CI never ran clippy on the agent crate (the build-server clippy job is
Linux-only and can't compile the Windows agent; build-agent only runs cargo
build), so 77 clippy -D-warnings errors had accumulated. Behavior-preserving
cleanup, code-reviewed APPROVED, locally verified (cargo clippy --workspace
--all-targets --all-features -- -D warnings exits 0; cargo test --workspace =
57 passed).
- let _ = on Win32 resource-teardown BOOL returns (gdi.rs); fallible
BitBlt/GetDIBits stay error-handled
- removed unused imports/vars; idiom fixes (div_ceil, is_null, transmute
annotations, match collapsing, useless_conversion)
- #[allow(dead_code)] + comment on genuine Task-6/7 scaffolding (vk consts,
SpecialKey emission, SAS mgmt API, modifier tracking, GDI frame-diff fields)
- Cargo.lock: cargo pruned ~147 stale transitive entries (no version changes)
Follow-up: add cargo clippy -D warnings to the build-agent CI job so the agent
crate stays clippy-clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
9082e11 compiles + passes all 50 server tests on the build host; only blocked
CI on cargo fmt (4 files) and one clippy -D dead-code denial:
- cargo fmt --all (relay/mod.rs, session/mod.rs, agent consent/mod.rs + session/mod.rs)
- #[cfg_attr(not(test), allow(dead_code))] on session::get_consent_state (a
read accessor currently exercised only by tests)
No logic change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SPEC-002 Phase 1 Task 5, code-reviewed APPROVED. An attended (support-code)
session is invisible and inert to the technician until the end user accepts a
consent prompt on their own machine.
- proto: ConsentRequest / ConsentResponse + ConsentAccessMode enum (oneof
fields 80/81; no existing field renumbered).
- server: ConsentState on Session; attended -> Pending, managed -> NotRequired;
join_session refuses viewers unless Granted/NotRequired (single chokepoint -
StartStream only fires from join_session, so no frames or input flow pre-
consent); run_consent_handshake sends ConsentRequest, 60s timeout, granted ->
proceed, denied/timeout/disconnect -> teardown (end_session denied, machine
offline, support code released). consent_state persisted; consent_requested/
granted/denied audited.
- agent: Windows MessageBox (topmost/system-modal) on spawn_blocking; anything
but an explicit Yes = deny; non-Windows build is a fail-closed stub.
Not cargo-check-verified locally (no toolchain). Server verified on the build
host; the Windows agent half is verified by CI build-agent (Pluto).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
5d5cd26 compiles + passes clippy -D warnings + all 45 tests on the build host;
only cargo fmt --check failed on one reflowed method chain in ip_extract.rs.
No logic change.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Resolves coord todo 3c1f372a (Task-4 review SHOULD-FIX). Behind NPM-on-loopback,
ConnectInfo was 127.0.0.1 so the rate limiter + lockout bucketed every client
under one IP. New shared utils::ip_extract::client_ip() honors X-Real-IP /
X-Forwarded-For (rightmost-untrusted hop) ONLY when the TCP peer is a configured
trusted proxy (CONNECT_TRUSTED_PROXIES env, default loopback, fail-closed);
untrusted peers are keyed by their true peer IP (forged headers ignored). Wired
into the 3 rate-limit middleware, the validate_code lockout feed, and the agent/
viewer WS handlers so the limiter, lockout, and audit ip_address all key on the
real client consistently. 13 unit tests (spoof rejection, XFF walk, fail-safe
defaults). Code-reviewed APPROVED. Not cargo-check-verified locally (no toolchain);
build-host/CI verification follows.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Task 4 (bfcdbb5) compiles and passes all 32 tests on the build host; only
clippy -D warnings blocked CI. Fixed the two denials:
- rate_limit.rs: converted a dangling /// doc block (no documented item) to //
to clear clippy::empty_line_after_doc_comments
- db/events.rs: #[allow(dead_code)] on CONNECTION_REJECTED_EXPIRED_CODE and
_CANCELLED_CODE (not-yet-wired audit-event constants), matching the file's
existing STREAMING_STOPPED pattern; TODO comments note the rejection-event wiring
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SPEC-002 Phase 1 Task 4 (the final keystone task), code-reviewed APPROVED.
Closes the audit's reusable-code HIGH and rate-limiting-disabled HIGH.
- Rebuilt rate limiting as a self-contained in-memory per-IP limiter (replaces
the non-compiling tower_governor; removed that dep). Fixed-window caps wired
to login (8/min), change-password (5/min), code-validate (15/min) -> 429;
per-IP lockout after 10 consecutive failed code validations (15-min cooldown).
- Single-use support codes: atomic consume on first agent bind (in-memory
Pending->Connected under write lock + DB conditional UPDATE), rejecting a
second presenter; validate/preview does not consume.
- Widened code format: XXX-XXX-XXX, 31-char unambiguous alphabet (no 0/O/1/I/L),
CSPRNG + rejection sampling, ~44.6 bits (replaces 6-digit numeric); migration
006 widens the code columns to TEXT.
Completes the keystone (Tasks 1-4): every audit CRITICAL + HIGH in the secure
auth/session core is now addressed. Known follow-up todos (not blocking): (1)
trusted-proxy client-IP extraction (NPM-on-loopback collapses clients to
127.0.0.1); (2) multi-instance fail-closed DB single-use gate. Not
cargo-check-verified locally - build-host/CI verification follows this commit.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The Task 2/3/authz commits failed CI at the first gate (cargo fmt --all
--check), which short-circuited before clippy/build/test ran. Verified on the
build host (172.16.3.30): the v2 server compiles and all 18 tests pass; only
3 cosmetic issues blocked CI, all fixed here:
- cargo fmt --all (whitespace, 3 files)
- clippy unused_imports: drop ViewerClaims from auth/mod.rs re-export
- clippy doc_overindented_list_items: de-indent one doc line in sessions.rs
Testing Agent confirmed fmt + clippy -D warnings + build --release + test are
all green with these applied. No logic changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Authz-strength fix (coord todo c8916c89), code-reviewed APPROVED. Replaces the
weak "view" gate (held by every role) with a permission-tiered access mode
stamped inside the signed viewer token:
- mint: is_admin() || has_permission("control") -> CONTROL token; else
has_permission("view") -> VIEW_ONLY token; else 403.
- enforce: the relay drops MouseEvent/KeyEvent/SpecialKey for a VIEW_ONLY token
before forwarding (video still streams); CONTROL tokens forward under the
Task-3 throttle. Mode is unforgeable (in the signature) and unbypassable
(all other viewer->agent payloads hit the catch-all and are never forwarded).
A low-privilege viewer-role user can now at most watch, never control. New
ViewerAccess enum (view_only|control) on ViewerClaims; 3 unit tests.
Audit CRITICAL #1 now fully closed (mechanism in Task 3 + this authz strength).
Not cargo-check-verified locally (no toolchain) - the push triggers CI
(clippy -D warnings + build + test) which is the verification gate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SPEC-002 Phase 1 Task 3 (specs/v2-secure-session-core), code-reviewed APPROVED.
- viewer_ws_handler: verify the session-scoped VIEWER token (validate_viewer_token
sig+exp+purpose) + token_blacklist.is_revoked + session_id claim == requested
session, before upgrade. Raw login JWTs no longer accepted on the viewer plane
(closes audit CRITICAL #2; closes the *mechanism* of CRITICAL #1).
- mint_viewer_token: authz gate is_admin() || has_permission("view") -> 403.
- Agent identity binding: validate_agent_api_key returns AgentKeyAuth; a cak_-
verified agent rebinds to the key's machine identity (fails closed if
unresolvable), so a key for machine X cannot seize machine Y's session slot.
- Frame caps on both WS upgrades (agent 4 MiB, viewer 64 KiB) - closes WS-OOM HIGH.
- Viewer->agent input throttle (200 ev/s token bucket, bounded try_send) - closes
input-injection MEDIUM.
- Startup managed-session reconcile clarified.
KNOWN FOLLOW-UPS (tracked todos): (1) authz STRENGTH - the "view" permission is
held by every default role incl. viewer, and a viewer token grants input control,
so the gate should be "control" or a VIEW_ONLY/CONTROL token split; CRITICAL #1 is
mechanism-closed, strength pending decision. (2) revoke minted viewer tokens on
logout (currently bounded only by 5-min TTL). Not cargo-check-verified (no toolchain
on the authoring host).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SPEC-002 Phase 1 Task 2 (specs/v2-secure-session-core), code-reviewed APPROVED.
- DELETE the JWT-as-agent-key branch in relay validate_agent_api_key (audit
CRITICAL): agent auth now = per-agent cak_ key (SHA-256 -> connect_agent_keys,
revoked filtered) OR support code OR deprecated shared AGENT_API_KEY (warned).
A user JWT can no longer authenticate an agent.
- auth/agent_keys.rs: cak_ gen (OsRng 256-bit) + SHA-256 hash + verify.
- auth/jwt.rs: ViewerClaims + create/validate_viewer_token (5-min TTL,
purpose=viewer, session_id+tenant_id claims; non-interchangeable with login).
- Admin key issuance: POST/GET/DELETE /api/machines/:agent_id/keys.
- POST /api/sessions/:id/viewer-token mints a session-bound short-lived token.
- Migration 005: organization/site/tags on connect_machines (fixes the silent
update_machine_metadata write, coord todo faf39fe0).
NOTE: viewer-token minting is gated by AuthenticatedUser only; the AUTHORIZATION
check (admin/permission gate) that closes audit CRITICAL #1 lands in Task 3 (the
viewer WS verification). The viewer WS path (relay/mod.rs:285) is untouched here.
Not cargo-check-verified (no toolchain on the authoring host) - self-reviewed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Flip both CI gates from informational to hard-fail (SPEC-001 quality gates):
- clippy: `-- -D warnings` on the server crate. Cleared the debt via clippy --fix
(unused imports/style), targeted #[allow(dead_code)] on native-remote-control
future API, and #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] on 3 protocol-mirroring fns.
- cargo audit: hard-fail with documented per-ID --ignore flags (rsa RUSTSEC-2023-0071
unfixable/unreachable in active tree; gtk-rs + glib Linux-only tray backend not
compiled into the Windows agent; proc-macro-error build-time). New advisories fail.
- Move [profile.release] to the workspace root (it was silently ignored in the server
member), activating lto/codegen-units/strip.
No behavioral changes. Reviewed and gates verified passing on the build host.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
jsign 7.1 signs guruconnect.exe successfully via Azure Trusted Signing, but the separate
verify step called `jsign --info` (not a real jsign subcommand) and wrongly failed the job.
jsign's non-zero exit under `set -euo pipefail` already gates signing fail-closed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
jsign 6.0 lacks the TRUSTEDSIGNING keystore type (only AZUREKEYVAULT); Azure Trusted
Signing support requires jsign >= 7.0. 7.1 matches /usr/share/jsign on the build host.
Fixes the release sign-and-publish step.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Windows agent jobs (build-and-test + release): set PROTOC env + add protoc to PATH
(prost-build needs it; the runner did not inherit the machine env), and fix the artifact
path to the workspace-root target/ (Cargo workspace, not agent/target/).
- Commit root Cargo.lock (was missing) -> fixes `cargo audit` (Couldn't load Cargo.lock) and
makes builds reproducible.
- Security audit is now a single workspace-root `cargo audit`, informational (warn-only) like
clippy; re-tighten in the GC re-spec.
- Remove test.yml: redundant with build-and-test and broken (`no library targets` — server is
a binary crate).
Native MSVC agent build verified on the Pluto runner (4m20s, clean compile).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Allow manual re-runs of the CI gate without a dummy commit (useful while
provisioning the Pluto windows-msvc runner). Also re-triggers the run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The build-agent job (build-and-test.yml) and a new build-agent-windows job (release.yml)
now run on the windows-msvc Gitea Actions runner on Pluto, building native
x86_64-pc-windows-msvc with crt-static. release.yml hands the unsigned guruconnect.exe to
the Linux job, which signs it with Azure Trusted Signing (jsign). Removes the fragile
mingw/GNU cross-compile. Reviewed by Code Review Agent (approve-with-nits).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The pre-spec server has ~65 clippy lints (no compile errors), mostly dead-code
for API the native-remote-control integration will wire. Keep clippy running for
visibility but stop gating on it; fmt stays strict. Re-tighten to -D warnings
during the GC re-spec.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
.cargo/config.toml defaults to x86_64-pc-windows-msvc for local Windows dev,
which made the CI clippy/test steps (no explicit --target) try to compile for
an uninstalled cross target (E0463 can't find crate for core). Set
CARGO_BUILD_TARGET=x86_64-unknown-linux-gnu for the build-server job.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
First run of the build-and-test CI gate (cargo fmt --all -- --check) surfaced
pre-existing formatting drift across the agent and server crates. Apply rustfmt
across the workspace so the codebase meets its own CI gate. Pure formatting; no
logic changes.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Release builds (auto-versioning + Azure Trusted Signing + Gitea release) no longer
run on every push to main; trigger deliberately via workflow_dispatch. build-and-test.yml
remains the automatic PR/push CI gate.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Brings azcomputerguru/guru-connect up to the authoritative working copy that
had been maintained in the claudetools monorepo: Phase 1 security and
infrastructure (middleware, metrics, utils, token blacklist, deployment
scripts, security audits) plus the native-remote-control integration spec.
Preserves the repo .gitignore, .cargo, and server/static/downloads.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Added organization, site, tags columns to connect_machines table
- Agent now sends org/site/tags from embedded config in AgentStatus
- Server stores org/site/tags metadata in database
- Enables grouping machines by client/site/tag in dashboard
Previously, any installation with the protocol handler registered
would default to running as an agent. This caused admin/technician
machines (viewer-only) to appear in the sessions list.
Changes:
- Add Config::has_agent_config() to check for explicit agent config
- Only run as agent when: explicit 'agent' command, support code
provided, OR agent config file exists
- Viewer-only installs (protocol handler but no config) now exit
silently when launched without arguments
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Features:
- Agent checks for updates periodically (hourly) during idle
- Admin can trigger immediate updates via dashboard "Update Agent" button
- Silent updates with in-place binary replacement (no reboot required)
- SHA-256 checksum verification before installation
- Semantic version comparison
Server changes:
- New releases table for tracking available versions
- GET /api/version endpoint for agent polling (unauthenticated)
- POST /api/machines/:id/update endpoint for admin push updates
- Release management API (/api/releases CRUD)
- Track agent_version in machine status
Agent changes:
- New update.rs module with download/verify/install/restart logic
- Handle ADMIN_UPDATE WebSocket command for push updates
- --post-update flag for cleanup after successful update
- Periodic update check in idle loop (persistent agents only)
- agent_version included in AgentStatus messages
Dashboard changes:
- Version display in machine detail panel
- "Update Agent" button for each connected machine
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Documents architecture, design constraints, security rules, coding
standards, and deployment procedures for GuruConnect.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add git hash (short and full), branch, commit date
- Add build timestamp and dirty/clean state
- Add build profile (debug/release) and target triple
- New `version-info` command shows all build details
- `--version` now shows version-hash format (e.g., 0.1.0-4614df04)
- Startup logs now include version hash and build info
Example output:
GuruConnect v0.1.0
Git: 4614df04 (clean)
Branch: main
Commit: 2025-12-30 06:30:28 -0700
Built: 2025-12-30 15:25:20 UTC
Profile: release
Target: x86_64-pc-windows-msvc
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- REST API: All session/code/machine endpoints now require AuthenticatedUser
- Viewer WebSocket: Requires JWT token in query params (token=...)
- Agent WebSocket: Requires either valid support code OR API key
- Dashboard: Passes JWT token when connecting to viewer WS
- Native viewer: Passes token in protocol URL and WebSocket connection
- Added AGENT_API_KEY env var support for persistent agents
- Added get_status() to SupportCodeManager for auth validation
This fixes the security vulnerability where unauthenticated agents
could connect and appear in the dashboard without any credentials.
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Add AdminCommand message to protobuf (uninstall, restart, update)
- Add DELETE /api/machines/:agent_id endpoint with options:
- ?uninstall=true - send uninstall command to online agent
- ?export=true - return session history before deletion
- Add GET /api/machines/:agent_id/history endpoint for history export
- Add GET /api/machines endpoint to list all machines
- Handle AdminCommand in agent session handler
- Handle ADMIN_UNINSTALL error in agent main loop to trigger uninstall
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- New viewer crate for Windows native remote desktop viewing
- Implements WH_KEYBOARD_LL hook for Win key, Alt+Tab capture
- WebSocket client for server communication
- softbuffer rendering for frame display
- Zstd decompression for compressed frames
- Mouse and keyboard input forwarding
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- Use raw FFI for named pipe operations instead of windows crate APIs
- Add Win32_System_IO feature to Cargo.toml
- Define pipe constants manually to avoid missing exports
🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
