Files
claudetools/SQL_INJECTION_FIXES_VERIFICATION.txt
Mike Swanson 89e5118306 Remove conversation context/recall system from ClaudeTools
Completely removed the database context recall system while preserving
database tables for safety. This major cleanup removes 80+ files and
16,831 lines of code.

What was removed:
- API layer: 4 routers (conversation-contexts, context-snippets,
  project-states, decision-logs) with 35+ endpoints
- Database models: 5 models (ConversationContext, ContextSnippet,
  DecisionLog, ProjectState, ContextTag)
- Services: 4 service layers with business logic
- Schemas: 4 Pydantic schema files
- Claude Code hooks: 13 hook files (user-prompt-submit, task-complete,
  sync-contexts, periodic saves)
- Scripts: 15+ scripts (import, migration, testing, tombstone checking)
- Tests: 5 test files (context recall, compression, diagnostics)
- Documentation: 30+ markdown files (guides, architecture, quick starts)
- Utilities: context compression, conversation parsing

Files modified:
- api/main.py: Removed router registrations
- api/models/__init__.py: Removed model imports
- api/schemas/__init__.py: Removed schema imports
- api/services/__init__.py: Removed service imports
- .claude/claude.md: Completely rewritten without context references

Database tables preserved:
- conversation_contexts, context_snippets, context_tags,
  project_states, decision_logs (5 orphaned tables remain for safety)
- Migration created but NOT applied: 20260118_172743_remove_context_system.py
- Tables can be dropped later when confirmed not needed

New files added:
- CONTEXT_SYSTEM_REMOVAL_SUMMARY.md: Detailed removal report
- CONTEXT_SYSTEM_REMOVAL_COMPLETE.md: Final status
- CONTEXT_EXPORT_RESULTS.md: Export attempt results
- scripts/export-tombstoned-contexts.py: Export tool for future use
- migrations/versions/20260118_172743_remove_context_system.py

Impact:
- Reduced from 130 to 95 API endpoints
- Reduced from 43 to 38 active database tables
- Removed 16,831 lines of code
- System fully operational without context recall

Reason for removal:
- System was not actively used (no tombstoned contexts found)
- Reduces codebase complexity
- Focuses on core MSP work tracking functionality
- Database preserved for safety (can rollback if needed)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-01-18 19:10:41 -07:00

152 lines
4.8 KiB
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SQL INJECTION VULNERABILITY FIXES - VERIFICATION GUIDE
=====================================================
FILES MODIFIED:
--------------
1. api/services/conversation_context_service.py
2. api/routers/conversation_contexts.py
CHANGES SUMMARY:
---------------
FILE 1: api/services/conversation_context_service.py
----------------------------------------------------
Line 13: ADDED import
OLD: from sqlalchemy import or_, text
NEW: from sqlalchemy import or_, text, func
Lines 178-201: FIXED search_term SQL injection
OLD:
if search_term:
fulltext_match = text(
"MATCH(title, dense_summary) AGAINST(:search_term IN NATURAL LANGUAGE MODE)"
).bindparams(search_term=search_term)
query = query.filter(
or_(
fulltext_match,
ConversationContext.title.like(f"%{search_term}%"), # VULNERABLE
ConversationContext.dense_summary.like(f"%{search_term}%") # VULNERABLE
)
)
NEW:
if search_term:
try:
fulltext_condition = text(
"MATCH(title, dense_summary) AGAINST(:search_term IN NATURAL LANGUAGE MODE)"
).bindparams(search_term=search_term)
like_condition = or_(
ConversationContext.title.like(func.concat('%', search_term, '%')), # SECURE
ConversationContext.dense_summary.like(func.concat('%', search_term, '%')) # SECURE
)
query = query.filter(or_(fulltext_condition, like_condition))
except Exception:
like_condition = or_(
ConversationContext.title.like(func.concat('%', search_term, '%')),
ConversationContext.dense_summary.like(func.concat('%', search_term, '%'))
)
query = query.filter(like_condition)
Lines 210-220: FIXED tags SQL injection
OLD:
if tags:
tag_filters = []
for tag in tags:
tag_filters.append(ConversationContext.tags.like(f'%"{tag}"%')) # VULNERABLE
if tag_filters:
query = query.filter(or_(*tag_filters))
NEW:
if tags:
# Use secure func.concat to prevent SQL injection
tag_filters = []
for tag in tags:
tag_filters.append(
ConversationContext.tags.like(func.concat('%"', tag, '"%')) # SECURE
)
if tag_filters:
query = query.filter(or_(*tag_filters))
FILE 2: api/routers/conversation_contexts.py
--------------------------------------------
Lines 79-90: ADDED input validation for search_term
NEW:
search_term: Optional[str] = Query(
None,
max_length=200,
pattern=r'^[a-zA-Z0-9\s\-_.,!?()]+$', # Whitelist validation
description="Full-text search term (alphanumeric, spaces, and basic punctuation only)"
),
Lines 86-90: ADDED validation for tags
NEW:
tags: Optional[List[str]] = Query(
None,
description="Filter by tags (OR logic)",
max_items=20 # Prevent DoS
),
Lines 121-130: ADDED runtime tag validation
NEW:
# Validate tags to prevent SQL injection
if tags:
import re
tag_pattern = re.compile(r'^[a-zA-Z0-9\-_]+$')
for tag in tags:
if not tag_pattern.match(tag):
raise HTTPException(
status_code=status.HTTP_400_BAD_REQUEST,
detail=f"Invalid tag format: '{tag}'. Tags must be alphanumeric with hyphens or underscores only."
)
TESTING THE FIXES:
-----------------
Test 1: Valid Input (should work - HTTP 200)
curl "http://172.16.3.30:8001/api/conversation-contexts/recall?search_term=test" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN"
Test 2: SQL Injection Attack (should be rejected - HTTP 422)
curl "http://172.16.3.30:8001/api/conversation-contexts/recall?search_term=%27%20OR%20%271%27%3D%271" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN"
Test 3: Tag Injection (should be rejected - HTTP 400)
curl "http://172.16.3.30:8001/api/conversation-contexts/recall?tags[]=%27%20OR%20%271%27%3D%271" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT_TOKEN"
KEY SECURITY IMPROVEMENTS:
-------------------------
1. NO F-STRING INTERPOLATION IN SQL
- All LIKE patterns use func.concat()
- All parameterized queries use .bindparams()
2. INPUT VALIDATION AT ROUTER LEVEL
- Regex pattern enforcement
- Length limits
- Character whitelisting
3. RUNTIME TAG VALIDATION
- Additional validation in endpoint
- Prevents bypass of Query validation
4. DEFENSE IN DEPTH
- Multiple layers of protection
- Validation + Parameterization + Database escaping
DEPLOYMENT NEEDED:
-----------------
These changes are in D:\ClaudeTools but need to be deployed to the running API server at 172.16.3.30:8001
After deployment, run: bash test_sql_injection_simple.sh