Resolves coord todo 3c1f372a (Task-4 review SHOULD-FIX). Behind NPM-on-loopback,
ConnectInfo was 127.0.0.1 so the rate limiter + lockout bucketed every client
under one IP. New shared utils::ip_extract::client_ip() honors X-Real-IP /
X-Forwarded-For (rightmost-untrusted hop) ONLY when the TCP peer is a configured
trusted proxy (CONNECT_TRUSTED_PROXIES env, default loopback, fail-closed);
untrusted peers are keyed by their true peer IP (forged headers ignored). Wired
into the 3 rate-limit middleware, the validate_code lockout feed, and the agent/
viewer WS handlers so the limiter, lockout, and audit ip_address all key on the
real client consistently. 13 unit tests (spoof rejection, XFF walk, fail-safe
defaults). Code-reviewed APPROVED. Not cargo-check-verified locally (no toolchain);
build-host/CI verification follows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>