582 lines
75 KiB
Markdown
582 lines
75 KiB
Markdown
---
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||
type: client
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||
name: dataforth
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||
display_name: Dataforth Corporation
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||
last_compiled: 2026-07-04
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||
compiled_by: Howard-Home/claude-main
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||
sources:
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||
- clients/dataforth/docs/overview.md
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||
- clients/dataforth/docs/active-directory.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/workstations.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/manufacturing.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/billing-log.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/SYNC_SCRIPT_UPDATE_SUMMARY.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/incident-2026-03-27-abuse-report-virtuo.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/incident-2026-03-27-abuse-report-connectwise.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/cloud/m365.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/issues/log.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/network/topology.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/network/vlans.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/network/firewall.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/rmm/rmm.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/security/antivirus.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/security/backup.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/servers/ad1.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/servers/ad2.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/servers/d2testnas.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/servers/df-hyperv-b.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/servers/files-d1.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/servers/sage-sql.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/projects/shares-permissions/roadmap.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/projects/shares-permissions/current-state-2026-06-10.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/projects/shares-permissions/acl-audit-detail-2026-06-10.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/projects/shares-permissions/discovery-email-draft.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/projects/shares-permissions/target-structure-draft-2026-06-22.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-06/2026-06-23-howard-dataforth-share-plan-recovery.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/aoi-xp-vlan-backup-runbook.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-03-23-galactic-advisors-report.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-03-27-security-incident-mfa-datasheets.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/SESSION-SUMMARY.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/MEMORY.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-04-12-session.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-04-13-session.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-04-14-session.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-04-23-session.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-05-03-session.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-05-04-lobby-phone-vlan-fix.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-05-06-session.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-05-12-session.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-06-01-aoi-xp-vlan-share.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-06-01-cbell-m365-bobbi-outlook.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-06-02-session.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-06-04-session.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/project_ad2_context.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/project_pipeline_rebuilt.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/project_test_datasheet_pipeline.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/project_new_product_lines.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/migration-gap-diff-RESUME.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/CLAUDE.dataforth.md
|
||
- projects/dataforth-dos/CONTEXT.md
|
||
- session-logs/2026-06-05-session.md
|
||
- session-logs/2026-06/2026-06-09-mike-dataforth-freepbx-safesite-forensics.md
|
||
- session-logs/2026-06/2026-06-18-mike-testdatadb-render-and-security-app.md
|
||
- .claude/memory/project_dataforth_incident_2026-03-27.md
|
||
- .claude/memory/project_datasheet_pipeline.md
|
||
- .claude/memory/project_neptune_sbr_email_routing.md
|
||
- .claude/memory/reference_dataforth_contact.md
|
||
- .claude/memory/reference_neptune_access_d2testnas.md
|
||
- .claude/memory/feedback_d2testnas_ssh.md
|
||
- .claude/memory/infra_office_network.md
|
||
- .claude/memory/project_dataforth.md
|
||
- .claude/memory/project_dataforth_history.md
|
||
- .claude/memory/project_ad2_dataforth_fork.md
|
||
- .claude/memory/ad2-ssh-mtu-blackhole.md
|
||
- .claude/memory/ad2-comms-via-sync-only.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-06/2026-06-23-mike-pbx-no-inbound-calls-fix.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-06/2026-06-25-howard-dforth-ship-tdr-bsod.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-07/2026-07-01-mike-dataforth-test-data-chain-audit.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-07/2026-07-04-howard-mydata-tpsys-smt-controller-access.md
|
||
- clients/dataforth/docs/audits/2026-07-01-test-data-chain-audit-AD2.md
|
||
- .claude/memory/reference_rmm_spawn_headless_claude.md
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||
backlinks:
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||
- projects/dataforth-dos
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- systems/jupiter
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---
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# Dataforth Corporation
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Signal conditioning / data acquisition manufacturer in Tucson, AZ. Long-standing ACG client. Active managed relationship — monthly prepaid block. Notable for 64 MS-DOS 6.22 test stations, a major security incident in March 2026, an ongoing test datasheet pipeline modernization project, an incomplete 2025 post-ransomware recovery restore that silently dropped files across multiple shares (active audit underway), a shares/permissions remediation project (Phase 1 still pending client input), and — newly documented as of 2026-07-04 — a previously-undocumented legacy Linux SMT line controller (MYDATA TPSys, Fedora Core 3) discovered on the manufacturing VLAN.
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---
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## Profile
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- **Contract type:** Prepaid hour block (monthly replenishment invoice $2,098.87)
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- **Key contacts:**
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| Name | Username | Role | Email |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| Dan Center | dcenter | Operations (primary IT contact) | dcenter@dataforth.com |
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| John Lehman | jlehman | Engineering, QB code, test specs | jlehman@dataforth.com |
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| Peter Iliya | pIliya | Applications Engineer | pIliya@dataforth.com |
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| Georg Haubner | ghaubner | Engineering; D: drive on HGHAUBNER has pre-ransomware-attack backup of all DF shares | ghaubner@dataforth.com |
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| Kevin Wackerly | kwackerly | IT/Admin, handles calibration@ account | kwackerly@dataforth.com |
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| Logan Tobey | ltobey | Support/Sales | ltobey@dataforth.com |
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| Ben Wadzinski | bwadzinski | Engineering | — |
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| Lee Payne | lpayne | Engineering | — |
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| Theresa Dean | tdean | Admin | tdean@dataforth.com |
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| Joel Lohr | jlohr | **RETIRED 2026-03-31** — account intentionally kept enabled; inbox rule forwards ntirety.com notifications to mike@azcomputerguru.com | jlohr@dataforth.com |
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| Ken Hoffman | khoffman / oemdata | TestDataSheetUploader author, external; also owns Dataforth product API | — |
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| Winter | — | Dataforth contact who requested Syncro asset cleanup 2026-06-02 | — |
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- **External distributor:** Ginger (gy@quatronix-cn.com) — Quatronix China; receives datasheets
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- **Billing rate:** Prepaid block; all invoices show $0.00 — hours drawn from block
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- **Hours remaining:** 30.0 hrs as of 2026-07-04 (live-check Syncro before billing — `GET /customers/578095`)
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- **Syncro customer ID:** 578095
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- **Syncro managed assets:** 50
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- **Open Syncro tickets:** 0 as of 2026-07-04
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- **Invoice CC:** jantar@dataforth.com
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---
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## Infrastructure
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### Servers & Services
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| Host | IP | Role | OS | Notes |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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| AD1 | 192.168.0.27 | Primary DC, DNS, FSMO roles, Engineering share | Windows Server 2016 | C:\ at **90%** capacity (C:\Engineering = 787 GB) — critical risk. FSMO roles (assumed all). GuruRMM agent `bf7bc5ee-4167-4a62-912a-c88b11a5943d`. Image plan (`Image2025`) + Files plan (NBF, daily 2 AM, 180-day retention — created 2026-06-05). |
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| AD2 | 192.168.0.6 | Secondary DC, TestDataDB service host, NAS mirror, WebShare | Windows Server 2019 (10.0.17763) | Hosts testdatadb Node.js service on :3000. Wiped by crypto attack 2025 — rebuilt. Windows Firewall disabled (all profiles). Shares: `C:\Shares\{c-drive,e-drive,webshare,test}`. Old `D:\c-drive` data volume is GONE — D: is now a mounted Windows install ISO. MSP360 agent at `C:\Program Files\Arizona Computer Guru\Online Backup\cbb.exe`; storage account `ACG-Dataforth`. GuruRMM agent `cfa93bb6-0cdc-4d4e-a29e-1609cda6f047`. No shadow copies. Runs ClaudeTools on `ad2` branch (coord-API isolated; comms via git sync only). **New (2026-07-01): its GuruRMM agent can also be used to spawn a headless `claude -p` for live read-only ground truth** — see [RMM-Spawned Claude](#rmm-spawned-claude-on-ad2) below; console user `sysadmin`, `claude.exe` v2.1.181 at `C:\Users\sysadmin\.local\bin\`, node v20.10.0. OS build corrected 2026-07-01 (was previously logged as 2022; live audit confirmed Server 2019). |
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| FILES-D1 | 192.168.0.189 | File server | Windows Server 2016 | Shares: `E:\Shares\{sales,archive}`. GuruRMM agent `8566a19d-49a9-4f8b-9c6c-012cc934484b`. **NOTE: `staff` share is missing** on FILES-D1 — separate issue. |
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| SAGE-SQL | 192.168.0.153 | Sage ERP (S:), RDS Session Host/Connection Broker/Web Access | Windows Server 2016 | RDS licensing grace period was expired (reset 2026-05-06). TSGateway disabled (server not externally exposed). New self-signed RDS cert installed. Bitdefender GravityZone managed AV. Share: `C:\sage`. GuruRMM agent `120ba7bf-8544-48a0-98a1-40ed5cdd3e1f`. |
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| 3CX | 192.168.0.125 | Phone system (possibly inactive) | — | Last logon Oct 2025. Production phones live on VLAN 100 under the Sangoma/FreePBX PBX — 3CX role likely superseded. |
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| DF-HYPERV-B | 192.168.0.123 | Hyper-V hypervisor | Windows Server 2025 | GuruRMM enrolled. Newest server in environment. VM inventory not captured. |
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| DF-SVR-D2-Sync | — | (role TBD) | — | GuruRMM enrolled |
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| ENG-DEV-SERVER | 192.168.0.126 | Engineering dev server | Windows 11 Pro | GuruRMM enrolled |
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| D2TESTNAS | 192.168.0.9 | SMB1 bridge for DOS test stations + AOI XP backup; Neptune Exchange colocation routing; rsync source/target for the test-data pipeline | Debian 13 (trixie), Samba 4.22.6 | **Repurposed Netgear ReadyNAS.** SMB1 enabled globally (CORE..SMB3, NTLMv1) — required for DOS 6.22 stations. rsync daemon on port 873 (module `test`, user `rsync`, hosts allow 192.168.0.0/24 + 172.16.0.0/12). SSH: `root@192.168.0.9`. Tailscale route for 172.16.0.0/22. **Shares:** `test`/`datasheets`/`snapshots` (guest; `hosts deny 192.168.1.175`), `aoibackup` (XP-only — see Access). Acts as jump host for UDM SSH (D2TESTNAS direct-tcpip channel to 192.168.0.254). **2026-07-01 audit:** root SSH key auth from AD2 (`root@192.168.0.9`) is broken (publickey denied) — no operational impact since the live sync uses the rsync daemon, not SSH, but the dormant SCP fallback script would fail if re-enabled (F9). |
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| ESXi hosts | 192.168.0.122, 192.168.0.124 | VMware ESXi hypervisors | ESXi | — |
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| UDM Firewall | 192.168.0.254 | Perimeter firewall/router | UniFi OS 5.1.15 | MAC d0:21:f9:6c:11:02. Also responds on 192.168.0.1. SSH: `azcomputerguru@192.168.0.254`, root SSH key added 2026-06-08, 2FA push required. Vault: `clients/dataforth/udm.sops.yaml`. C2 IPs blocked via iptables (NOT permanent — need to add to UniFi UI). Boot scripts in `/data/on_boot.d/`: `10-neptune-snat.sh` (Neptune outbound SNAT), `30-freepbx-sip-forward.sh` (SIP DNAT, WAN UDP 5060 source-locked to 66.7.123.0/24 → 192.168.100.2; SIP-only — do NOT add RTP forward). **[WARNING] Confirmed 2026-06-23: the SIP DNAT rule can be silently flushed by a UniFi controller provision/update, not only a reboot** — the on_boot.d script only re-applies at boot, so a mid-uptime provision event leaves inbound calls dead until the script is manually re-run. Recommend adding a persistent UI port-forward rule as a belt-and-suspenders measure (still not done as of 2026-07-04). |
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| PBX (Sangoma FreePBX) | 192.168.100.2 | VoIP PBX — production phones on 192.168.100.0/24 | Sangoma FreePBX 17 / Asterisk 22.5.2, Debian 12 | FirstDigital PJSIP trunk; SBC 66.7.123.215:5060 (Sonus), match 66.7.123.0/24; IP-auth (no registration). `qualify_frequency=0` (FD SBC ignores OPTIONS — do NOT revert). TFTP provisioning for Cisco SPA502G phones. Extensions 201-343. SSH: `sangoma@192.168.100.2` (ACG SSH key also authenticates). Vault: `clients/dataforth/pbx.sops.yaml` — password corrected 2026-06-23 (prior entry had a backslash-escaping corruption in the stored value; re-verify the vault entry byte-for-byte before use rather than assuming it is stale). [WARNING] Re-apply `PJSip.class.php` line-504 patch after any `fwconsole ma updateall`. **NOTE:** `sangoma` user is in the `sudo` group but sudo authorization on this box appears not actually granted — verify before assuming privileged ops will work via sudo. |
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| **MYDATA TPSys SMT Controller** (`myserver`) | 192.168.1.x (verify — exact IP unconfirmed) | MYDATA/Mycronic TPSys pick-and-place SMT production-line controller | Fedora Core 3 "Heidelberg" (Nov 2004), kernel 2.6.16.20, glibc ~2.3.5, bash 3.00, **LILO** bootloader, **SysV init** (no systemd) | **NEW, discovered 2026-07-04.** On VLAN 2 "mydata" (192.168.1.0/24, gateway 192.168.1.1). TPSys operator UI runs under X (runlevel 5); local PostgreSQL (uid 500) backs TPSys. Accounts: `root`, `tpsys` (TPSys app user), `tpspool` (TPSys spool), `postgres`. **No credential existed anywhere (vault or wiki) prior to this discovery** — root password was RESET via physical-console LILO recovery (no prior password to lose) and is now vaulted at `clients/dataforth/mydata-smt.sops.yaml` (reference the vault path only; never the raw password). `tpsys` being added to the `wheel` group plus a scoped `NOPASSWD` sudoers entry for the app-launch command (directed, not yet verified as landed). **GuruRMM agent CANNOT run on this box** — see Patterns below. |
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**Neptune Exchange (ACG infrastructure, physically at Dataforth D2):**
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- `neptune.acghosting.com` | internal `172.16.3.11` | external inbound `67.206.163.124` / outbound `67.206.163.122`
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- Exchange Server 2016, active ACG-hosted mail server for multiple clients
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- Physically colocated at Dataforth's D2 facility — NOT on ACG office LAN despite 172.16.x.x IP
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- Access requires routing through D2TESTNAS (192.168.0.9): Dataforth UDM has a 172.16.x.x subnet that overlaps ACG office LAN, making direct routing ambiguous
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- SNAT rule on Dataforth UDM at `/data/on_boot.d/10-neptune-snat.sh` should force Neptune outbound to use `.124` (not always active — verify)
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- Vault: `clients/dataforth/neptune-exchange.sops.yaml`
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- [WARNING] TODO: Resubnet Dataforth UDM to a non-overlapping range to permanently fix Neptune routing
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### RMM-Spawned Claude on AD2
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- **New capability proven 2026-07-01:** a headless `claude -p` can be launched on AD2 through its GuruRMM agent (`cfa93bb6-...`, `context:user_session`, since `sysadmin` is logged into the console and the RMM elevated token works), detached (`Start-Process ... -WindowStyle Hidden`) so it survives the RMM command-timeout window, writing a deliverable file + `DONE.txt` marker that a background poller watches. This is a live read-only ground-truth channel that works despite AD2 being isolated from the ACG coord API (172.16.3.30 unreachable from Dataforth LAN) — it does NOT replace the git-sync handoff for anything that needs to write back to the shared repo.
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- **Gotcha:** a stale machine-level `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` (108 chars, invalid) on AD2 shadows `sysadmin`'s working OAuth credentials (`C:\Users\sysadmin\.claude\.credentials.json`). Must `Remove-Item Env:\ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` before invoking `claude -p`, or it fails with `Invalid API key`.
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- Reference: `.claude/memory/reference_rmm_spawn_headless_claude.md`; full pattern + transcript in `clients/dataforth/session-logs/2026-07/2026-07-01-mike-dataforth-test-data-chain-audit.md`.
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### Share -> Server -> Physical Path Map
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| Drive/Share | Server | Physical path | Notes |
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|---|---|---|---|
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| Q: / `c-drive` | AD2 | `C:\Shares\c-drive` | Old `D:\c-drive` is gone (D: = mounted install ISO) |
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| T: / `e-drive` | AD2 | `C:\Shares\e-drive` | On AD2 itself, `T:` is `\\ad2\e-drive` — NOT the NAS. DOS stations separately map their own `T:` to `\\D2TESTNAS\test` (see DOS Test Station Data Pipeline pattern). |
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| X: / `webshare` | AD2 | `C:\Shares\webshare` | On AD2, `X:` = `\\ad2\webshare`. DOS stations separately map their own `X:` to `\\D2TESTNAS\datasheets`. |
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| S: / `sage` | SAGE-SQL | `C:\sage` | — |
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| W: / `sales` | FILES-D1 | `E:\Shares\sales` | — |
|
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| Y: / `archive` | FILES-D1 | `E:\Shares\archive` | — |
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| B: / `Engineering` | AD1 | `C:\Engineering` | — |
|
||
| B: / `itsvc` | AD1 | `C:\Shares\ITSvc` | — |
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| `staff` | FILES-D1 | — | **MISSING** — share does not exist on FILES-D1 |
|
||
|
||
### Workstations (summary)
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||
|
||
| Category | Count | OS | Notable |
|
||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||
| Engineering | ~12 | Win 10/11 Pro | HGHAUBNER (192.168.0.148) — Georg's PC; `D:` = full pre-attack backup of all 7 DF shares (`DF C-Drive`, `DF E-Drive`, `DF WebShare`, `DF Sage`, `DF Server Sales/Archive/Engineering`, + personal). GuruRMM agent `2aefe0d5-2357-4bdd-965a-abfccb4767a5`. D1-PWRM for PWRM10 test. |
|
||
| Manufacturing/Assembly | ~14 | Win 10/11 Pro | AS24, AS26 + various assembly/hi-pot stations |
|
||
| Office/Admin | ~12 | Win 10/11 Pro | DF-GAGETRAK (192.168.0.102) — GAGEtrak calibration host. DF-JOEL2 (192.168.0.174) — compromised 2026-03-27, remediated. |
|
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| Shipping | (part of Office/Admin count) | Win 10/11 Pro | **DFORTH-Ship** — GuruRMM agent `db17e069-2948-4cbc-97ea-1da721edcaf5`, HP EliteDesk 800 G1 USDT (BIOS 2014-12-10, ~11.5 yrs old). Recurring BSOD `0x116 VIDEO_TDR_FAILURE` on integrated Intel HD Graphics 4600 — see Patterns. Do not confuse with near-twin host **DForth-Shipp** (`95991b45-d843-4586-8275-9996d0d9ae17`), a separate machine. |
|
||
| End-of-Life (Win 7) | 3 | Windows 7 Pro | LABELPC (192.168.0.100), LABELPC2 (192.168.0.98), D2-RCVG-003 (192.168.0.47) — EOL, on network |
|
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| AOI Optical Inspection (XP) | 1 | Windows XP | WinXPBE-724667 @ **192.168.1.175** on VLAN 2 (mydata/SMT). Holds the AOI machine's external drive; backs up to `\\192.168.0.9\aoibackup` (SMB1, XP-only). EOL. See AOI runbook + 2026-06-01 session log. |
|
||
| SMT Line Controller (legacy Linux appliance) | 1 | Fedora Core 3 "Heidelberg" (2004) | **MYDATA TPSys** (`myserver`), on VLAN 2 (mydata/SMT), ~20 years old. Full detail in Infrastructure Servers table above. No GuruRMM agent possible (glibc/kernel/init all below the agent's floor) — agentless monitoring planned. |
|
||
| DOS Test Stations | 64 | MS-DOS 6.22 | TS-1 through TS-30 + variants (62 `TS-*` folders confirmed on NAS 2026-07-01). Not domain-joined. SMB1 via D2TESTNAS. See DOS Test Station Data Pipeline pattern for the 2026-07-01 audit findings. |
|
||
|
||
### Email & Identity
|
||
|
||
- **M365 tenant:** dataforth.com | Tenant ID: `7dfa3ce8-c496-4b51-ab8d-bd3dcd78b584`
|
||
- **Entra ID Sync:** Yes — Azure AD Connect. Synced OUs include **OU=SyncedUsers** and **OU=Azure_Users** (cbell confirmed in OU=Azure_Users and syncing, 2026-06-01) — the earlier "SyncedUsers only" note was incomplete.
|
||
- **M365 licenses:** 50x Business Premium (39 used), 19x Exchange Online Plan 1 (5 used), 5x SPB (4 used)
|
||
- **SMTP settings:** smtp.office365.com, port 587, STARTTLS — use `sysadmin@dataforth.com`
|
||
- **SMTP AUTH status:** Tenant-level not disabled; per-mailbox varies. `calibration@dataforth.com` had SmtpClientAuthentication=true re-enabled 2026-04-23. `sysadmin@dataforth.com` SMTP AUTH is blocked by Exchange Online default — testdatadb uses Graph API for email (Mail.Send permission granted to Claude-Code-M365 app 2026-05-12).
|
||
- **Mail security stack (layered):**
|
||
1. **INKY PhishFence** — active transport rule `B859327F-3FBD-4BE7-A47A-97D02F1558A7` fires first (StopProcessingRules=true). Use inbox rules for per-user mail routing, NOT transport rules.
|
||
2. **Mailprotector CloudFilter** — outbound delivery gateway (`dataforth-com.outbound.emailservice.io`, 52.3.213.180). Active outbound connector "Outbound-Mailprotector" (recipientDomains `*`). Mail may be held here. If a message shows "Delivered" in Dataforth outbound trace but never arrives, check Mailprotector (/mailprotector skill). Discovered 2026-06-05 when ghaubner email was held by "INKY - Annotation - Recipient Not Group Member" transport rule.
|
||
- **DKIM:** Both selector1 and selector2 published. Rotated 2026-05-12; cutover to selector2 on 2026-05-16.
|
||
- `selector1._domainkey.dataforth.com` → selector1-dataforth-com._domainkey.dataforthcom.onmicrosoft.com
|
||
- `selector2._domainkey.dataforth.com` → selector2-dataforth-com._domainkey.dataforthcom.onmicrosoft.com
|
||
- **DNS Host:** ntirety.com — Dataforth's public DNS zone managed through ntirety's portal (not a standard registrar). DNS change requests go to ntirety, not a domain control panel. Joel Lohr's account retained to receive ntirety.com infrastructure notifications (inbox rule → mike@azcomputerguru.com).
|
||
- **AutoForwarding blocked by default** (tenant outbound spam policy). If per-user forwarding needed, create scoped HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy for that sender with AutoForwardingMode=On.
|
||
- **MFA:** 3 Conditional Access policies created 2026-03-27 (initially report-only; enforced 2026-04-04):
|
||
- "ACG - Require MFA for All Users" — skip from office IP 67.206.163.122
|
||
- "ACG - Block Foreign Sign-Ins" — US-only; MFA-Travel-Bypass group for exceptions
|
||
- "ACG - Block Legacy Authentication"
|
||
- **Named locations:** Dataforth Office - Tucson (67.206.163.122/32, trusted), Allowed Countries - US Only
|
||
- **MFA-Excluded-BreakGlass group:** Brian Faires, Dataforth Calibration, Dataforth Notifications, Endcap, Tablet 01
|
||
- **MFA enrollment (as of 2026-03-27):** 19/38 ready, 19 needed setup — deadline April 4, 2026
|
||
|
||
### Network
|
||
|
||
- **Domain:** intranet.dataforth.com | Forest/Domain Level: Windows Server 2016
|
||
- **ISP:** fdtnet.net | Public IP: 67.206.163.122 (outbound), 67.206.163.124 (Neptune inbound)
|
||
- **Firewall/Router:** UniFi Dream Machine Pro at 192.168.0.254 (also 192.168.0.1), UniFi OS 5.1.15
|
||
- **Network:** Flat (no VLANs on main LAN — 192.168.0.0/24). Voice/PBX VLAN: 192.168.100.0/24 — production phones live here. **VLAN 2 "mydata" (192.168.1.0/24)** = SMT production-line network (gateway 192.168.1.1); members on the *D2-SMT Switch* (USW Enterprise 8) + *D2-Breakroom* port 12. Supersedes the earlier note that 192.168.1.0/24 was an unused UDM default voice VLAN — it is in active use by SMT. Inter-VLAN routing from mydata → main LAN is currently OPEN.
|
||
- **mydata members (2026-06-01):** WinXPBE-724667 (AOI XP, .175), goldstar19, DESKTOP-FT0T4MK, My9-PC, + 3 unnamed industrial/SMT devices (MAC 00:90:fb:80:f0:c6, 00:80:79:05:23:f2, 00:80:79:04:47:e7).
|
||
- **mydata addition (2026-07-04):** **MYDATA TPSys controller** (`myserver`) confirmed present on this VLAN — hostname distinct from the named members above; exact IP still to confirm (verify). Likely corresponds to one of the previously "unnamed industrial" devices or is a device not yet captured in the member list; reconcile on next VLAN sweep.
|
||
- **VPN:** OpenVPN for ACG remote access. Client subnet 192.168.6.x (GURU-5070 gets 192.168.6.2). [WARNING] GURU-5070 OpenVPN adapter "Local Area Connection" (ifIndex 12) MTU must be set to 1400 — default 1500 causes PMTU blackhole (tunnel path MTU ~1424; bulk SSH/SCP silently drops). Verify/re-apply: `Set-NetIPInterface -InterfaceIndex 12 -AddressFamily IPv4 -NlMtuBytes 1400`. Permanent fix: add `mssfix 1360` server-side on the Dataforth OpenVPN server.
|
||
- **Drive mappings (GPO):** B: (\\ad1\itsvc), Q: (\\ad2\c-drive), S: (\\SAGE-SQL\sage), T: (\\ad2\e-drive), W: (\\files-d1\sales), X: (\\ad2\webshare), Y: (\\files-d1\archive). DOS test stations: T: (\\D2TESTNAS\test), X: (\\D2TESTNAS\datasheets)
|
||
|
||
### GuruRMM Enrollment
|
||
|
||
- **Site name:** Dataforth D1 | Site ID: `3a2f6866-26cd-452c-9806-a8df21475c3c`
|
||
- **Site API key:** vault `clients/dataforth/...` [check vault for current entry]
|
||
- **Fleet size:** 45 agents enrolled as of 2026-06-04; Syncro managed count 50 as of 2026-07-04
|
||
- **[WARNING] GuruRMM enrollment workaround:** WebSocket auth in `ws/mod.rs` does not validate `enrolled_agents.agent_key_hash`. New agent installs must overwrite registry AgentKey with the site API key (not the enrollment AgentKey) and restart service. See Gitea issue #8.
|
||
- **[WARNING] Agent floor confirmed 2026-07-04 (MYDATA TPSys case):** the Linux installer (`agent/scripts/install.sh`) requires glibc ~2.17+, kernel >=2.6.32, and a systemd host. Legacy Linux appliances below that floor (e.g. Fedora Core 3, SysV init) cannot run the agent — plan agentless monitoring (ICMP/TCP probe, SSH heartbeat from a reachable host) for such boxes instead of attempting install.
|
||
|
||
**Known enrolled agents:**
|
||
|
||
| Host | Agent ID | Notes |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| DF-GAGETRAK | `7626d82c-0736-47a6-8bc6-68e39859caed` | Enrolled 2026-04-23 (auth workaround applied) |
|
||
| HGHAUBNER | `2aefe0d5-2357-4bdd-965a-abfccb4767a5` | Georg's PC; pre-attack backup on D: |
|
||
| AD2 | `cfa93bb6-0cdc-4d4e-a29e-1609cda6f047` | Enrolled 2026-06-04; also used 2026-07-01 to spawn headless Claude for the test-data-chain audit |
|
||
| AD1 | `bf7bc5ee-4167-4a62-912a-c88b11a5943d` | Enrolled 2026-06-04 |
|
||
| FILES-D1 | `8566a19d-49a9-4f8b-9c6c-012cc934484b` | Enrolled 2026-06-04 |
|
||
| SAGE-SQL | `120ba7bf-8544-48a0-98a1-40ed5cdd3e1f` | Enrolled 2026-06-04 |
|
||
| DF-HYPERV-B | (see RMM dashboard) | Enrolled 2026-06-04 |
|
||
| DF-SVR-D2-Sync | (see RMM dashboard) | Enrolled 2026-06-04 |
|
||
| ENG-DEV-SERVER | (see RMM dashboard) | Enrolled 2026-06-04 |
|
||
| DFORTH-Ship | `db17e069-2948-4cbc-97ea-1da721edcaf5` | Shipping-station PC; recurring TDR BSOD — see Patterns |
|
||
| (36 additional agents) | — | Mix of workstations; full list in GuruRMM dashboard |
|
||
|
||
**Cannot be enrolled:**
|
||
|
||
| Host | Reason |
|
||
|---|---|
|
||
| MYDATA TPSys (`myserver`) | Fedora Core 3: glibc ~2.3.5 (<2.17 floor), kernel 2.6.16 (<2.6.32 floor), SysV init (no systemd unit target) — three independent hard blockers. Confirmed 2026-07-04. |
|
||
|
||
### Backup Architecture
|
||
|
||
- **MSP360 ("ACG-Online Backup", `cbb.exe`):** Backup provider. Storage account: `ACG-Dataforth` (account ID `0b49ca5e-...`).
|
||
- **AD2:** Two plans — `AD2 Image` (image plan, bunch `35a5c3d2`, running daily), `Files` plan (180-day retention, NBF, daily 2 AM, covers `C:\Shares` tree; GFS off, synthetic full, compression, fast-NTFS). No shadow copies on AD2.
|
||
- **AD1:** `Image2025` image plan + **Files plan created 2026-06-05** (NBF, daily 2 AM, 180-day retention, `ACG-Dataforth`, covers `C:\Engineering` + `C:\Shares\ITSvc`; initial run at 2:00 AM, not manually triggered). Both image and file plans now in place, matching AD2.
|
||
- **Pre-attack backup (offline, not MSP360):** HGHAUBNER `D:` drive holds a full pre-attack snapshot of all 7 mapped DF shares, captured before the 2025 ransomware event. This is the only recovery source predating the attack. Accessible via GuruRMM `user_session` on HGHAUBNER. Cross-machine writes use existing GPO-mapped drives only (fresh UNC blocked by WTS-impersonation — see Patterns).
|
||
- **Historical file-level backup:** NBF bunch `faad5a67` ("Backup plan on 8/29/2025") in `ACG-Dataforth` storage contains restore points 8/29–9/29/2025, archived at old physical path `D:\c-drive\...` (pre-migration layout). Used successfully 2026-06-04 to confirm SP1366 file contents.
|
||
- **WizTree backup CSV (2026-06-04):** Full-drive WizTree export of HGHAUBNER's `D:` stored at AD2 `C:\ClaudeTools\clients\dataforth\WizTree_20260604184904.zip` (sensitive — kept OFF shares). ~8.7M files / 5.7 TB across 7 shares documented.
|
||
|
||
### Key Applications
|
||
|
||
| Application | Host | URL/Port | Notes |
|
||
|---|---|---|---|
|
||
| TestDataDB | AD2 | http://192.168.0.6:3000 | Node.js + Express, PostgreSQL 18.3. Internal LAN only. Redesigned UI deployed 2026-06-18 (cert-fit, publish chips, push toasts, full-screen results). Row counts per the 2026-07-01 audit: `test_records` 475,553, `work_orders` 34,149, `work_order_lines` 64,051; 99.3% of test_records have `api_uploaded_at` set (HTTP API uploader is the live web-delivery path — the older `For_Web`/ASP.NET path has been dead since 2026-05-11). |
|
||
| Sage ERP | SAGE-SQL | \\SAGE-SQL\sage (S:) | RDS-served RemoteApp |
|
||
| GageTrak | DF-GAGETRAK (192.168.0.102) | — | Calibration tracking. Sends email via calibration@dataforth.com (SMTP). GuruRMM enrolled. |
|
||
| Dataforth Product API | Hoffman's servers | https://www.dataforth.com/api/v1/TestReportDataFiles | OAuth2 client_credentials. Vault: `clients/dataforth/api-oauth.sops.yaml`. Used actively to recover DSCA33/45 and 8B/5B/SCM spec templates. |
|
||
| QuickBASIC 4.5 ATE | 64 DOS stations | T:\ (\\D2TESTNAS\test) | Automated test equipment programs. 1,470+ product model specs. Inbound spec/software distribution to stations is currently broken (root-caused 2026-07-01 — see DOS Test Station Data Pipeline pattern and Syncro #32489). |
|
||
| Power Monitor SPA | Georg's dev / TBD | — | Vanilla-JS SPA for Dataforth power meters (built by Georg/Antigravity AI). Demo at PWM.dataforth.com proposed; gateway architecture designed. Parked pending Mike↔Georg conversation. `clients/dataforth/power-monitor-demo/` |
|
||
| MYDATA TPSys | MYDATA TPSys controller (`myserver`, VLAN 2) | local X UI / local PostgreSQL | SMT pick-and-place line control software. Newly documented 2026-07-04 — see Infrastructure Servers table. |
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Syncro Asset Inventory (2026-06-02 Reconciliation)
|
||
|
||
Pulled full Syncro asset list for customer_id `578095`: **78 assets** across 2 pages. Syncro currently shows 50 managed assets (confirmed again 2026-07-04 live pull); reconciliation/cleanup ongoing.
|
||
|
||
### Reconciliation Result
|
||
|
||
| Bucket | Count | Meaning |
|
||
|---|---|---|
|
||
| KEEP | 20 | Active in Syncro (<150 days since last check-in) |
|
||
| SAVE + FLAG | 21 | Alive in ScreenConnect or Bitdefender but Syncro agent broken; do NOT delete — reinstall agent |
|
||
| REMOVE | 28 | Dead in all three systems (Syncro + ScreenConnect + Bitdefender) |
|
||
| VERIFY | 9 | Servers with no agent anywhere; could be live console-only; confirm before removing |
|
||
|
||
**Governing rule (Howard's 3-system OR):** A machine is saved if it has been online within 150 days in ANY of Syncro, ScreenConnect, or Bitdefender. Removal only if dead in all three.
|
||
|
||
### SAVE + FLAG — alive but Syncro agent broken (21 machines)
|
||
|
||
AD1, AD2, SAGE-SQL, FILES-D1, ENG-DEV-SERVER, D2-MFG-001, D1-ENGI-012, MY9-PC, D1-CUST-003, DANC0619, DFORTH-SHIP, DF-LEE11-I9, DFASLB0519, D2-AS-26, HGHAUBNER, D1-PWRM, D1-ENGI-EMCLAB1, D1-CONF-002, D2-HIPOT-SURFAC, D2-AS-34, TS-41 (shows as STATION_41 in ScreenConnect)
|
||
|
||
### VERIFY — servers with no agent (9 machines)
|
||
|
||
APPS, EXCHANGE, EXCHANGE16, AD-3, AD-4, OLD-AD2, SAGETS-1, EPICOR, D2-ASSY-001
|
||
|
||
Likely dead: OLD-AD2, EXCHANGE16, SAGETS-1. Confirm before removing: APPS, AD-3, AD-4, EXCHANGE, EPICOR, D2-ASSY-001.
|
||
|
||
### REMOVE — confirmed dead in all systems (28 asset IDs)
|
||
|
||
Syncro asset IDs: 23845, 149614, 9708445, 9357407, 9276901, 9212922, 9078651, 8824875, 8824867, 8726494, 8726485, 8657233, 8606209, 8572160, 8523941, 8411908, 8410614, 8632009, 8726495, 8421223, 9081717, 8726493, 8423782, 8726481, 8525650, 8622969, 8361459, 8670944
|
||
|
||
**Deletion method:** Syncro GUI only (`https://computerguru.syncromsp.com/customer_assets?customer_id=578095`). API route `DELETE /customer_assets/{id}` returns HTML 404 for this integration token — not exposed.
|
||
|
||
### Root Cause — Fleet-wide Syncro Agent Break ~2025-10-06
|
||
|
||
57 of 78 assets show `updated_at` frozen at or before 2025-10-06, while the remaining 21 show recent check-ins. This is a hard cutoff, not gradual attrition — indicating a fleet-wide Syncro agent failure around that date. The machines stayed online (visible in ScreenConnect); only the Syncro agent stopped reporting. Root cause not yet investigated.
|
||
|
||
### Pending Actions (Coord todo tree, parent `103c48ad-7b31-4967-9388-065a91888e7c`, assigned to Howard)
|
||
|
||
1. Delete the 28 confirmed-dead assets in Syncro GUI.
|
||
2. Decide the 9 VERIFY servers.
|
||
3. Reinstall Syncro agent on the 21 SAVE+FLAG machines.
|
||
4. Switch Dataforth to metered Syncro asset billing once clean.
|
||
5. Reply to Winter; flag the ~2025-10-06 fleet-wide agent break for investigation.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Third-Party Tool Inventory
|
||
|
||
### Bitdefender GravityZone
|
||
|
||
- **Company ID:** `64c94ef310db128bfa0d908f` (suffix `_578095` confirms Dataforth mapping)
|
||
- **Status:** Dataforth is being **phased off Bitdefender**. Only 4 of 57 GravityZone endpoints remain in "Custom Groups" (actively managed); 53 are in the "Deleted" folder (mostly unmanaged).
|
||
- **[WARNING] Bitdefender absence is NOT a decommission signal for Dataforth.** A machine missing from BD may simply have had its BD agent uninstalled as part of the phase-off. Use Syncro or ScreenConnect as liveness indicators.
|
||
- GravityZone company owner field: Lee Payne.
|
||
|
||
### ScreenConnect
|
||
|
||
- **Host:** `https://computerguru.screenconnect.com`
|
||
- **Extension GUID:** `2d558935-686a-4bd0-9991-07539f5fe749`
|
||
- **Vault:** `msp-tools/screenconnect.sops.yaml` (fields `credentials.username`, `credentials.api_secret`)
|
||
- **Working API auth (determined 2026-06-02):** `CTRLAuthHeader: <raw api_secret>` (NO "Basic " prefix) + `Origin: https://computerguru.screenconnect.com`. Basic-auth or "Basic <b64>" in CTRLAuthHeader both return 401.
|
||
- **Only exposed method:** `POST /App_Extensions/<guid>/Service.ashx/GetSessionsByName` with body `{"sessionName":"<name>"}`. All other Get* method names return 500. Agent `Name` fields are blank for unattended sessions — this API cannot enumerate the full Dataforth fleet; name-based lookup only.
|
||
- Custom session properties: CP1=Company, CP2=Site, CP3=Tag.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Access
|
||
|
||
### Domain / Server Access
|
||
- **AD2 SSH:** `ssh sysadmin@192.168.0.6` (port 22) — vault: `clients/dataforth/ad2.sops.yaml` → `credentials.password` — NOTE: stale backslash escape in vault entry; strip with `sed 's/\\//g'`. MTU-sensitive: GURU-5070 OpenVPN adapter ifIndex 12 must be MTU 1400 for reliable bulk transfers.
|
||
- **AD1 SSH:** `ssh sysadmin@192.168.0.27` — vault: `clients/dataforth/ad1.sops.yaml`
|
||
- **D2TESTNAS SSH:** `ssh root@192.168.0.9` — vault: `clients/dataforth/d2testnas.sops.yaml`. Use root, NOT sysadmin (sysadmin SSH fails on D2TESTNAS). SSH key from acg-guru-5070 authorized. **From AD2, root SSH key auth to D2TESTNAS is currently broken** (publickey denied, confirmed 2026-07-01) — the live rsync-daemon sync path does not depend on it, but fix or retire the dormant SCP script that does.
|
||
- **D2TESTNAS `aoibackup` share (AOI XP backup):** `\\192.168.0.9\aoibackup` — Samba user `admin` (password matches the XP's local login), `hosts allow = 192.168.1.175` only, `browseable = no`. Other NAS shares explicitly deny 192.168.1.175. Creds in vault: `clients/dataforth/d2testnas.sops.yaml → credentials.smb.aoi-user` / `.aoi-password` / `.aoi-share`.
|
||
- **UDM SSH:** `ssh azcomputerguru@192.168.0.254` (2FA push) or `ssh root@192.168.0.254` (root SSH key installed 2026-06-08). Jump via D2TESTNAS: paramiko `direct-tcpip` channel or ProxyJump. Vault: `clients/dataforth/udm.sops.yaml` (corrected 2026-06-09).
|
||
- **SAGE-SQL SSH:** `ssh sysadmin@192.168.0.153` — SSH key (`C:\ProgramData\ssh\administrators_authorized_keys` on SAGE-SQL)
|
||
- **All server passwords:** vault (individual vault entries per server — `clients/dataforth/<host>.sops.yaml`)
|
||
- **WinRM (AD2/AD1):** port 5985 — pywinrm with NTLM, user `INTRANET\sysadmin`
|
||
- **HGHAUBNER:** No SSH. Reached via GuruRMM agent `2aefe0d5`. Logged-in user `intranet\ghaubner`. Cross-machine file writes use existing GPO-mapped drives only (Q: → \\ad2\c-drive, T: → \\ad2\e-drive, etc.).
|
||
|
||
### MYDATA TPSys SMT Controller (new, 2026-07-04)
|
||
- **Root:** password — vault `clients/dataforth/mydata-smt.sops.yaml`. Console/network access method beyond physical console not yet documented (verify — likely SSH once IP is confirmed). Exact IP on VLAN 2 "mydata" (192.168.1.0/24) not yet confirmed (verify).
|
||
- **Recovery method if locked out again:** at the LILO `boot:` prompt, boot `linux init=/bin/bash rw` to land in a passwordless root shell (bypasses `sulogin`, which on this Red-Hat-family box would otherwise demand the root password even in single-user mode), then `mount -o remount,rw /` and `passwd root`. Reboot with `reboot -f` or, if that hangs, `echo b > /proc/sysrq-trigger`.
|
||
- **Accounts:** `root`, `tpsys` (TPSys application user, being added to `wheel` + scoped `NOPASSWD` sudo for the app-launch command), `tpspool` (TPSys spool user), `postgres` (uid 500, local TPSys database).
|
||
- **No prior credential existed** for this machine in vault or wiki before 2026-07-04 — it was undocumented until discovered at the physical console.
|
||
|
||
### M365 / Entra
|
||
- **M365 admin:** sysadmin@dataforth.com — vault: `clients/dataforth/m365.sops.yaml`
|
||
- **Tenant ID:** `7dfa3ce8-c496-4b51-ab8d-bd3dcd78b584`
|
||
- **Claude-Code-M365 Entra App:** App ID `7a8c0b2e-57fb-4d79-9b5a-4b88d21b1f29`, secret expires 2027-12-22 — vault: `clients/dataforth/m365.sops.yaml → credentials.entra-app`
|
||
- **MSP remediation app suite:** MSP tenant `ce61461e-81a0-4c84-bb4a-7b354a9a356d` — tiered ComputerGuru apps (Exchange Operator `b43e7342` etc.), vault `msp-tools/computerguru-*.sops.yaml`. *(Old single app `fabb3421`/Claude-MSP-Access DELETED 2026-06-14 — AADSTS700016, do not use.)*
|
||
- **ComputerGuru tiered apps:** All 5 apps consented 2026-04-23. Exchange Operator SP (b43e7342) had Exchange Admin role added manually (gap in onboard-tenant.sh — not auto-assigned for Exch Operator).
|
||
|
||
### MSP360 Managed Backup API
|
||
- **Vault:** `msp-tools/msp360-api.sops.yaml` (api.mspbackups.com, /api/Provider/Login)
|
||
- `cbb.exe` path on AD2: `C:\Program Files\Arizona Computer Guru\Online Backup\cbb.exe`
|
||
- Browse file backup: `cbb.exe list -a "ACG-Dataforth" -b <bunch_id> -rp <restore_point_id> -path "<path>"`
|
||
|
||
### Dataforth Product API (Hoffman)
|
||
- **Vault:** `clients/dataforth/api-oauth.sops.yaml`
|
||
- Token URL: `https://login.dataforth.com/connect/token`
|
||
- Grant: `client_credentials`, Client ID: `dataforth.onprem.sync`, Scope: `dataforth.web`
|
||
- Token TTL: 1 hour
|
||
- Swagger: `https://www.dataforth.com/swagger/index.html`
|
||
- Endpoints: `GET /api/v1/TestReportDataFiles/{serial}` (per-model cert), `/bulk`, `/stats`
|
||
|
||
### ESXi / Hypervisors
|
||
- ESXi-122: 192.168.0.122 — vault: `clients/dataforth/esxi-122.sops.yaml`
|
||
- ESXi-124: 192.168.0.124 — vault: `clients/dataforth/esxi-124.sops.yaml`
|
||
|
||
### PBX
|
||
- Vault: `clients/dataforth/pbx.sops.yaml` (password corrected 2026-06-23 — see Infrastructure Servers table)
|
||
- SSH: `sangoma@192.168.100.2`
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Patterns & Known Issues
|
||
|
||
### Active Directory
|
||
- **No custom security groups** — only default Windows groups. Service accounts in OU=ServiceAccounts.
|
||
- **ClaudeTools-ReadOnly AD account** — purpose unclear. Investigate.
|
||
- **Ken Hoffman has two accounts** (khoffman + oemdata) — not consolidated.
|
||
- **jlohr account retained** — post-retirement (2026-03-31), kept enabled specifically to receive ntirety.com infrastructure notifications. Inbox rule forwards to mike@azcomputerguru.com. Do NOT disable.
|
||
- **Entra sync scope:** OU=SyncedUsers **and OU=Azure_Users** sync to Entra (cbell confirmed in OU=Azure_Users, synced — 2026-06-01; the prior "SyncedUsers only" note was incomplete). CompanyUsers OU does NOT sync. 38 stale TS-* test station accounts were cleaned from Entra 2026-03-27.
|
||
|
||
### RDS / SAGE-SQL
|
||
- **RDS licensing:** Grace period reset 2026-05-06 by deleting GracePeriod registry key. Grace period expires again without proper CALs. Purchase RDS CALs (Per User mode, LicensingType=4).
|
||
- **TSGateway:** Disabled on SAGE-SQL (server not externally exposed at firewall). Do NOT re-enable without reason.
|
||
- **SSL cert:** Self-signed, subject `CN=sage-sql.intranet.dataforth.com`. Non-domain machines must manually import to Trusted Root + Trusted Publishers.
|
||
- **GPO cert distribution:** Not completed (AD2 SYSVOL write blocked from non-domain workstation). Pending.
|
||
- **Bitdefender GravityZone:** Managed AV on SAGE-SQL. Can block PowerShell execution — may need temporary disable for admin work.
|
||
|
||
### Voice / Phones / FreePBX
|
||
- **Production phones VLAN:** 192.168.100.0/24. PBX at .196 / .2. All production phones live here.
|
||
- **Unifi default voice VLAN (192.168.1.0/24):** NOT used for production voice — phones landing here cannot reach PBX. Switch port misconfiguration symptom: phone shows wrong date/time (NTP failure) and no dial tone. (This subnet is however in active use for the mydata/SMT VLAN — see Network section; do not confuse the two purposes.)
|
||
- **D1-Server-Room port 1:** Controls lobby drop → must stay on VLAN 100. Reverted to default once before (2026-05-04 incident).
|
||
- **FirstDigital trunk — `qualify_frequency=0`:** FD's Sonus SBC ignores SIP OPTIONS keepalives. Setting `qualify=0` in the `pjsip` DB (id=1) prevents trunk from going Unavailable. **Do NOT revert to a non-zero qualify.** (Total phone outage 2026-06-08 was caused by FD SBC not answering OPTIONS, making trunk go Unavailable and blocking all INVITEs.)
|
||
- **PJSip.class.php line 504 patch must be re-applied** after any `fwconsole ma updateall`. It is wiped by FreePBX updates. Backup before each update (`PJSip.class.php.bak.<timestamp>`).
|
||
- **Do NOT port-forward the RTP range (10000-20000)** on the UDM for this trunk. A static RTP DNAT creates a conntrack collision with the PBX's outbound RTP — inbound works but outbound audio dies. SIP 5060 forward only (source-locked to 66.7.123.0/24). Current on_boot.d script (`30-freepbx-sip-forward.sh`) is SIP-only, correct.
|
||
- **Inbound SIP relies on `/data/on_boot.d/30-freepbx-sip-forward.sh`** — not a persistent UniFi UI rule. Must survive UDM reboot via the script. **Confirmed 2026-06-23: the risk window is broader than "survives reboot" — a mid-uptime UniFi controller provision/update can also flush the SIP DNAT** while the box never reboots, silently killing inbound calls until the script is manually re-run (`sh /data/on_boot.d/30-freepbx-sip-forward.sh`). Diagnostic: `iptables -t nat -S | grep -iE '5060|192.168.100.2'` on the UDM — empty output means the rule is gone. Recommend Mike add a UI port-forward as a belt-and-suspenders measure (not yet done as of 2026-07-04).
|
||
- **PBX sudo authorization gap:** `sangoma` is in the `sudo` group but sudo authorization on this distro appears not actually granted (a sudo-based liveness test can fail on authorization, not auth — do not use it to judge whether a password/credential is stale).
|
||
|
||
### Exchange Online / Email
|
||
- **INKY PhishFence StopProcessingRules:** Kills all subsequent transport rules. Use inbox rules for per-mailbox forwarding, NOT transport rules.
|
||
- **Mailprotector CloudFilter:** Outbound delivery goes through Mailprotector. If a message is "Delivered" per Dataforth's outbound trace but never arrives, check Mailprotector (`/mailprotector skill`, `py mp.py messages ...`) — it may be held. The INKY "Annotation - Recipient Not Group Member" transport rule can route mail to Mailprotector's hold queue.
|
||
- **AutoForwarding blocked by default** (tenant outbound spam policy). If per-user forwarding needed, create scoped HostedOutboundSpamFilterPolicy for that sender with AutoForwardingMode=On.
|
||
- **Get-MessageTrace deprecated Sept 2025:** Use Get-MessageTraceV2 and Get-MessageTraceDetailV2 in Exchange PowerShell.
|
||
|
||
### GuruRMM Agent Deployment
|
||
- **WebSocket auth bug (Issue #8):** enrolled_agents.agent_key_hash is never checked by ws/mod.rs. Workaround: after MSI install, overwrite registry `HKLM:\SOFTWARE\GuruRMM\AgentKey` with the site API key (not enrollment AgentKey), then restart service.
|
||
- **rmm-api.azcomputerguru.com must be grey-clouded** (DNS-only, not proxied) — Cloudflare proxy blocks WebSocket. Do NOT re-enable orange cloud. Gitea Issue #9.
|
||
- **No RMM agent possible on FC3-class legacy appliances (confirmed 2026-07-04, MYDATA TPSys):** the Linux agent installer requires glibc ~2.17+, kernel >=2.6.32, and installs a systemd unit. A box on glibc ~2.3.5 / kernel 2.6.16 / SysV init (Fedora Core 3 "Heidelberg", Nov 2004) fails all three floors simultaneously — do not attempt install; plan agentless monitoring (ICMP/TCP probe or SSH heartbeat from a host that can reach the appliance's VLAN, e.g. D2TESTNAS or the RMM server, since inter-VLAN routing from mydata to main LAN is open) instead. If this becomes a recurring need across other legacy appliances, file a `/feature-request` for legacy/appliance Linux monitoring support in GuruRMM.
|
||
- **Legacy Red-Hat-family recovery pattern:** if a box like this is ever locked out again with no vaulted credential, LILO `boot:` → `linux init=/bin/bash rw` gives a passwordless root shell and bypasses `sulogin` (which on this OS family would otherwise demand the root password even in single-user mode). Always check BOTH vault and wiki before assuming a machine has no documented credential — a prior session missed the wiki check here and had to be corrected.
|
||
|
||
### Cross-Machine File Operations (Windows Domain)
|
||
- **Double-hop / WTS-impersonation blocks fresh UNC paths.** When running commands in GuruRMM `user_session` (or via SSH-through-another-server), the impersonated token carries no network credentials. `net use` and fresh `\\server\share` paths fail with Access Denied.
|
||
- **Workaround that works:** Run on the SOURCE machine in `user_session` and write to an **existing GPO-mapped drive** (e.g. Q: → `\\ad2\c-drive`). The existing mapping survives impersonation; fresh UNC does not.
|
||
- **Proven 2026-06-04 on HGHAUBNER:** local `D:\DF C-Drive` read + `Q:` write succeeded; AD2-side `user_session` copy and SSH-from-AD2 both failed.
|
||
|
||
### AD2 SSH / VPN MTU
|
||
- **PMTU blackhole on GURU-5070 → AD2 SSH:** GURU-5070's OpenVPN adapter "Local Area Connection" (ifIndex 12, IP 192.168.6.2) defaults to MTU 1500. Tunnel path MTU is ~1424 (FD ping confirms). Over-MTU bulk TCP segments (SSH transfers, SCP) are silently dropped. Small interactive commands pass, creating a false appearance of "flaky VPN" or "SSH ban."
|
||
- **Fix (applied 2026-06-18):** `Set-NetIPInterface -InterfaceIndex 12 -AddressFamily IPv4 -NlMtuBytes 1400` on GURU-5070 via SYSTEM RMM agent. Registry-persistent but may reset on OpenVPN reconnect — verify with `Get-NetIPInterface -InterfaceIndex 12`.
|
||
- **Durable fix:** server-side `mssfix 1360` on the Dataforth OpenVPN server (or `push "tun-mtu 1400"`) — would auto-clamp all fleet clients, not just GURU-5070.
|
||
- **AD2 is NOT the target for SSH diagnosis** when SSH is the failing channel — use RMM instead.
|
||
|
||
### AD2 Branch / Coordination
|
||
- **AD2 operates on the `ad2` git branch.** Fork is rebased from main + thin Dataforth-specific commits. Do NOT edit shared fleet files on `ad2` — conflicts on every sync. Dataforth context lives in `clients/dataforth/CLAUDE.dataforth.md`.
|
||
- **AD2 is coord-API isolated:** 172.16.3.30 is unreachable from Dataforth LAN. Coord messages, locks, and todos NEVER reach AD2. All inter-session coordination goes through git sync: committed handoff docs + `## Note for <user>` blocks. Do NOT use the coord skill for AD2.
|
||
- **sync.sh on AD2:** not fork-aware on the push step (always tries `main`); force-push manually: `git push --force-with-lease origin ad2` after rebasing.
|
||
- **New (2026-07-01): AD2's GuruRMM agent can be used as a live read-only ground-truth channel** by spawning a headless `claude -p` through it (`context:user_session`, detached, poll for a `DONE` marker) — bypasses the coord isolation for READ-ONLY investigation without waiting on git-sync round trips. Unset the stale machine-level `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` env var first or auth fails. See [RMM-Spawned Claude](#rmm-spawned-claude-on-ad2) above.
|
||
|
||
### Post-Ransomware Recovery Restore (2025) — Incomplete File Migration
|
||
- **The 10/1/2025 recovery restore was incomplete.** The `Restore plan 10/1/2025` (~3.4M files) migrated each share from the old `D:\<share>` layout to the current `C:\Shares\...` layout on AD2 and dropped files in the process. Proven case: SP1366 MAQ20 Communications Module — each `PRINTOUTS FOR MANUFACTURING` folder for revisions E–H received only one file (the drill panel) when the backup contained ~6 files per revision. The 9/29/2025 file-level backup confirms the files existed before the restore.
|
||
- **Scope unknown.** Other folders across the 7 shares may have similar gaps. A full migration-gap audit is underway (WizTree both sides — see Active Work). The audit is **review-only** — no automatic restore, because some deletions were intentional and the HGHAUBNER backup is additive-only (includes Georg's personal files alongside corporate data).
|
||
- **Backup-side CSV** for diffing stored at AD2 `C:\ClaudeTools\clients\dataforth\WizTree_20260604184904.zip` (sensitive file list — keep off shares and off any publicly accessible directory).
|
||
- **AD2 D: drive is gone.** The old `D:\c-drive` data volume was repurposed as a mounted Windows install ISO during the rebuild. All share data now lives under `C:\Shares`. The historical file-level backup (bunch `faad5a67`) archived the data under `D:\c-drive\...` (pre-migration path) — reconcile paths accordingly.
|
||
|
||
### Shares ACL State — All Open to All Staff
|
||
- **All 8 business shares grant access to every employee** via `Everyone`/`Domain Users` (FullControl on 4 shares, Modify on 3). No department-based security groups exist. Sensitive data — Payroll, OSHA records, Purchase Orders, Accounting/QuickBooks, Sage financials — is fully readable and writable by all domain users.
|
||
- **Remediation project in progress** (Shares & Permissions, started 2026-06-10). Phase 0 (discovery) complete. Phase 1 (client input/department matrix) pending email to Dan Center. Do not apply ACL changes until after client sign-off on the target model. Details: `clients/dataforth/docs/projects/shares-permissions/`.
|
||
- **Special shares excluded from remediation:** `test` (DOS/SMB1 guest — leave open); `webshare` (preserve `svc_testdatadb:Full`); `ITSvc` (Domain Computers needs Read); Sage app data path (restrict by group at the share, but keep the live UNC stable for the ERP/SQL).
|
||
- **Phase 2 target-state strawman (drafted 2026-06-22, pre-client-input):** `target-structure-draft-2026-06-22.md`. Inferred from the existing share/folder layout (which is already department-shaped) plus a client-facing render at `Dataforth-Shared-Drives-Plan.html`. Target = one logical tree: `Company\Departments\` (Engineering [+Test-Engineering], Manufacturing, Quality, Sales-Marketing, Shipping-Receiving, Purchasing, IT), a `Restricted\` branch with **broken inheritance / no Domain Users** (Accounting-Finance, Payroll, HR, OSHA, Purchase-Orders), a read-mostly `Company-Wide\`, per-user `Users\`, and read-only `Archive\`. ABE on. Groups named `SG-<Resource>-<RW|RO>`; users get **Modify** via the RW group (never Full), SYSTEM/Administrators keep Full.
|
||
- **Drive-letter strategy — Option A recommended:** keep current Q/S/T/W/Y/B mappings and realize the tree *logically* (reorg folders within each share + apply groups) for the first rollout — lowest disruption, no app/UNC breakage, no retraining. Hold physical consolidation to one `Company` drive (Option B) as a later optional phase after a hard-coded-UNC-path audit (DOS, Sage, datasheet pipeline, GageTrak/Epicor). The permission model is identical either way.
|
||
- **Strawman is NOT a build order — six items still gate Phase 2 sign-off (need the client):** confirm the inferred department list; the per-department RW/RO/none access matrix; named access for sensitive data (Payroll/OSHA/POs/Accounting — likely HR/Finance sign-off, not just Dan); department rosters to populate groups; legacy cleanup approval (person-named / "Do not use" folders); and an Engineering destination volume (AD1 C: ~90% full blocks any ENGR restructure).
|
||
|
||
### DOS Test Station Data Pipeline (new, 2026-07-01 ground-truth audit)
|
||
- **Root cause of Syncro #32489 confirmed (F1, HIGH):** the deployed inbound spec downloader `T:\COMMON\ProdSW\NWTOC.BAT` v5.0 (mirrored to NAS `COMMON/ProdSW/NWTOC.BAT`) copies only `*.BAT` and `*.EXE` from the NAS to stations — **zero `.DAT` files**. Its own changelog header says so verbatim: "Added EXE copy, removed DATA folder copies (avoid cyclic overwrites)". No version of NWTOC, past or present, has ever distributed the shared `COMMON` master specs — the fix must ADD a data copy, not "restore" one. Engineering masters (e.g. `5BMAIN.DAT`, updated 2026-06-26) reach the NAS fine; they simply never reach the stations.
|
||
- **New risk found (F2, HIGH, needs on-station confirmation):** the deployed `NWTOC.BAT` v5.0 and `CTONWTXT.BAT` v2.3 use `COPY /Y`. `/Y` is **not a valid MS-DOS 6.22 switch** (introduced in MS-DOS 7.0/Windows 95); 6.22's `COPY` supports only `/A /B /V`. If the stations run genuine 6.22, `COPY /Y` returns `Invalid switch - /Y` and copies nothing — meaning NWTOC has been silently copying NOTHING (not even the .BAT/.EXE files it's supposed to) since it was deployed 2026-03-16. This was independently confirmed by Grok in verify mode. The pivotal unresolved question — whether the stations run true 6.22 or MS-DOS 7.x — is empirical and can only be checked on a station itself (`VER`, then `COPY /Y NUL C:\TEST.TXT`); stations have no RMM agent. The upload path (`CTONW.BAT` v5.0) is unaffected — it uses plain `COPY` — which is why test data has kept flowing even if NWTOC is dead.
|
||
- **Do NOT judge DOS-6.22 compatibility from the root-level `test\{NWTOC,CTONW,CHECKUPD,STAGE}.BAT` v1.x files** — those are abandoned drafts riddled with NT-only constructs (`FOR /F`, `SET /A`, `CALL :label`, `2>NUL` stderr redirection, tilde path modifiers). The scripts that actually run on stations live under `COMMON\ProdSW\` and were deliberately cleaned of those constructs (except for the `/Y` issue above).
|
||
- **F3 (MED):** `C:\Shares\test\TS-21\ProdSW` is a stray **file** (a misplaced `7BMAIN4`-type EXE), not the directory rsync expects — this makes the 15-minute AD2↔NAS sync report `ERRORS` on every single run (`exit 3`, "Not a directory"), masking any genuine new failure. Fix: remove/relocate the file, harden the push loop to skip non-directory `ProdSW` paths.
|
||
- **F4 (MED):** Server-side datasheet generation (`spec-reader.js`) reads specs from `testdatadb\specdata\`, which is a **frozen 2026-03-27 snapshot** — not the live engineering masters. Any spec limit changed after that date is not reflected in generated datasheets even though the outbound data pipeline itself is healthy.
|
||
- **F5 (MED, security):** Plaintext credentials found hard-coded in scripts on AD2 — rsync daemon password in `Sync-FromNAS-rsync.ps1`, NAS root SSH password in the dormant `Sync-FromNAS.ps1`, and the Postgres `testdatadb_app` password in `testdatadb\database\db.js`. Flagged for rotation + proper vaulting; not yet remediated as of 2026-07-04.
|
||
- **Stale-assumption corrections established by this audit** (do not carry forward the old versions): datastore is **PostgreSQL 18**, not SQLite (the SQLite file is a 4.4 GB archive from the 2026-04-03 migration cutover); the scheduled sync task runs **`Sync-FromNAS-rsync.ps1`**, not the dormant per-file SCP script; web delivery is a live **HTTP API uploader** (`upload-to-api.js`, 472,290 records flagged as of 2026-07-01), not the dead `For_Web`/ASP.NET path (dead since 2026-05-11); `CTONWTXT.BAT` IS actively invoked (called from `CTONW.BAT` line 30), contradicting an earlier assumption that it was a gap.
|
||
- Full report: `clients/dataforth/docs/audits/2026-07-01-test-data-chain-audit-AD2.md`. Recommendations in that report are proposals only — nothing has been applied (the audit was strictly read-only).
|
||
|
||
### Hardware / Endpoint — Aging Fleet
|
||
- **DFORTH-Ship recurring TDR BSOD (`0x116 VIDEO_TDR_FAILURE`), diagnosed 2026-06-25:** integrated Intel HD Graphics 4600 on driver 20.19.15.5126 (Intel's final driver for that part, dated 2020-01-20) hitting the GPU-reset timeout on an 11.5-year-old HP EliteDesk 800 G1 USDT (BIOS 2014-12-10). Five minidumps span 2025-11-03 through 2026-06-24 with an **accelerating cadence** — treat as a degrading-hardware trend, not a one-off. Mitigation applied: Edge hardware acceleration disabled via machine policy (`HKLM\SOFTWARE\Policies\Microsoft\Edge\HardwareAccelerationModeEnabled = 0`). No durable fix is possible for integrated graphics (nothing to reseat/replace) — **PC replacement is the real fix**; thermal cleaning of the USDT chassis is a secondary mitigation worth doing regardless. Do not confuse with near-twin host **DForth-Shipp** — verify the exact agent ID before acting.
|
||
|
||
### Security
|
||
- **C2 IP blocks are iptables only** — do not survive UDM reboot. Must add to permanent UniFi block list via UI. C2 IPs: 80.76.49.18, 45.88.91.99 (AS399486 Virtuo, Montreal).
|
||
- **AD1 disk 90% full** — C:\Engineering = 787 GB of 1023 GB. Risk of replication failures.
|
||
- **Windows Firewall disabled on AD2** (all profiles) — known risk, not yet remediated.
|
||
- **3 Windows 7 machines on network** (LABELPC, LABELPC2, D2-RCVG-003) — EOL, unpatched.
|
||
- **AD1/AD2 on Windows Server 2016 / 2019 respectively** — approaching/at end of mainstream support. Plan upgrade.
|
||
- **Entra ID P2 not licensed** — IdentityRiskyUser risk check returns 403 even with scope consented. Would need P2 upgrade to enable Identity Protection.
|
||
- **IdentityRiskyUser.Read.All scope:** Consented to Security Investigator app but unusable (no P2 license).
|
||
- **Plaintext credentials in Dataforth test-data-chain scripts (F5, 2026-07-01):** rsync daemon, NAS root, and Postgres app passwords are hard-coded in scripts under `C:\Shares\test\scripts\` and `testdatadb\database\db.js`, world-readable via the `test` SMB share. Rotation + vaulting recommended, not yet done.
|
||
- **Legacy appliance with no prior credential (MYDATA TPSys, 2026-07-04):** an entire production SMT-line controller existed with no vault or wiki entry until physically discovered. Root password reset via LILO recovery; now vaulted. Worth a broader sweep for other undocumented devices on VLAN 2 "mydata" given 3 unnamed industrial MACs were already known but unresolved as of 2026-06-01.
|
||
|
||
### Syncro Asset Management
|
||
- **Fleet-wide Syncro agent break ~2025-10-06:** ~half of Dataforth machines stopped reporting to Syncro on or around that date while remaining online in ScreenConnect. Do NOT auto-remove machines frozen at that date without cross-checking ScreenConnect. Root cause unknown — needs investigation.
|
||
- **Bitdefender is NOT a liveness signal:** Dataforth is being phased off BD; 53 of 57 GravityZone endpoints are in the "Deleted" folder. Missing from BD = BD agent uninstalled, not machine dead.
|
||
- **API delete not available:** `DELETE /customer_assets/{id}` returns HTML 404 for the current integration token. All asset deletions must go through the Syncro GUI.
|
||
|
||
### `staff` Share Missing
|
||
- The `staff` network share is absent from FILES-D1 (only `archive` and `sales` exist). HGHAUBNER's backup includes a `DF Staff` folder, suggesting the share existed pre-attack. Not in scope for the current migration-gap diff — separate issue requiring investigation.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Active Work
|
||
|
||
As of 2026-07-04 (0 open Syncro tickets per live pull):
|
||
|
||
- **DOS Test Station Data Pipeline (Syncro #32489, active):** Root cause confirmed 2026-07-01 via a read-only ground-truth audit run through a headless Claude spawned on AD2's GuruRMM agent (new capability — see [RMM-Spawned Claude](#rmm-spawned-claude-on-ad2)). F1 (NWTOC v5.0 never copies master `.DAT` specs to stations) is confirmed; F2 (`COPY /Y` may not be valid on true MS-DOS 6.22) needs a station-side check before scoping the fix. **Next steps:** (1) confirm station DOS version (`VER` + `COPY /Y NUL C:\TEST.TXT` on a station), (2) draft a DOS-6.22-safe `NWTOC v5.1` that adds a one-way pull of master `.DAT`s (plain `COPY`, no `/Y` if 6.22 confirmed) without reintroducing the cyclic-overwrite problem v5.0 was avoiding, (3) Grok-review the new script before it touches a station, (4) update ticket #32489 with the confirmed root cause and plan. Secondary cleanup items from the same audit (not urgent): remove the stray `TS-21\ProdSW` file (F3), feed `testdatadb\specdata\` from live engineering masters (F4), rotate/vault the plaintext creds found in scripts (F5), retire dead `For_Web` output and abandoned v1.x script drafts (F6/F7/F8).
|
||
|
||
- **MYDATA TPSys SMT controller (new, discovered 2026-07-04):** Root password reset via LILO recovery and **vaulted 2026-07-04** at `clients/dataforth/mydata-smt.sops.yaml` (host/VLAN/OS/accounts/recovery-method documented; decrypt-verified). **Outstanding:** (1) confirm the machine's exact IP on 192.168.1.x and reconcile against the known mydata VLAN member list; (2) verify the `tpsys` wheel-group + scoped `NOPASSWD` sudoers change actually landed (`id tpsys`, `sudo -l` as tpsys); (3) get the exact TPSys app-launch command from Howard/Mike to finalize the sudoers scope; (4) confirm the controller booted cleanly into TPSys after the forced reboot (it is a live production SMT line); (5) decide and stand up agentless monitoring (ICMP/TCP probe or SSH heartbeat from D2TESTNAS or the RMM server — inter-VLAN routing to mydata is open) since a GuruRMM agent is impossible on this OS; formalize via `/feature-request` if Mike wants legacy/appliance Linux monitoring as a standing GuruRMM capability.
|
||
|
||
- **DFORTH-Ship BSOD (ongoing monitoring):** Edge hardware-acceleration mitigation applied 2026-06-25; needs on-site Edge restart/reboot to take effect, verify at `edge://policy`. Monitor for recurrence — if it bugchecks again, pull and analyze the four older dump signatures to confirm whether it is drifting toward a hard hardware fault. Schedule thermal cleaning of the USDT chassis. Recommend/plan replacement of the 11.5-year-old EliteDesk 800 G1 USDT shipping station as the durable fix.
|
||
|
||
- **UDM inbound SIP DNAT (recurring risk, unresolved):** Confirmed again 2026-06-23 that the SIP 5060 DNAT can be flushed by a UniFi controller provision mid-uptime, not only at reboot. Coord to-do `45572ee1` tracks the durable fix (persistent UI port-forward rule or a cron/watcher re-running the idempotent on_boot.d script) — needs a maintenance window. Still SIP-only; never forward the RTP range.
|
||
|
||
- **Shares & Permissions project (Phase 1 — BLOCKING, pending client input):** Phase 0 (discovery) completed 2026-06-10 — read-only ACL audit confirmed all 8 business shares open to all employees; Domain Users has FullControl on 4 shares. Discovery email to Dan Center drafted (`clients/dataforth/docs/projects/shares-permissions/discovery-email-draft.md`); **not yet sent — recipients/sender not locked** (Dan Center primary; CC Kevin Wackerly?; Mike or Howard sending?). Phase 1 blocked on client responses: department list, access matrix, sensitive-data rules, staff rosters. A **Phase 2 target-state strawman was drafted 2026-06-22** (`target-structure-draft-2026-06-22.md` + client-facing `Dataforth-Shared-Drives-Plan.html`) from the existing layout — see [Shares ACL State](#shares-acl-state--all-open-to-all-staff); it still needs the Phase 1 client matrix to finalize. Next-step options: polish the client HTML, finalize + send the discovery email to unblock Phase 1, or refine the internal strawman. Full roadmap: `clients/dataforth/docs/projects/shares-permissions/roadmap.md`.
|
||
|
||
- **8B/5B/SCM render completion (parked with AD2):** Root-caused a `parseRawData` bug (PASS/FAIL line consumed as step-response for families that omit `"0","0",v` line). 136 8B/5B/SCM templates mined from Hoffman API (2026-06-18). Completion — wiring templates into the live renderer with correct slotmaps, QB rounding, and frequency/AAC accuracy — handed to AD2 (its now-proven machinery from DSCA33/45 work). Sync handoff at `projects/dataforth-dos/8B5BSCM-RENDER-VERIFY-2026-06-18.md`. ~9,624 records remain unpublished; this is a render-coverage gap (null renders correctly skipped), not a backlog.
|
||
|
||
- **Migration-gap audit (parked):** WizTree CSV of HGHAUBNER's pre-attack backup captured (AD2 `C:\ClaudeTools\clients\dataforth\WizTree_20260604184904.zip`). WizTree runs on live servers deferred — no diff yet. Plan: run WizTree on AD2, FILES-D1, SAGE-SQL, AD1 → diff CSV-to-CSV per share → `clients/dataforth/migration-gap-catalog-2026-06-04.md`. Full plan in `clients/dataforth/migration-gap-diff-RESUME.md`. No auto-restore — review-only catalog.
|
||
|
||
- **Syncro asset cleanup (with Howard):** 78-asset reconciliation complete. 28 confirmed-dead assets pending GUI deletion; 21 alive-but-broken machines need Syncro agent reinstall; 9 servers in VERIFY bucket. Move to metered billing once clean. Coord todo tree assigned to Howard (parent `103c48ad-7b31-4967-9388-065a91888e7c`). See [Syncro Asset Inventory](#syncro-asset-inventory-2026-06-02-reconciliation) above.
|
||
|
||
- **AOI XP backup + isolation (ongoing):** AOI optical-inspection XP PC on VLAN 2 (mydata/SMT) @ 192.168.1.175; locked-down SMB1 share `aoibackup` on D2TESTNAS (XP-only, user `admin`). Other NAS shares now deny the XP. **Optional EOL hardening pending:** block XP → company LAN (except NAS 192.168.0.9) + Internet on the UDM, scoped to .175. Todo `37543f7f`.
|
||
|
||
- **AD2 Claude capability updates (parked):** AD2 runs its own Claude from `C:\ClaudeTools` on the `ad2` branch. Needs: (a) syncro + coord commands, (b) DF wiki read-write, (c) Dataforth client data access. Python 3.12.8 and identity.json installed 2026-06-17. Coord API unreachable from Dataforth LAN — comms via git sync only, though the 2026-07-01 RMM-spawn pattern now offers a read-only side channel for investigation.
|
||
|
||
- **Power Monitor SPA demo (parked):** Georg Haubner developed a vanilla-JS power-meter SPA (AI-built, `clients/dataforth/ExternalCodeReview.zip`). ACG designed a gateway architecture for a gated demo at `PWM.dataforth.com` (inbound tunnel, no meter publicly exposed, magic-link auth). Spec at `clients/dataforth/power-monitor-demo/GATEWAY-SPEC.md`. Parked pending Mike↔Georg conversation.
|
||
|
||
- **Test Datasheet Pipeline:**
|
||
- Production pipeline healthy — outbound (station → NAS → AD2 → Postgres → web) confirmed current as of 2026-07-01 (import as recent as 13:41 UTC same day). 475K+ records, DSCA33/45 recovery complete (1,452 new certs published 2026-06-18 via Hoffman API).
|
||
- Inbound spec/software distribution to stations is broken — see DOS Test Station Data Pipeline pattern above and Syncro #32489.
|
||
- Email notifications deployed (Graph API via `sysadmin@dataforth.com`).
|
||
- 8B/5B/SCM render gap — parked with AD2 (see above).
|
||
- 2 niche DSCA models (DSCA33-1948, DSCA45-1746) and their 8B equivalents have no Hoffman original — no template, cannot auto-publish.
|
||
- DKIM: cutover to selector2 on 2026-05-16 — no action needed; verify signing after that date.
|
||
|
||
- **GAGEtrak email (ticket #32142):** calibration@ SMTP re-enabled 2026-04-23. GAGEtrak configured (smtp.office365.com:587, calibration@dataforth.com). Kevin Wackerly verifying schedule — expected Monday run appears to run Tuesday.
|
||
|
||
- **jlohr forwarding:** ntirety.com inbox rule active as of 2026-05-12; confirmed delivering to mike@azcomputerguru.com. Defunct transport rule pending cleanup.
|
||
|
||
- **RDS / SAGE-SQL:** RDS grace period reset. GPO cert distribution pending. RDS CALs purchase needed long-term.
|
||
|
||
- **MFA enforcement ongoing** — 19 users were not enrolled as of April 4 enforcement date; current enrollment count unverified.
|
||
|
||
- **C2 IP blocks need permanence:** Iptables rules on UDM (80.76.49.18, 45.88.91.99) need to be added to permanent UniFi UI block list.
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## History Highlights
|
||
|
||
| Date | Event |
|
||
|---|---|
|
||
| 2025 | Crypto/ransomware attack — AD2 wiped and rebuilt, many files lost. Test datasheet pipeline broken. |
|
||
| 2025-08-29 – 2025-09-29 | MSP360 file-level backup (`faad5a67`) covering DF shares at old `D:\c-drive\...` path. Last snapshot before the recovery restore. |
|
||
| 2025-10-01 – 2025-10-02 | Post-ransomware recovery restore (`Restore plan 10/1/2025`, ~3.4M files) migrated shares from `D:\<share>` to `C:\Shares\...` on AD2. Restore was incomplete — files dropped in multiple folders (root cause: restore tool gap, not user deletion). AD2 `C:\Shares` tree NTFS creation timestamp confirms this date. |
|
||
| ~2025-10-06 | Fleet-wide Syncro agent break — ~half of Dataforth machines freeze in Syncro while remaining online in ScreenConnect. Root cause unknown. |
|
||
| 2026-01-19 | DOS Update System built and deployed — NWTOC/CTONW/UPDATE/DEPLOY BAT files, 39 deployments. Sync-FromNAS updated (DEPLOY.BAT). |
|
||
| 2026-03-20 | Galactic Advisors security assessment — AD1 C: at 90%, legacy SQL 2008 R2 client noted, 3 computers scanned. |
|
||
| 2026-03-23 | Galactic Advisors assessment analyzed by ACG. |
|
||
| 2026-03-27 | **Major security incident:** DF-JOEL2 compromised via social engineering/ScreenConnect (attacker "Angel Raya", C2 on Virtuo hosting). M365 sign-in from Turkey. Full remediation. 3 CA policies deployed. MFA notice sent. IC3 filed (1c32ade367084be9acd548f23705736f). |
|
||
| 2026-03-27–29 | Test datasheet pipeline rebuilt — 72/73 Quatronix datasheets generated, new Node.js pipeline replaces VB6 DFWDS + VB.NET uploader. |
|
||
| 2026-03-31 | Joel Lohr retirement. Brian Faires mailbox converted to shared (5,711 messages preserved). 38 stale Entra TS-* accounts deleted. |
|
||
| 2026-04-04 | MFA CA policies enforced (switched from report-only). |
|
||
| 2026-04-11–12 | SCMVAS/SCMHVAS pipeline extension — 27,503 records backfilled, 434 Engineering-Tested .txt files imported. |
|
||
| 2026-04-12 | TestDataDB PostgreSQL migration verified (2.89M records). Hoffman API discovered (Swagger). |
|
||
| 2026-04-13 | API architecture discussion with Hoffman — client_credentials grant confirmed for dataforth.onprem.sync client. |
|
||
| 2026-04-14 | DFWDS logic ported to Node.js (dfwds-process.js). 897 staged datasheets drained. 803 new records created on Hoffman API. |
|
||
| 2026-04-15 | Major release — DB dedup (2.89M→469K rows), FAIL→PASS retest rule, For_Web filesystem dependency eliminated, 170,984 records bulk-pushed to Hoffman. Dashboard UI upgrades. |
|
||
| 2026-04-23 | Full Dataforth tenant onboarded to all 5 ComputerGuru tiered apps. calibration@ SMTP AUTH fixed. DF-GAGETRAK GuruRMM agent enrolled (with auth workaround). Syncro ticket #32142 billed. |
|
||
| 2026-05-03 | jantar@dataforth.com darkweb breach check — no indicators of compromise. eM Client OAuth grant and SP revoked/disabled. 1 hr billed. |
|
||
| 2026-05-04 | Howard onsite — lobby phone offline (VLAN misconfiguration on D1-Server-Room port 1 → fixed to VLAN 100). |
|
||
| 2026-05-06 | SAGE-SQL RDS issues resolved — grace period reset, SSL cert replaced, TSGateway disabled, RemoteApp permission prompts fixed. |
|
||
| 2026-05-12 | Pipeline audit + email notifications implemented (Graph API). jlohr forwarding configured (ntirety.com → mike@). DKIM keys rotated. |
|
||
| 2026-06-01 | AOI optical-inspection XP PC isolated onto VLAN 2 (mydata/SMT) @ 192.168.1.175; `aoibackup` SMB1 share created on D2TESTNAS locked to the XP only; other NAS shares set to deny the XP. D2TESTNAS confirmed Debian 13 / Samba 4.22.6 (repurposed Netgear ReadyNAS); vault + wiki OS corrected. |
|
||
| 2026-06-01 | Chauncey Bell (cbell) M365 verified — active mailbox, licensed M365 Business Standard; AD password reset on AD2 (synced user, OU=Azure_Users), signed into Office. Bobbi's Outlook printing fixed. Ticket #32364 (0.5 hr onsite). |
|
||
| 2026-06-02 | Syncro asset reconciliation (78 assets): 20 keep / 21 save+flag / 28 remove / 9 verify. Root cause identified: fleet-wide Syncro agent break ~2025-10-06 silenced ~half the fleet while boxes stayed online (visible in ScreenConnect). Dataforth confirmed phasing off Bitdefender. Cleanup list handed to Howard. |
|
||
| 2026-06-04 | SP1366 MAQ20 manufacturing print recovery — 19/20 PDFs for revisions E–H restored to AD2 from HGHAUBNER's pre-attack backup via GuruRMM user_session + GPO-mapped Q: drive. Root cause of loss: incomplete 10/1/2025 recovery restore. Syncro #32385, 1.0 hr remote, prepaid $0, resolved. GuruRMM fleet grew 13 → 45 agents. WizTree backup-side CSV captured for migration-gap diff (deferred). |
|
||
| 2026-06-05 | AD1 Files backup plan created via GuruRMM remote command (cbb.exe, NBF, 180-day retention, daily 2 AM, covers C:\Engineering + C:\Shares\ITSvc). AD1 now has both image and file plans matching AD2. |
|
||
| 2026-06-05 | **Mailprotector CloudFilter discovered** as Dataforth's outbound delivery layer (atop INKY + Exchange Online). Email from Georg Haubner was held by Mailprotector due to INKY "Annotation" transport rule. Released manually. New `/mailprotector` skill built and committed. |
|
||
| 2026-06-05 | Georg Haubner's Power Monitor SPA analyzed (vanilla-JS, AI-built). Gateway architecture designed for PWM.dataforth.com demo. Parked pending Mike↔Georg conversation. |
|
||
| 2026-06-08–09 | **Total Dataforth phone outage.** Outbound failed (FirstDigital SBC ignoring OPTIONS → trunk Unavailable); inbound never worked (no SIP port-forward existed). Fixed: `qualify_frequency=0` in pjsip DB; `PJSip.class.php` line 504 re-patched; `/data/on_boot.d/30-freepbx-sip-forward.sh` added (SIP-only DNAT, source-locked 66.7.123.0/24). Two-way audio verified. UDM vault corrected. Syncro #32392, 1.0 hr emergency (×1.5 rate) remote, prepaid. |
|
||
| 2026-06-10 | **Shares & Permissions Phase 0 complete.** Read-only ACL audit of all 8 business shares: all grant Domain Users/Everyone Full or Modify; no department security groups exist; Payroll/OSHA/PO/accounting data open to all employees. Phase 1 (client input) pending discovery email to Dan Center. |
|
||
| 2026-06-17 | AD2 identity.json + Python 3.12.8 installed. `CLAUDE.dataforth.md` created for AD2 context file (relocated from in-line `.claude/CLAUDE.md` edits to maintain clean fork). |
|
||
| 2026-06-18 | **DSCA33/45 certs recovered via Hoffman API** — 56 model templates mined, 1,452 new DSCA33/45 certs published on AD2 (0 overwrites). Root-caused `parseRawData` bug affecting 8B/5B/SCM families. 136 8B/5B/SCM templates mined from Hoffman and handed to AD2 for wiring. TestDataDB UI redesigned and deployed on AD2 (cert-fit, publish chips, push toasts, full-screen inspector). AD2 SSH PMTU blackhole diagnosed (GURU-5070 adapter MTU 1500 vs tunnel ~1424) and fixed (MTU 1400). Syncro #32441. |
|
||
| 2026-06-22 | **Shares & Permissions Phase 2 target-state strawman drafted** — proposed `Company\Departments\…Restricted\…Company-Wide\…Users\…Archive\` tree with `SG-<Resource>-<RW|RO>` groups, current→target migration map, and Option-A (keep drive letters) rollout, all inferred from the existing layout. Internal draft + client-facing HTML render. Phase 1 client input still gates sign-off. |
|
||
| 2026-06-23 | **PBX no-inbound-calls emergency fixed.** UDM SIP 5060 DNAT was completely absent — flushed by a UniFi controller provision (not a reboot), confirming the on_boot.d re-apply script's coverage gap is broader than previously understood. Re-ran `/data/on_boot.d/30-freepbx-sip-forward.sh`, verified DNAT + forward-accept restored, inbound confirmed working end-to-end. Vault `pbx.sops.yaml` password corrected (was backslash-corrupted from shell-escaping leaking into storage). Syncro #32450, 1.5 hr emergency (×1.5 rate) remote, invoiced, block debited 31.5 → 30.0 hrs. Durable-fix coord to-do `45572ee1` filed. |
|
||
| 2026-06-24–25 | **DFORTH-Ship recurring BSOD diagnosed.** Stop code `0x116 VIDEO_TDR_FAILURE` on integrated Intel HD Graphics 4600 (final 2020 driver) — an 11.5-year-old HP EliteDesk 800 G1 USDT with an accelerating crash cadence (5 dumps since 2025-11-03). Mitigated by disabling Edge hardware acceleration via machine policy; PC replacement recommended as the durable fix; thermal cleaning flagged as a secondary measure. |
|
||
| 2026-07-01 | **Test-data-chain ground-truth audit** via a headless Claude spawned through AD2's GuruRMM agent (new capability, bypassing AD2's coord-API isolation for read-only investigation). Confirmed root cause of Syncro #32489: deployed `NWTOC.BAT` v5.0 never copies master spec `.DAT` files to stations (removed by design in the v5.0 changelog). New HIGH finding: `NWTOC.BAT`/`CTONWTXT.BAT` use `COPY /Y`, not a valid MS-DOS 6.22 switch — pending station-side DOS-version confirmation before scoping the fix (independently confirmed by Grok). Corrected several stale assumptions: datastore is PostgreSQL 18 (475,553 test_records), the sync task runs `Sync-FromNAS-rsync.ps1`, web delivery is a live HTTP API uploader (472,290 records flagged). Also found: a stray file breaking the AD2↔NAS rsync push on every run (masking real errors), a frozen 2026-03-27 server-side spec snapshot, and plaintext credentials hard-coded in three scripts (flagged for rotation, not yet fixed). |
|
||
| 2026-07-04 | MYDATA TPSys SMT controller (myserver, FC3/VLAN2) discovered + root recovered via LILO single-user; vaulted; RMM agent ruled out (legacy glibc/kernel/no-systemd). |
|
||
|
||
---
|
||
|
||
## Backlinks
|
||
|
||
- [[projects/dataforth-dos]] — Active test datasheet pipeline project on AD2
|
||
- [[systems/jupiter]] — Neptune Exchange physically colocated at Dataforth D2 facility; D2TESTNAS provides Tailscale routing
|