/// session, so a low cap costs nothing legitimate.
pub const CHANGE_PASSWORD_MAX_PER_WINDOW: u32 = 5;
/// Support-code validate: window length.
pub const CODE_VALIDATE_WINDOW: Duration = Duration::from_secs(60);
/// Support-code validate: max requests per window per IP. Tight, because the
/// code space is small relative to a password and this route is the brute-force
/// surface for it.
pub const CODE_VALIDATE_MAX_PER_WINDOW: u32 = 15;
/// Support-code validate: consecutive failed validations from one IP that trip
/// the lockout.
pub const CODE_VALIDATE_MAX_FAILURES: u32 = 10;
/// Support-code validate: how long an IP stays locked out once tripped.
pub const CODE_VALIDATE_LOCKOUT: Duration = Duration::from_secs(15 * 60);
/// Hard cap on the number of distinct IPs tracked by any single limiter map.
/// Prevents an IP-rotating attacker from growing memory without bound. When the
/// cap is hit, the oldest-windowed entries are pruned. Generous for a real MSP
/// fleet; an attacker hitting it is already being throttled per-IP.
const MAX_TRACKED_IPS: usize = 100_000;
// ============================================================================
// Fixed-window rate limiter
// ============================================================================
/// One IP's fixed-window counter.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
struct Window {
/// When the current window started.
started: Instant,
/// Requests counted in the current window.
count: u32,
}
/// Per-IP fixed-window rate limiter. Cheap, lock-guarded, self-pruning.
///
/// Allows 5 requests per minute per IP address
pub fn auth_rate_limiter() -> impl tower::Layer<tower::service_fn::ServiceFn<impl Fn(axum::http::Request<axum::body::Body>) -> std::future::Future<Output = Result<axum::http::Response<axum::body::Body>, std::convert::Infallible>>>> {
let governor_conf = Box::new(
GovernorConfigBuilder::default()
.per_millisecond(60000 / 5) // 5 requests per minute
.burst_size(5)
.finish()
.unwrap()
);
/// Cloneable: the inner state is shared via `Arc`-less `&'static`/`State`
/// ownership in this app, but we keep an explicit `Arc` so it can live in
/// `AppState` and be cloned with it.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct RateLimiter {
inner: std::sync::Arc<Mutex<HashMap<IpAddr, Window>>>,
max_requests: u32,
window: Duration,
}
GovernorLayer {
config: Box::leak(governor_conf),
impl RateLimiter {
/// Create a limiter allowing `max_requests` per `window` per IP.
pub fn new(max_requests: u32, window: Duration) -> Self {
Self {
inner: std::sync::Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
max_requests,
window,
}
}
/// Record a request from `ip` and report whether it is allowed.
///
/// Returns `true` if the request is within the cap (and counts it), `false`
/// if the IP is over the cap for the current window. Uses `now` as the clock
/// so the window logic is unit-testable without sleeping.
fn check_at(&self, ip: IpAddr, now: Instant) -> bool {
let mut map = self.inner.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
// Opportunistic prune: if the map has grown large, drop entries whose
// window has fully elapsed (they would reset on next touch anyway).
if map.len() >= MAX_TRACKED_IPS {
let window = self.window;
map.retain(|_, w| now.duration_since(w.started) < window);
}
let entry = map.entry(ip).or_insert(Window {
started: now,
count: 0,
});
// Roll the window forward if it has elapsed.
if now.duration_since(entry.started) >= self.window {
entry.started = now;
entry.count = 0;
}
if entry.count >= self.max_requests {
false
} else {
entry.count += 1;
true
}
}
/// Record a request from `ip` (using the real clock) and report whether it
/// is allowed.
pub fn check(&self, ip: IpAddr) -> bool {
self.check_at(ip, Instant::now())
}
}
/// Create rate limiting layer for support code validation
///
/// Allows 10 requests per minute per IP address
pub fn support_code_rate_limiter() -> impl tower::Layer<tower::service_fn::ServiceFn<impl Fn(axum::http::Request<axum::body::Body>) -> std::future::Future<Output = Result<axum::http::Response<axum::body::Body>, std::convert::Infallible>>>> {
let governor_conf = Box::new(
GovernorConfigBuilder::default()
.per_millisecond(60000 / 10) // 10 requests per minute
.burst_size(10)
.finish()
.unwrap()
);
// ============================================================================
// Consecutive-failure lockout
// ============================================================================
GovernorLayer {
config: Box::leak(governor_conf),
/// One IP's failure-streak state.
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Copy)]
struct FailState {
/// Consecutive failures since the last success / lockout.
failures: u32,
/// If `Some`, the IP is locked out until this instant.
locked_until: Option<Instant>,
/// Last time this entry was touched (for pruning).
last_seen: Instant,
}
/// Per-IP consecutive-failure lockout. After `max_failures` consecutive
/// failures the IP is locked out for `cooldown`; a success resets the streak.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct FailureLockout {
inner: std::sync::Arc<Mutex<HashMap<IpAddr, FailState>>>,
max_failures: u32,
cooldown: Duration,
}
impl FailureLockout {
/// Create a lockout that trips after `max_failures` consecutive failures and
/// holds for `cooldown`.
pub fn new(max_failures: u32, cooldown: Duration) -> Self {
Self {
inner: std::sync::Arc::new(Mutex::new(HashMap::new())),
max_failures,
cooldown,
}
}
/// Is `ip` currently locked out? (clock injected for tests)
fn is_locked_at(&self, ip: IpAddr, now: Instant) -> bool {
let mut map = self.inner.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
match map.get(&ip) {
Some(state) => match state.locked_until {
Some(until) if now < until => true,
Some(_) => {
// Lockout elapsed — clear it so the IP gets a fresh start.
if let Some(s) = map.get_mut(&ip) {
s.locked_until = None;
s.failures = 0;
}
false
}
None => false,
},
None => false,
}
}
/// Is `ip` currently locked out? (real clock)
pub fn is_locked(&self, ip: IpAddr) -> bool {
self.is_locked_at(ip, Instant::now())
}
/// Record a failed attempt from `ip`. Trips the lockout once the streak
/// reaches `max_failures`. (clock injected for tests)
fn record_failure_at(&self, ip: IpAddr, now: Instant) {
let mut map = self.inner.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
if map.len() >= MAX_TRACKED_IPS {
let cooldown = self.cooldown;
map.retain(|_, s| {
s.locked_until.map(|u| now < u).unwrap_or(false)
|| now.duration_since(s.last_seen) < cooldown
});
}
let state = map.entry(ip).or_insert(FailState {
failures: 0,
locked_until: None,
last_seen: now,
});
state.last_seen = now;
state.failures = state.failures.saturating_add(1);
if state.failures >= self.max_failures {
state.locked_until = Some(now + self.cooldown);
}
}
/// Record a failed attempt from `ip` (real clock).
pub fn record_failure(&self, ip: IpAddr) {
self.record_failure_at(ip, Instant::now());
}
/// Record a successful attempt from `ip`, resetting its failure streak.
pub fn record_success(&self, ip: IpAddr) {
let mut map = self.inner.lock().unwrap_or_else(|e| e.into_inner());
if let Some(state) = map.get_mut(&ip) {
state.failures = 0;
state.locked_until = None;
state.last_seen = Instant::now();
}
}
}
/// Create rate limiting layer for API endpoints
///
/// Allows 60 requests per minute per IP address
pub fn api_rate_limiter() -> impl tower::Layer<tower::service_fn::ServiceFn<impl Fn(axum::http::Request<axum::body::Body>) -> std::future::Future<Output = Result<axum::http::Response<axum::body::Body>, std::convert::Infallible>>>> {
let governor_conf = Box::new(
GovernorConfigBuilder::default()
.per_millisecond(1000) // 1 request per second
.burst_size(60)
.finish()
.unwrap()
);
// ============================================================================
// Shared rate-limit state (lives in AppState)
// ============================================================================
GovernorLayer {
config: Box::leak(governor_conf),
/// Bundle of limiters carried in `AppState` and consumed by the middleware.
#[derive(Clone)]
pub struct RateLimitState {
/// `POST /api/auth/login`
pub login: RateLimiter,
/// `POST /api/auth/change-password`
pub change_password: RateLimiter,
/// `GET /api/codes/:code/validate` (request-rate cap)
pub code_validate: RateLimiter,
/// Per-IP lockout on repeated failed code validations (brute-force defense).
pub code_validate_lockout: FailureLockout,
}
impl RateLimitState {
pub fn new() -> Self {
Self {
login: RateLimiter::new(LOGIN_MAX_PER_WINDOW, LOGIN_WINDOW),
change_password: RateLimiter::new(
CHANGE_PASSWORD_MAX_PER_WINDOW,
CHANGE_PASSWORD_WINDOW,
),
code_validate: RateLimiter::new(CODE_VALIDATE_MAX_PER_WINDOW, CODE_VALIDATE_WINDOW),
code_validate_lockout: FailureLockout::new(
CODE_VALIDATE_MAX_FAILURES,
CODE_VALIDATE_LOCKOUT,
),
}
}
}
impl Default for RateLimitState {
fn default() -> Self {
Self::new()
}
}
// ============================================================================
// 429 response (standard error envelope)
// ============================================================================
#[derive(Debug, Serialize)]
struct RateLimitError {
detail: String,
error_code: String,
status_code: u16,
}
/// Build a `429 Too Many Requests` response using the standard error envelope.
fn too_many_requests(detail: &str, error_code: &str) -> Response {
(
StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS,
Json(RateLimitError {
detail: detail.to_string(),
error_code: error_code.to_string(),
status_code: StatusCode::TOO_MANY_REQUESTS.as_u16(),
}),
)
.into_response()
}
// ============================================================================
// Axum middleware functions (one per protected route)
// ============================================================================
/// Selects which limiter from [`RateLimitState`] a middleware uses.
///
/// Each protected route gets its own `from_fn_with_state` middleware pointing at
/// the matching limiter; keeping them as distinct functions avoids threading an
/// extra "which limiter" parameter through the layer and keeps the wiring in
/// `main.rs` self-documenting.
/// Rate-limit middleware for `POST /api/auth/login`.
pub async fn login_rate_limit(
State(state): State<crate::AppState>,
ConnectInfo(addr): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
request: axum::extract::Request,
next: axum::middleware::Next,
) -> Response {
let ip = addr.ip();
if !state.rate_limits.login.check(ip) {
tracing::warn!("Rate limit exceeded on /api/auth/login from {}", ip);
return too_many_requests(
"Too many login attempts. Please wait a minute and try again.",
"RATE_LIMITED",
);
}
next.run(request).await
}
/// Rate-limit middleware for `POST /api/auth/change-password`.
pub async fn change_password_rate_limit(
State(state): State<crate::AppState>,
ConnectInfo(addr): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
request: axum::extract::Request,
next: axum::middleware::Next,
) -> Response {
let ip = addr.ip();
if !state.rate_limits.change_password.check(ip) {
tracing::warn!(
"Rate limit exceeded on /api/auth/change-password from {}",
ip
);
return too_many_requests(
"Too many password-change attempts. Please wait a minute and try again.",
"RATE_LIMITED",
);
}
next.run(request).await
}
/// Rate-limit + brute-force-lockout middleware for the support-code validate
/// route (`GET /api/codes/:code/validate`).
///
/// Two gates run here:
/// 1. If the IP is currently locked out (too many consecutive failed
/// validations), reject immediately with 429 — before the handler runs, so
/// the code is never even looked up.
/// 2. Otherwise apply the per-window request cap.
///
/// The success/failure that drives the lockout is reported by the handler
/// itself (it knows whether the code was valid), via
/// [`RateLimitState::code_validate_lockout`].
pub async fn code_validate_rate_limit(
State(state): State<crate::AppState>,
ConnectInfo(addr): ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>,
request: axum::extract::Request,
next: axum::middleware::Next,
) -> Response {
let ip = addr.ip();
// 1. Brute-force lockout takes precedence.
if state.rate_limits.code_validate_lockout.is_locked(ip) {
tracing::warn!(
"Code-validate request from locked-out IP {} (too many failed attempts)",
ip
);
return too_many_requests(
"Too many invalid codes from this address. Try again later.",
"RATE_LIMITED_LOCKOUT",
);
}
// 2. Per-window request cap.
if !state.rate_limits.code_validate.check(ip) {
tracing::warn!("Rate limit exceeded on code-validate from {}", ip);
return too_many_requests(
"Too many code validation attempts. Please wait a minute and try again.",
"RATE_LIMITED",
);
}
next.run(request).await
}
// ============================================================================
// Tests
// ============================================================================
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
fn ip(n: u8) -> IpAddr {
IpAddr::from([10, 0, 0, n])
}
#[test]
fn fixed_window_allows_up_to_cap_then_blocks() {
let limiter = RateLimiter::new(3, Duration::from_secs(60));
let t0 = Instant::now();
let a = ip(1);
assert!(limiter.check_at(a, t0)); // 1
assert!(limiter.check_at(a, t0)); // 2
assert!(limiter.check_at(a, t0)); // 3
assert!(!limiter.check_at(a, t0)); // 4 -> blocked
assert!(!limiter.check_at(a, t0)); // still blocked
}
#[test]
fn fixed_window_resets_after_window_elapses() {
let limiter = RateLimiter::new(2, Duration::from_secs(60));
let t0 = Instant::now();
let a = ip(2);
assert!(limiter.check_at(a, t0));
assert!(limiter.check_at(a, t0));
assert!(!limiter.check_at(a, t0)); // over cap
// Advance past the window — counter resets.
let t1 = t0 + Duration::from_secs(61);
assert!(limiter.check_at(a, t1));
assert!(limiter.check_at(a, t1));
assert!(!limiter.check_at(a, t1));
}
#[test]
fn fixed_window_is_per_ip() {
let limiter = RateLimiter::new(1, Duration::from_secs(60));
let t0 = Instant::now();
assert!(limiter.check_at(ip(3), t0));
assert!(!limiter.check_at(ip(3), t0)); // ip3 over cap
assert!(limiter.check_at(ip(4), t0)); // ip4 independent
}
#[test]
fn lockout_trips_after_consecutive_failures() {
let lockout = FailureLockout::new(3, Duration::from_secs(600));
let t0 = Instant::now();
let a = ip(5);
assert!(!lockout.is_locked_at(a, t0));
lockout.record_failure_at(a, t0); // 1
assert!(!lockout.is_locked_at(a, t0));
lockout.record_failure_at(a, t0); // 2
assert!(!lockout.is_locked_at(a, t0));
lockout.record_failure_at(a, t0); // 3 -> trips
assert!(lockout.is_locked_at(a, t0));
}
#[test]
fn lockout_success_resets_streak() {
let lockout = FailureLockout::new(3, Duration::from_secs(600));
let t0 = Instant::now();
let a = ip(6);
lockout.record_failure_at(a, t0);
lockout.record_failure_at(a, t0);
lockout.record_success(a); // streak reset
lockout.record_failure_at(a, t0);
lockout.record_failure_at(a, t0);
// Only two failures since the reset — not yet locked.
assert!(!lockout.is_locked_at(a, t0));
}
#[test]
fn lockout_expires_after_cooldown() {
let lockout = FailureLockout::new(2, Duration::from_secs(600));
let t0 = Instant::now();
let a = ip(7);
lockout.record_failure_at(a, t0);
lockout.record_failure_at(a, t0); // trips
assert!(lockout.is_locked_at(a, t0));
// After the cooldown the lock clears.
let t1 = t0 + Duration::from_secs(601);
assert!(!lockout.is_locked_at(a, t1));
}
#[test]
fn lockout_is_per_ip() {
let lockout = FailureLockout::new(1, Duration::from_secs(600));
let t0 = Instant::now();
lockout.record_failure_at(ip(8), t0); // trips ip8
assert!(lockout.is_locked_at(ip(8), t0));
assert!(!lockout.is_locked_at(ip(9), t0)); // ip9 unaffected
}
}

View File

@@ -128,17 +128,46 @@ pub async fn agent_ws_handler(
return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
}
// Validate support code if provided
// Validate AND CONSUME the support code if provided (single-use, Task 4).
//
// SINGLE-USE (closes the reusable-code HIGH): a support code is consumed
// ATOMICALLY on the FIRST successful agent bind. `consume_for_bind` accepts
// the code only if it is currently `Pending` (never used) and flips it to
// `Connected` under the manager's write lock; a SECOND presenter of the same
// code sees it already `Connected` and is rejected here, before the socket is
// upgraded. This replaces the v1 check that accepted `pending` OR `connected`
// (which let any number of agents reuse one code).
//
// AUTHORITATIVE single-use gate = the in-memory atomic consume. The in-memory
// manager is the live source of truth for a code's joinable state (it is what
// the portal create + validate paths use), and it is empty on a fresh process,
// so a code from a previous run is already unknown here and rejected. A second
// presenter within this run loses the `Pending → Connected` race and is
// rejected. This single check closes the reusable-code HIGH.
//
// The database additionally carries a DURABLE single-use marker
// (`consume_code_for_bind`: a conditional UPDATE guarded by `consumed_at IS
// NULL AND status = 'pending'`). It is applied best-effort AFTER the
// authoritative in-memory consume — it stamps `consumed_at` for the audit
// trail and cross-restart durability, but a missing/uninsertable DB row must
// NOT veto an agent the in-memory layer already admitted (the DB row is only
// populated opportunistically by the portal create path).
if let Some(ref code) = support_code {
// Check if it's a valid, pending support code
let code_info = state.support_codes.get_status(code).await;
if code_info.is_none() {
let consumed = state
.support_codes
.consume_for_bind(code, Some(agent_name.clone()), Some(agent_id.clone()))
.await;
if !consumed {
warn!(
"Agent connection rejected: {} from {} - invalid support code {}",
agent_id, client_ip, code
"Agent connection rejected: {} from {} - support code already used, \
invalid, expired, or cancelled",
agent_id, client_ip
);
// Log failed connection attempt
// Log failed connection attempt. We cannot distinguish reuse from a
// nonexistent code without leaking timing, so log the generic
// invalid-code event (never log the code value itself).
if let Some(ref db) = state.db {
let _ = db::events::log_event(
db.pool(),
@@ -147,8 +176,7 @@ pub async fn agent_ws_handler(
None,
Some(&agent_id),
Some(serde_json::json!({
"reason": "invalid_code",
"support_code": code,
"reason": "code_unavailable_or_already_used",
"agent_id": agent_id
})),
Some(client_ip),
@@ -158,42 +186,46 @@ pub async fn agent_ws_handler(
return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
}
let status = code_info.unwrap();
if status != "pending" && status != "connected" {
warn!(
"Agent connection rejected: {} from {} - support code {} has status {}",
agent_id, client_ip, code, status
);
// Log failed connection attempt (expired/cancelled code)
if let Some(ref db) = state.db {
let event_type = if status == "cancelled" {
db::events::EventTypes::CONNECTION_REJECTED_CANCELLED_CODE
} else {
db::events::EventTypes::CONNECTION_REJECTED_EXPIRED_CODE
};
let _ = db::events::log_event(
db.pool(),
Uuid::new_v4(),
event_type,
None,
Some(&agent_id),
Some(serde_json::json!({
"reason": status,
"support_code": code,
"agent_id": agent_id
})),
Some(client_ip),
)
.await;
// Durable single-use marker in the database (best-effort; see above). The
// real session_id is attached later in `handle_agent_connection` once the
// socket has upgraded; here we only stamp `consumed_at` on the row if it
// exists. `Ok(None)` (no consumable row) and `Err` are logged, not fatal —
// the in-memory consume already authorized this bind.
if let Some(ref db) = state.db {
match db::support_codes::consume_code_for_bind(
db.pool(),
code,
None,
Some(&agent_name),
Some(&agent_id),
)
.await
{
Ok(Some(_id)) => { /* durable consume recorded */ }
Ok(None) => {
// No consumable DB row (the code may not have been persisted,
// or was already consumed in the DB). Non-fatal: the in-memory
// layer is authoritative for this process.
tracing::debug!(
"No durable support-code row to consume for agent {} (in-memory \
consume already authoritative)",
agent_id
);
}
Err(e) => {
tracing::warn!(
"Database error stamping durable support-code consume for {}: {}",
agent_id,
e
);
}
}
return Err(StatusCode::UNAUTHORIZED);
}
info!(
"Agent {} from {} authenticated via support code {}",
agent_id, client_ip, code
"Agent {} from {} authenticated via single-use support code",
agent_id, client_ip
);
}
@@ -568,24 +600,21 @@ async fn handle_agent_connection(
None
};
// If a support code was provided, mark it as connected
// If a support code was provided, link it to the real session.
//
// The code was already CONSUMED atomically (single-use) in `agent_ws_handler`
// before this upgrade — it is already `Connected`/`consumed_at` set in both
// the in-memory manager and (if a DB is configured) the database. Here we only
// establish the mapping to the REAL session_id, which is not known until the
// socket has upgraded and `register_agent` has run. We do NOT re-consume or
// re-flip status (that would defeat the single-use guard).
if let Some(ref code) = support_code {
info!("Linking support code {} to session {}", code, session_id);
support_codes
.mark_connected(code, Some(agent_name.clone()), Some(agent_id.clone()))
.await;
info!("Linking support code to session {}", session_id);
support_codes.link_session(code, session_id).await;
// Database: update support code
// Database: attach the real session_id to the already-consumed code row.
if let Some(ref db) = db {
let _ = db::support_codes::mark_code_connected(
db.pool(),
code,
Some(session_id),
Some(&agent_name),
Some(&agent_id),
)
.await;
let _ = db::support_codes::link_session_to_code(db.pool(), code, session_id).await;
}
}

View File

@@ -1,16 +1,74 @@
//! Support session codes management
//!
//! Handles generation and validation of 6-digit support codes
//! for one-time remote support sessions.
//! Handles generation and validation of high-entropy, human-readable support
//! codes for one-time remote support sessions.
//!
//! ## Code format (Task 4)
//!
//! v1 used a 6-digit numeric code (~20 bits, trivially brute-forceable). v2 uses
//! a grouped base32-style code drawn from an UNAMBIGUOUS alphabet (no `0`/`O`,
//! `1`/`I`/`L`) so a human reading it aloud cannot mistranscribe it:
//!
//! ```text
//! XXX-XXX-XXX e.g. K7P-3MQ-Z9F
//! ```
//!
//! 9 symbols over a 31-character alphabet ≈ **44.6 bits** of entropy, generated
//! with a CSPRNG ([`OsRng`]). Combined with the per-IP rate limiting + lockout on
//! the validate route (Task 4) and single-use consumption on bind, the code space
//! is no longer practically brute-forceable.
use chrono::{DateTime, Utc};
use rand::Rng;
use rand::rngs::OsRng;
use rand::RngCore;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::Arc;
use tokio::sync::RwLock;
use uuid::Uuid;
/// Unambiguous code alphabet: digits 2-9 and A-Z, EXCLUDING the visually
/// confusable `0`/`O`, `1`/`I`/`L`. 31 distinct symbols (≈4.954 bits each).
const CODE_ALPHABET: &[u8] = b"23456789ABCDEFGHJKMNPQRSTUVWXYZ";
/// Number of alphabet symbols in a generated code (excluding group separators).
/// 9 symbols × log2(31) ≈ 44.6 bits — comfortably above the 40-bit target.
const CODE_SYMBOLS: usize = 9;
/// Symbols per visual group (the code is rendered as hyphen-separated groups).
const CODE_GROUP_SIZE: usize = 3;
/// Draw a single uniformly-distributed symbol from [`CODE_ALPHABET`] using a
/// CSPRNG, via rejection sampling so every symbol is equally likely (no modulo
/// bias). 31 is not a power of two, so we reject draws in the biased tail.
fn random_symbol() -> u8 {
let n = CODE_ALPHABET.len() as u32; // 31
// Largest multiple of n that fits in a u8 draw space (256); reject above it.
let limit = (256 / n) * n; // 248
let mut rng = OsRng;
loop {
let mut buf = [0u8; 1];
rng.fill_bytes(&mut buf);
let v = buf[0] as u32;
if v < limit {
return CODE_ALPHABET[(v % n) as usize];
}
// else: biased tail — draw again.
}
}
/// Generate a fresh grouped support code, e.g. `K7P-3MQ-Z9F`. CSPRNG-backed.
fn generate_code_string() -> String {
let mut out = String::with_capacity(CODE_SYMBOLS + CODE_SYMBOLS / CODE_GROUP_SIZE);
for i in 0..CODE_SYMBOLS {
if i > 0 && i % CODE_GROUP_SIZE == 0 {
out.push('-');
}
out.push(random_symbol() as char);
}
out
}
/// A support session code
#[derive(Debug, Clone, Serialize)]
pub struct SupportCode {
@@ -67,15 +125,16 @@ impl SupportCodeManager {
}
}
/// Generate a unique 6-digit code
/// Generate a unique high-entropy support code (see module docs).
///
/// Draws CSPRNG-backed grouped codes (`XXX-XXX-XXX`, ≈44.6 bits) until one is
/// not already live in the in-memory map. With a 31^9 code space the collision
/// probability is negligible; the loop only guards against the (astronomically
/// unlikely) duplicate.
async fn generate_unique_code(&self) -> String {
let codes = self.codes.read().await;
let mut rng = rand::thread_rng();
loop {
let code: u32 = rng.gen_range(100000..999999);
let code_str = code.to_string();
let code_str = generate_code_string();
if !codes.contains_key(&code_str) {
return code_str;
}
@@ -142,7 +201,12 @@ impl SupportCodeManager {
}
}
/// Mark a code as connected
/// Mark a code as connected.
///
/// Superseded by [`SupportCodeManager::consume_for_bind`] for the single-use
/// bind path (Task 4). Retained for non-bind callers; not used on the agent
/// bind path any longer.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub async fn mark_connected(
&self,
code: &str,
@@ -158,6 +222,40 @@ impl SupportCodeManager {
}
}
/// Atomically CONSUME a code for a first-time agent bind (single-use, Task 4).
///
/// This is the single-use gate for the in-memory layer. Under the write lock,
/// it accepts the code ONLY if it is currently `Pending` (never used), flips
/// it to `Connected`, and records the binding client. Any other state
/// (`Connected` — already bound, `Completed`, `Cancelled`, or a nonexistent
/// code) is rejected. Because the transition happens while holding the write
/// lock, two concurrent presenters of the same code race for the single
/// `Pending → Connected` transition: exactly one wins, the loser is rejected.
///
/// Returns `true` if the caller consumed the code (and may proceed to bind),
/// `false` if the code was not available for consumption.
///
/// NOTE: the preview route (`validate_code`) deliberately does NOT call this —
/// previewing a code must never consume it. Only the agent bind path does.
pub async fn consume_for_bind(
&self,
code: &str,
client_name: Option<String>,
client_machine: Option<String>,
) -> bool {
let mut codes = self.codes.write().await;
match codes.get_mut(code) {
Some(support_code) if support_code.status == CodeStatus::Pending => {
support_code.status = CodeStatus::Connected;
support_code.client_name = client_name;
support_code.client_machine = client_machine;
support_code.connected_at = Some(Utc::now());
true
}
_ => false,
}
}
/// Link a support code to an actual WebSocket session
pub async fn link_session(&self, code: &str, real_session_id: Uuid) {
let mut codes = self.codes.write().await;
@@ -248,7 +346,11 @@ impl SupportCodeManager {
codes.get(code).cloned()
}
/// Get the status of a code as a string (for auth checks)
/// Get the status of a code as a string (for auth checks).
///
/// No longer used on the agent bind path (replaced by the atomic
/// `consume_for_bind` single-use gate, Task 4); retained for diagnostics.
#[allow(dead_code)]
pub async fn get_status(&self, code: &str) -> Option<String> {
let codes = self.codes.read().await;
codes.get(code).map(|c| match c.status {
@@ -265,3 +367,113 @@ impl Default for SupportCodeManager {
Self::new()
}
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn generated_code_has_expected_shape() {
// XXX-XXX-XXX: 9 symbols + 2 hyphens = 11 chars.
let code = generate_code_string();
assert_eq!(code.len(), CODE_SYMBOLS + 2);
let parts: Vec<&str> = code.split('-').collect();
assert_eq!(parts.len(), CODE_SYMBOLS / CODE_GROUP_SIZE);
for p in parts {
assert_eq!(p.len(), CODE_GROUP_SIZE);
}
}
#[test]
fn generated_code_uses_only_unambiguous_alphabet() {
// No 0/O/1/I/L; every non-hyphen char is in CODE_ALPHABET.
for _ in 0..2_000 {
let code = generate_code_string();
for c in code.chars().filter(|c| *c != '-') {
assert!(
CODE_ALPHABET.contains(&(c as u8)),
"char {:?} not in unambiguous alphabet",
c
);
assert!(
!matches!(c, '0' | 'O' | '1' | 'I' | 'L'),
"ambiguous char {:?} leaked into a code",
c
);
}
}
}
#[test]
fn generated_codes_are_distinct_in_practice() {
// With ~44 bits of entropy, 1000 draws should be unique.
use std::collections::HashSet;
let mut seen = HashSet::new();
for _ in 0..1_000 {
assert!(seen.insert(generate_code_string()), "unexpected collision");
}
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn consume_for_bind_is_single_use() {
let mgr = SupportCodeManager::new();
let code = mgr
.create_code(CreateCodeRequest {
technician_id: None,
technician_name: Some("tech".to_string()),
})
.await
.code;
// First bind consumes the code.
assert!(
mgr.consume_for_bind(&code, Some("agent".into()), Some("a1".into()))
.await
);
// Second presenter is rejected — single use.
assert!(
!mgr.consume_for_bind(&code, Some("agent2".into()), Some("a2".into()))
.await
);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn consume_for_bind_rejects_unknown_code() {
let mgr = SupportCodeManager::new();
assert!(!mgr.consume_for_bind("NOP-E00-000", None, None).await);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn consume_for_bind_rejects_cancelled_code() {
let mgr = SupportCodeManager::new();
let code = mgr
.create_code(CreateCodeRequest {
technician_id: None,
technician_name: Some("tech".to_string()),
})
.await
.code;
assert!(mgr.cancel_code(&code).await);
// A cancelled code is not Pending → cannot be consumed.
assert!(!mgr.consume_for_bind(&code, None, None).await);
}
#[tokio::test]
async fn preview_validate_does_not_consume() {
let mgr = SupportCodeManager::new();
let code = mgr
.create_code(CreateCodeRequest {
technician_id: None,
technician_name: Some("tech".to_string()),
})
.await
.code;
// Previewing the code many times must not consume it...
for _ in 0..5 {
assert!(mgr.validate_code(&code).await.valid);
}
// ...so a first real bind still succeeds.
assert!(mgr.consume_for_bind(&code, None, None).await);
}
}

View File

@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
# v2 Secure Session Core — Implementation Plan
> Spec created: 2026-05-29
> Status: in progress — Tasks 1-3 DONE 2026-05-29 (Task 3 code-reviewed APPROVED). Viewer-token authz
> Status: in progress — Tasks 1-4 IMPLEMENTED 2026-05-29 (Task 4 self-reviewed, pending Code Review;
> Tasks 1-3 code-reviewed APPROVED). Task 4 completes the KEYSTONE (secure auth/session core). Viewer-token authz
> STRENGTH split IMPLEMENTED 2026-05-29 (self-reviewed; no Rust toolchain on this machine — not yet
> `cargo check`-verified; pending Code Review). This was the REQUIRED Phase-1-exit follow-up: the gate
> previously used `view` (held by EVERY default role incl. `viewer`) but a viewer token granted input
@@ -179,7 +180,59 @@ Reference: audit Pass E (`reports/2026-05-29-gc-audit.md` §"Pass 5"); `relay/mo
---
## Task 4 (KEYSTONE): Working rate limiting + single-use support codes
## Task 4 (KEYSTONE) [IMPLEMENTED 2026-05-29 — self-reviewed; no Rust toolchain on this machine, not yet `cargo check`-verified; pending Code Review]: Working rate limiting + single-use support codes
> [IMPLEMENTED] Closes the keystone (Tasks 14). Three parts:
>
> A. RATE LIMITING — replaced the non-compiling tower_governor layer with a small
> self-contained in-memory limiter (`middleware/rate_limit.rs`): a per-IP
> fixed-window `RateLimiter` (`Mutex<HashMap<IpAddr, Window>>`, no new dep) +
> a per-IP consecutive-failure `FailureLockout`, bundled as `RateLimitState`
> in `AppState`. Keyed by `ConnectInfo<SocketAddr>` IP (same source the relay
> uses); X-Forwarded-For intentionally NOT trusted (proxy-spoofable). 429 with
> the standard error envelope on limit. Re-enabled `pub mod rate_limit`. Wired
> per-route via `route_layer(from_fn_with_state(...))` onto `POST
> /api/auth/login` (8/min/IP), `POST /api/auth/change-password` (5/min/IP), and
> `GET /api/codes/:code/validate` (15/min/IP). Named consts for every limit.
> LOCKOUT: after 10 consecutive failed code-validations from an IP, that IP is
> locked out 15 min; the validate handler reports success/failure into the
> lockout, the middleware enforces it BEFORE the handler runs. Unit tests cover
> window allow/block/reset, per-IP isolation, and lockout trip/reset/expire
> (clock injected, no sleeps).
>
> B. SINGLE-USE CODES — the agent bind path now CONSUMES the code atomically on
> first bind. In-memory: new `SupportCodeManager::consume_for_bind` accepts
> ONLY a `Pending` code and flips it to `Connected` under the write lock (a 2nd
> presenter loses the race → rejected). This replaces the v1 pre-upgrade check
> that accepted `pending` OR `connected` (the reusable-code HIGH). DB: new
> `db::support_codes::consume_code_for_bind` — a single conditional UPDATE
> `... SET consumed_at = NOW(), status='connected' WHERE code=$1 AND consumed_at
> IS NULL AND status='pending' AND (expires_at IS NULL OR expires_at > NOW())
> RETURNING id`; zero rows ⇒ not consumable. The in-memory consume is
> AUTHORITATIVE (the live source of truth); the DB UPDATE is a durable/audit
> mirror applied best-effort after it (a missing DB row does not veto a bind the
> in-memory layer admitted). To make the durable record meaningful, the portal
> `create_code` handler now also inserts the code into `connect_support_codes`.
> Validate/preview path is UNCHANGED and explicitly does NOT consume (test
> `preview_validate_does_not_consume`).
>
> C. WIDER CODE — replaced the 6-digit numeric generator with a grouped
> base32-style code `XXX-XXX-XXX` (9 symbols over a 31-char UNAMBIGUOUS alphabet
> excluding 0/O/1/I/L ≈ 44.6 bits), CSPRNG-backed (`OsRng`, rejection sampling
> to avoid modulo bias). The new code (11 chars incl. hyphens) does NOT fit the
> `VARCHAR(10)` column from migration 001, so migration `006_widen_support_code.sql`
> widens `connect_support_codes.code` AND `connect_sessions.support_code` to
> TEXT (idempotent). Unit tests cover shape, charset (no ambiguous chars), and
> practical uniqueness.
>
> DEPS: none added; `tower_governor` REMOVED from Cargo.toml (it never compiled).
> No code/secret/support-code value logged on any path. Runtime `sqlx::query`.
> Files: `server/src/middleware/rate_limit.rs` (rebuilt), `server/src/middleware/mod.rs`,
> `server/src/main.rs` (AppState field + 3 route wirings + create_code DB insert +
> validate handler lockout feed), `server/src/support_codes.rs` (new generator +
> `consume_for_bind` + tests), `server/src/db/support_codes.rs`
> (`consume_code_for_bind`), `server/src/relay/mod.rs` (atomic consume on bind),
> `server/migrations/006_widen_support_code.sql` [new], `server/Cargo.toml`.
Files touched: `server/src/middleware/rate_limit.rs` (rebuild — v1 is non-compiling),
`server/src/middleware/mod.rs`, `server/src/api/auth.rs` (login), `server/src/api/` (code validate),